

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Wednesday, October 26, 1983

The House met at 11 a.m.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

With the fires of conflict in our world, we pray, O Divine Creator, that Your still small voice will be heard amid and above the clamor. May Your word of justice and reconciliation, of understanding and tolerance, encourage us to seek the paths of peace. As all people have been created by Your will, so teach us to live as one people. Putting aside hatred and suspicion, and putting on the cloak of righteousness, let us fight the good fight for concord and goodwill, seeking Your peace that passes human understanding. Bless all those people, O God, who seek to do the right even in an uncertain world, that together we will do those things that honor You and bring confidence and hope to all. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate having proceeded to reconsider the bill (H.R. 1062) entitled "An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey, without consideration, certain lands in Lane County, Oreg.," returned by the President of the United States with his objections, to the House, in which it originated, and passed by the House on reconsideration of the same.

The message also announced that the said bill was passed, two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative.

U.S. INVASION OF GRENADA

(Mr. EDGAR asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Speaker, in light of the situation that we are now facing in Grenada and the death and destruction that has taken place in Lebanon, I think it is appropriate for the House to put off its discussion and debate on the defense appropriation bill until we can reflect more carefully on the events of these last few days.

President Dwight David Eisenhower said on April 16, 1953:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone, it is spending the sweat of its labors and the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

I believe that in order to secure a positive future for our children we ought to reflect carefully on the actions of the administration yesterday in Grenada.

I think those troops ought to be removed.

There were no clear, direct threats to U.S. medical students or other American citizens living in Grenada. There was no request for assistance from officials of the St. George's Medical School, which many Americans attend. There was no input into the decision from the people of Grenada. The President failed to adequately consult Congress in planning and executing the invasion. President Reagan's motives in ordering the invasion were honest, but I believe that his reasons were shallow.

The Secretary of State spoke yesterday of the "atmosphere of violence" in Grenada and the "vacuum" of power there. However, these conditions exist in many other nations—we have not invaded them. Many other countries have experienced a bloody coup d'etat—we have not invaded them. Other nations or groups of nations have asked us for military assistance—we have almost never responded by supplying troops to overthrow the existing government. There are no special conditions which separate this case from many others where we have not found military force to be the answer. Are we to send in our marines and Rangers every time there is an international disturbance? Are we to adopt the interventionist policies of the Soviet Union, which we have criticized so frequently?

One of my major objections to this action regards its timing. This ill-advised adventure shifts our attention away from the serious situation facing us in Lebanon. Our primary concern now should be the safety of our marines in Beirut; our attention should be on securing peace in Lebanon, rather than on possibly illegal military adventures in the Caribbean.

The U.S. Government certainly should support the establishment of a democratic government in Grenada, but there are numerous peaceful ways to achieve this goal. Democracy is a

fragile flower which must grow. It cannot be imposed by military means, no matter how much we might wish it.

Mr. Speaker, let us pull the Defense bill until we can think more clearly about these important issues.

A JOINT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BIPARTISAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT REDUCTION

(Mr. AuCOIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Speaker, recently the national columnist David Broder stated that if we faced an international crisis with the potential to inflict as much damage on the United States as do \$200 billion Federal deficits that there would be an immediate, effective, bipartisan response to that danger.

Unfortunately we have seen no adequate response, frankly, from either political party.

Mr. Speaker, without such a response, neither the conservative agenda for capital formation nor the liberal agenda for helping the needy will be possible because we will be allowing debt service in our budget to reach the No. 1 or No. 2 item in that budget. That is why my colleague from Ohio, Mr. WYLIE, and I, along with 12 Republicans and Democrats, have introduced a joint resolution calling for the establishment of a bipartisan National Commission on Federal Budget Deficit Reductions.

The proposal has won the support of the National Home Builders Association who agree that this may be the only way we can achieve a face-saving way to break the ideological hangups that seem to beset both political parties.

It may be the only way to deal with entitlements, tax loopholes, and excessive military spending all at once, so that there is the certainty of equality of sacrifice in order to get this deficit under control.

I urge my colleagues to support the resolution. We are gaining momentum. With their help I believe such a commission is possible.

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

THE UNITED STATES RISKS BECOMING SCAPEGOAT FOR GRENADA

(Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, the invasion of the tiny island of Grenada is illegal, immoral, and a wasteful expenditure of resources and human lives. It is imperative that the Congress exercise its constitutional powers to restore sanity to our foreign policy. We must reject this new policy which implies that the United States is responsible for maintaining democratic institutions in all of the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

I sincerely hope that this administration is not planning to invade Haiti where dictators have murdered, tortured, and denied basic human rights to its citizens for decades. My pleas to this administration is that it not invade the nation of Chile where armed thugs invaded the presidential palace and murdered the constitutionally elected head of government, Salvador Allende. Today Chile still has not restored its democratic institutions.

In Grenada, the murder of Maurice Bishop and his cabinet was an outrageous atrocity. The new military government was a scandal. Overnight Grenada became a political tragedy. The only worse thing that could have happened is this attempt to solve the internal problems of Grenada by the violence of military intervention and invasion. The United States will now become the scapegoat. Within a few days the poor and unemployed will be blaming the United States for their condition. Throughout the Caribbean the next generation will forget the facts and only anger and bitterness will shape their attitudes and governmental policies with respect to the United States.

Before more harm is done, within the next 48 hours, let us evacuate all Americans and withdraw from Grenada. Let the people of Grenada work out their destiny. In the final analysis these internal problems can only be solved by the people of Grenada themselves.

THE SUPREME SACRIFICE

(Mr. DURBIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, for several anxious days I have been keeping in close touch with a family in my district who have a young marine in Lebanon. They are waiting for word on that young man's safety. It is one thing to watch worried and grieving parents on television from all across the United States and quite another to

share with them on a day-to-day basis their feelings.

I hear those in this Chamber, Mr. Speaker, who support the President say, "Well, if we are a great American power we have got to be willing to act like one."

What they are saying is if we believe in a foreign policy we must be prepared to sacrifice the lives of our sons and brothers and fathers and husbands.

I have sat through what they call a secret briefing with Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz. I have listened for that foreign policy, that impetus that would lead me to ask my son to serve in Lebanon. I must tell you quite candidly I have not heard it because, ladies and gentlemen of the House, 1,900 of the bravest marines in the world cannot contain a religious civil war that has raged for decades; 1,900 of the finest American marines cannot contain 60,000 Syrian troops, and 1,900 marines, in the words of the Marine Commandant, cannot even be protected in Beirut from the attack of the fanatic in an area of the world that is teeming with fanatics.

□ 1110

Mr. President, if you cannot take your case for Lebanon to the American people, then for God's sake, bring the marines home.

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TO HAVE HEARINGS ON SECURITY OF MARINE BASE IN LEBANON

(Mr. HERTEL of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HERTEL of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the House Armed Services Committee, in closed session, was able to ask questions about the security of the Marine base in Beirut.

The answers were not adequate. And yesterday I requested that we have a full hearing on the security of the Marine base in Beirut.

We have in today's paper the Marine Commandant, Gen. Paul X. Kelley, saying that he was totally satisfied. We have many questions to ask.

The chairman has said that we will meet next Tuesday for a full hearing and we will report to this Congress.

A FOREIGN POLICY OF NO POLICY

(Ms. FERRARO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Ms. FERRARO. Mr. Speaker, the American people have been absolutely stunned by the events of the last few days. We woke up on Sunday morning to learn that an untold number of U.S.

marines—and the count now stands at 216—had been killed by a bombing attack on their barracks in Beirut.

Before we could recover from that shock, we learned that more marines had invaded Grenada. More death, more war, more grief-stricken families.

These new tragedies have obscured the foreign crisis that had already troubled the American people in Central America. The overriding question now is: Do we have any foreign policy guiding us, or are we just lurching from disaster to disaster, from military intervention to military intervention?

We can survive with a questionable economic policy, we can survive with a debateable energy policy, we can even survive with an undefined trade policy; but we cannot survive with a foreign policy of no policy.

ADMINISTRATION IS DESTROYING CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATES

(Mr. WEISS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Speaker, the Reagan administration's invasion of the small island nation of Grenada is immoral, illegal, and unconstitutional.

What it does substantively is to demean the reputation and the traditions of the United States. It tends to destroy the distinctions which exist between our international behavior and that of the Soviet Union.

There is no way of distinguishing what we are doing in Grenada and what they have done in Afghanistan.

What is worse is that the Reagan administration has quite clearly decided to undercut the Constitution of the United States. This is not just a matter of ignoring the War Powers Resolution. That legislation applies when American military personnel are placed in a situation where hostilities exist—where people are shooting at one another—or where there is an imminent likelihood that hostilities will erupt.

In this instance, we are creating the hostilities ourselves by undertaking an unprovoked military invasion of a sovereign nation. That is a deliberate act of war and requires approval in advance by the Congress of the United States.

This administration is intent, not only in undercutting the prestige and honor of the United States, but in destroying the very constitutional framework of our Government. In ordering the invasion of Grenada, Ronald Reagan has adopted the tactic of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as the new American standard of behavior. The Congress of the United States

cannot allow this perversion of our system to go unchallenged.

LET'S CALL THE WHOLE THING OFF

(Mr. SHANNON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SHANNON. Mr. Speaker, some 40 years ago, George Gershwin popularized a little ditty that went like this:

You like po-ta-to and I like po-tah-to,
You like to-ma-to, and I like to-mah-to,
Po-ta-to, po-tah-to, To-ma-to, to-mah-to!
Let's call the whole thing off!

At about the same time that Mr. Gershwin was writing his tune, Mr. Reagan was starring in the kind of movies that recent incidents in Grenada cannot help but remind one of. Think about it for a moment—a small Caribbean island, a band of bearded local militia, a lot of beautiful and confused residents, and throw in a few angry tourists for comic relief. Unfortunately, this is not a grade B movie, it is not even a very good script—two American marines have already lost their lives.

But if that is the way Mr. Reagan persists in looking at these issues, maybe he will listen to a little advice from Mr. Gershwin. If Gershwin were alive today, perhaps he would consider this rewrite:

You like po-ta-to, I like po-tah-to,
You say Gre-na-da, I say Gre-nah-da,
Po-ta-to, po-tah-to, Gre-na-da, Gre-nah-da,
Let's call the whole thing off.

WE WERE THERE WHEN NEEDED

(Mr. CORRADA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CORRADA. Mr. Speaker, I regret to disagree with many of my Democratic colleagues who preceded me here.

I support the action taken by the United States in conjunction with the Governments of Jamaica, Barbados, and the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

I live in Puerto Rico and we are very close to Grenada. And although our normal reaction would be one of non-intervention on the internal affairs of a foreign country, we are not dealing with an established Government. They do not follow the basic rules of civility and order. This action was necessary to protect the lives of 1,000 U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals, but also to protect the life and well-being of the citizens of Grenada.

I hope that civility and order will be restored there by some temporary government, followed by free elections as soon as possible, so that the people of Grenada are able to choose their own

government and not be ruled by a band of thugs.

I think that we could not have neglected to respond to those friends, democratic governments like Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica, who said: "We cannot take over or do anything concerning these thugs. We need your help."

And we were there at the time that it was needed.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AND TRANSPORTATION OF COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO SIT TODAY DURING 5-MINUTE RULE

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the Committee on Government Operations be permitted to meet today to receive testimony while the House is operating under the 5-minute rule.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Illinois?

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, could the gentlewoman tell me, has this been checked with the minority?

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Illinois.

Mrs. COLLINS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It has been checked with the minority and they have agreed to it, both the ranking member and the ranking member on the subcommittee.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

ANSWERS ARE ASKED FOR

(Mr. LEHMAN of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEHMAN of California. Mr. Speaker, now that American soldiers are engaged in a war on a tiny island in the Caribbean, some important questions need to be answered.

First, what steps did the administration take, short of an invasion, to see that American interests were protected? Is armed intervention now our first alternative? What diplomatic options were pursued?

Second, what evidence is there, other than pure speculation, to support the contention that American lives were endangered? Surely, it is just as plausible to speculate that creating a state of war on the island

would also put our citizens in jeopardy.

Third, what will be our posture if the elements we seek to root out take to the hills and engage in a guerrilla struggle against the authorities we have left in their place? Will we take to the hills in pursuit and continue our mission indefinitely or will we leave it to a few hundred soldiers from our Caribbean allies to do the job?

Fourth, if this is a joint venture in concert with our allies, why are we providing 85 percent of the manpower and why did our allies wait 5 hours to land on beaches that our soldiers had already secured?

Fifth, is it our policy to enforce treaties around the world that we are not a party to? Does this policy supercede our obligation, to the charter of the Organization of American States?

Mr. President, we ask for the answers.

AN ECONOMICS TEST

(Mr. PARRIS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Speaker, many of the problems of a free international economy have been caused by the rapidity of change in our domestic economy. For instance, the percentage of our citizens employed in agricultural pursuits in this Nation has decreased from 50 to 3 percent in 50 years.

Earlier this morning our colleague from Connecticut, Mr. McKINNEY and I jotted down some suggestions that would guarantee that our colleagues would have flunked a test on simple economics in the 1950's.

At that time if you said that you could experience recession and higher inflation at the same time, or if you believed that the value of gold would go to \$500 and not destroy world order, or that real inflation would be 3 percent and the prime rate at the same time would be 10½, or that the price of energy could triple and the world economy would not collapse, or if you thought the United States would become an isolationist island economy rather than Japan, you would have been severely questioned. Now, all of these statements are fundamentally true on this date in October 1983.

□ 1120

But if you had seriously forecast them 30 years ago, you would surely have flunked economics I-A.

NATIONAL COMMISSION OF FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICIT REDUCTIONS

(Mr. MORRISON of Washington asked and was given permission to ad-

dress the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORRISON of Washington. Mr. Speaker, with each day that passes, the prospects for a stable, and sustained, economic recovery grow dimmer and dimmer. We can continue to pay lip service about the creators, and the problems, and the solutions, and the impacts, of the Federal budget deficit—lip service from now until election day and we will have done two things—we will have allowed the already staggering deficit to mushroom out of control, and we will have convinced the American people that Congress is incapable of addressing the one element of our economy which negatively impacts each and every one of us.

It is clear that a consensus for an effective plan to tackle the deficit will not emerge because no one wants to bite the bullet. We can help build a consensus, however, if we set about to form an objective group that will forge a program to control and substantially reduce the deficit. I urge my colleagues to support efforts, as I am, to establish a bipartisan National Commission on Federal Budget Deficit Reductions.

By bringing together both parties, and representatives of the public and private sectors, and credit-sensitive industries, we will have the best chance of achieving a reasonable compromise with which we can all live. We cannot talk around this issue any longer, Mr. Speaker. Such a bipartisan effort must be established immediately. The alternatives are unthinkable.

THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND PROJECTED DEFICITS

(Mr. BILIRAKIS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, in a time of international crisis, one can easily overlook the continuing domestic crisis we face with regard to the Federal budget and projected deficits.

Quite simply, deficits threaten our recovery, our economy, and our country. They threaten our security and our way of life as surely as any foreign entanglement—taking their toll day by day and dollar by dollar. They threaten our dreams and aspirations, denying the young and the elderly the chance to own homes and support families.

I think it is time for Congress to lay aside its political differences and explore how we can resolve, together, our national economic problems. Therefore, I believe a bipartisan National Commission to review all options on the deficit is necessary.

We must seek a broad consensus on deficit reductions, or be faced with divisive turmoil in our free market.

We must agree on a balanced-budgetary plan, or be willing to let growing deficits decide our future for us.

We in Congress must act, or be negligent in our duties. We must try and we must succeed.

GRENADA

(Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, President Reagan is right in Grenada.

Let us remember what was happening in Grenada. The Communist government of Prime Minister Bishop that had come to power by force had itself a week ago been overthrown and assassinated by even more violent Communists who sought to insure that Grenada would become a stronger Cuban and Soviet military base. Those who then came to power did not consider themselves to be a government. Why should we recognize them as such?

The people of Grenada had no say in these series of armed robberies of their country; and so our purpose, along with our regional allies, is to return to Grenada to the Grenadians and to eliminate this new Communist threat to the region.

Some of our colleagues in the other body equate this attempt to liberate Grenada with the Soviets' attempt to subjugate Afghanistan. If the Soviets can overthrow their own puppet government in Afghanistan because it was not ruthless enough, must they be allowed to overthrow Grenada as well?

They seem to be insisting that we uphold the right of self-determination only for the blood-loving Communist gangsters.

We have heard a lot here about whether our action in joining with all the countries in that region to remove those who stole Grenada constitutes a violation of some international principle. Well, Mr. Speaker, it is clear that one doctrine was violated: The Brezhnev doctrine has been violated and no longer applies to the Caribbean.

HE IS DOING HIS JOB

(Mr. DREIER of California asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, I have listened for 3 years now to some of my colleagues from the other side of the aisle criticize the President for not having a foreign policy, for drifting from one situation to another, for reacting instead of planning. Now I sit here and listen to them criticize him for doing what they have urged him to do all along.

I would remind everyone that almost 4 years ago another President sat in the White House. He was caught off guard by a bloody revolutionary government that took 54 Americans hostage and held them for 444 days. America was humiliated. The most powerful Nation on Earth and we were helpless.

I would now like to point out that President Reagan faced the same situation except that there were 1,000 Americans in Grenada. Our Marines have gone in. They have secured the safety of the Americans and they have laid the groundwork for a democratic government on that tiny island.

I suppose that if the President is going to be criticized, it might just as well be for doing his job—protecting American lives, promoting democracy and showing the world that we are in firm control of our foreign policy and not reacting to world events after they happen. It would be nice, however, if Congress backed him in doing this.

PRAYER IN THE CLASSROOM

(Mr. KINDNESS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KINDNESS. Mr. Speaker, 20 years have passed since the U.S. Supreme Court began the series of decisions which have gradually informed the Nation that the Court believes that the framers of our Republic intended to prohibit voluntary group prayer in public schools.

Over these years, an overwhelming majority of the American people have consistently expressed their support for restoring prayer in the classroom; but the Congress has failed to respond.

The formulation of public policy on such a vital issue is the responsibility of elected Representatives, not the privilege of the judiciary. In recent years, measures to restore prayer in our Nation's schools have been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary where they languish without the benefit of a hearing.

Accordingly, I have filed a motion with the Clerk of the House to discharge the Judiciary Committee from consideration of House Joint Resolution 100, proposing a constitutional amendment to allow voluntary "individual or group prayer in public schools or other public institutions," and urge my colleagues to join in bringing this issue out of the cellar of the judiciary and into the full light of the House floor for consideration, where it belongs.

Please visit the Clerk's desk and join in signing the petition to discharge House Joint Resolution 100.

MR. PRESIDENT, YOU DID THE RIGHT THING, AND YOU DID IT WELL

(Mr. LIVINGSTON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, well, the nay sayers are back at work—those for whom President Reagan and the U.S. Government can do no good. Yes, the critics are already attacking the mission in Grenada, calling the President “trigger happy,” and condemning him for his attack on the peaceful and well intentioned leaders of that Caribbean island.

Well, Mr. Speaker, those leaders were murderers and terrorists—prompted by the “peaceful” People’s Republics of Cuba and the Soviet Union. Despite the disinformation which is hard at work in this country today, they threatened the lives of American citizens and the security of neighboring Caribbean islands, and yes, ultimately, all free people in the Western World.

But, of course, we all know what the nay sayers would be saying if several hundred of our American citizens had been killed before we acted, they would have criticized him for being insufficiently decisive.

So Mr. President, I congratulate you. You did the right thing, and you did it well.

AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN CUBAN CRIMINALS

(Mr. McCOLLUM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, we should be proud that our President took action yesterday in Grenada to protect American lives and to restore order there, in the interests of American security. We should be proud of that fact. There are those who are questioning whether or not American lives were really in danger down there. How many lives have to be lost? How many Americans have to be taken hostage? How much of a threat do we have to have before we act?

I submit to the Members that we had plenty of concern yesterday and over the weekend, and long before that, about the ruthless and blood-thirsty leadership that has evolved in Grenada to justify taking those actions.

Now we have an opportunity to take some additional action. It is my understanding there are about 600, or so Cubans that we are about to return to Cuba from the island of Grenada. We have over 1,000 Cuban criminals from the Mariel boat lift still in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. I submit that this is the perfect opportunity for the President to ship back those 1,000

Cuban criminals from the Atlanta Penitentiary, along with the ones from Grenada, to Cuba now. I have a letter I will be circulating among my colleagues to urge the President to do precisely that. I hope the Members will join me and sign this letter to support that initiative.

STATESMANSHIP OF THE SPEAKER

(Mr. WALKER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I am rather consistently critical of many of the policies you advocated, but you should be commended for your statesmanship yesterday regarding our intervention in Grenada.

When our fighting men are on active duty in the field, they have the right to expect support from Congress. The sacrifices they are making, their courage and heroism, merit our gratitude and admiration.

Unfortunately, no sooner did news of our liberation in Grenada come out than some Members scampered to the well of the House or to the recording studio to denounce that action. From the nature of the circumstances, they could not have possibly had all the facts as the intervention had only begun hours before and the briefing from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense was to take place late in the afternoon.

Some did not need the facts, because as always, their aim was political partisanship, and as is becoming increasingly frequent, it was being advanced by attacking the actions of the President taken in the interest of national security.

Statesmanship means rising above petty partisan interests when the national interest is really at stake. You proved yourself capable of statesmanship yesterday. Too bad that some of our colleagues did not. Too bad some of them are here today compounding their mistake by siding with Communist thugs as they criticize our President’s actions against those thugs.

THANKS FOR LIBERATING GRENADIANS

(Mr. SOLOMON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my thanks and the thanks of my constituents to the magnificent American fighting men who are now engaged in rescuing our countrymen who were endangered by the Marxist reign of terror in Grenada, and who are also engaged in liberating the Grenadian people. They deserve the thanks of all Americans.

The response of many on the other side of the aisle to this heroic action is instructive. They are ready to believe every peace offer made by the Sandinistas and Castro, but they reflexively disbelieve every statement of their own Government. They vote to cut off funding for covert action in Nicaragua, but they speak against our open, overt action in Grenada. They talk about their devotion to human rights, but they speak against this military intervention to liberate the Grenadian people from Marxist tyranny.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that we should support the President in this action to secure the safety of the Americans on the island, and to help our allies maintain their free, pluralistic governments.

A CASTRO, SANDINISTA, OR KHOMEINI ON GRENADA?

(Mr. SAWYER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SAWYER. Mr. Speaker, I have sat and listened yesterday and today to many people who have been referred to as “naysayers” criticizing and condemning our action in Grenada. It just reminds me of the same people or their predecessors in thinking that give us a Castro by condemning Batista and would have decried any interference, who gave us the Sandinistas instead of Somoza, and who blessed us with Khomeini instead of the Shah of Iran. If we had sat and let Grenada go the way that they have urged we do before, we would probably be blessed with similar events on that island.

I want to congratulate the President for acting effectively when the iron was hot and the time was right before we had an established government and a real problem on our hands.

I also want to congratulate the Speaker, Mr. O’NEILL, for his statesmanship yesterday which, unfortunately, was not reflected by many members of his party on his side of the aisle.

GRENADA: THE WISDOM OF INTERVENTIONISM

(Mr. LEACH of Iowa asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, the wisdom of our recent actions in the Caribbean remains in doubt.

I have personal qualms that the administration may be too inclined to play the role of policeman for the world and have particular concern that American troops may already be too thinly spread. To be involved simultaneously in such disparate parts of the globe as El Salvador, Lebanon,

South Korea, and now Grenada is to run the risk of overextension.

In a political context, the U.S. intervention in Grenada may turn out to be an extremely popular electoral issue next year. But I think it important that Congress ask today if the administration has fully thought through all of the ramifications of the course on which it has embarked.

It is, after all, far easier to capture a capital than govern the countryside. As Maurice Bishop, whose rule we so recently deplored, but whose martyrdom we now use as justification for our intervention, warned in a speech 2 years ago: It may be easy for foreign troops to land in Grenada, but it could prove very difficult for them to leave. There is simply no assurance that stiff resistance and/or a continuing guerrilla strategy against interventionist forces will not be the order of the day.

While it is conjectural whether American lives, particularly those associated with the medical school, were in any real jeopardy prior to the intervention, it is clear that the school is now vulnerable to a terrorist act of retribution.

The principle of intervening in the domestic affairs of other states is always troubling. It is particularly so in this instance given the fact that Grenada is a member of the British Commonwealth and that our most loyal ally, Great Britain, strongly objected to our decision. Technically, in fact, U.S. forces are now engaged in combat with troops which under other circumstances might be serving Her Majesty the Queen.

We must recognize that events of this nature have ramifications in other parts of the Third World as well as in the context of East-West relations. The full slate is yet to be written on the impact of this intervention to our general foreign policy goals. In any case, it is clear we have reconstituted gunboat diplomacy in an era when the efficacy as well as the morality of great power interventions have come increasingly into question.

In Lebanon, at issue has been the diplomatic judgment to insert troops and the military judgment on how best to deploy them. Both judgments are under critical scrutiny today. Likewise, in Grenada, a diplomatic judgment has been made to intervene and a military one has taken place to do so with limited force. Questions remain, however, whether that force, which represents numerically less than the island's own armed forces, is adequate to insure a quick resolution of the conflict and whether sufficient policy planning has gone into establishing the framework by which Grenadan society will evolve after military order is established. Who, for instance, will become interim authorities? How will they hold elections? In what time frame? What constitutional and legal

sanctions will they and their successors operate under? The answers to these questions are far from clear.

It is said that an individual's character is best revealed by what he or she does when no one is watching. Analogously, a nation's character is perhaps best revealed when it has overwhelming power in relation to an adversary. Whether it acts with impunity or in such a manner as to expand respect for law and order is the true test. The events of the next several weeks will reveal much about the character as well as judgment of current American political leadership.

Only time can provide a definitive assessment of our policy in Grenada. If a legitimate democratic government can be established capable of governing in peace with its neighbors, the intervention may not be in vain. But unfortunately, the precedent for our actions and their dubious viability under international law may temper any short-term success which may occur. The setting up of a less belligerent, more responsible government on this tiny island republic is a noble goal. But if it is accomplished without regard to the obligations states undertake to international order, the loss could be far greater than the gain.

STATESMANLIKE POSITION OF SPEAKER AND MAJORITY LEADER

(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make two points today.

One, we have our differences with regard to Grenada and we have our differences with regard to Lebanon, but I would like to ask the American people at this very difficult time to first, remember to pray for the President and the leaders of our Government and the leaders of our Congress on both sides for wisdom and guidance and knowledge to do the right thing.

The second thing, Mr. Speaker, I would like to pay personal tribute to you and to the majority leader, the gentleman from Texas, JIM WRIGHT, for a very responsible and I think a statesmanlike position that you have taken.

I know it must be very difficult when many Members on your side who have honest differences do not agree with what you are doing, but I think you have handled yourself exceptionally well and I am very proud to serve in the Congress with Speaker of the House "Tip" O'NEILL and Majority Leader JIM WRIGHT.

IT AIN'T GOING TO HAPPEN

(Mr. YOUNG of Florida asked and was given permission to address the

House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, along the lines of one picture being worth a thousand words, or fact being more persuasive than rhetoric, if the situation in Grenada is what some of our friends on the majority side would like us to believe it is, why is it that the fighting going on there right now is not against Grenadian forces but against Cuban combat troops; not Grenadians but Cubans?

You might wonder how did these Cuban forces get there so quickly. The answer is Mr. Speaker, they have been there for a long time, as they have been in Angola, as they have been in Ethiopia, as they have been in Nicaragua, and so many other places in the world where they do not belong.

We talk about sending messages here in the House all the time, but yesterday we sent a real message to the terrorists of the world, we sent a message to Fidel Castro, and those who would communize the entire Western Hemisphere. We sent them a message yesterday: "It ain't going to happen."

SUPPORT FOR BIPARTISAN DEFICIT REDUCTION COMMISSION

(Mr. TALLON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. TALLON. Mr. Speaker, I join my colleagues in support of the establishment of a bipartisan National Commission on Federal Budget Deficit Reduction. A National Commission offers the best chance for finding solutions to our mounting deficit crisis. If we fail to act now, we will run the risk of ruining our present economic recovery with Government debt, double-digit interest rates, and enormous trade deficits.

The budget deficit for fiscal year 1982 soared to over \$100 billion and the forecasts for the coming years are even more staggering. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that we will run up \$1 trillion in deficits over the next 5 years. This means that the Treasury will be paying around \$200 billion in interest payments each year; 53 percent of America's savings will be absorbed by the Federal Government in subsidizing the deficit. Any extended economic recovery will be inhibited by this draining of the savings pool. There will not be funds available for private sector investments.

This bleak picture makes it imperative that we establish a bipartisan National Commission with the goal of seeking consensus solutions for reducing the budget deficits. Budget deficits are not a Democrat or Republican issue. It cannot be solved by partisan rhetoric and finger pointing. Both par-

ties must share in the blame, in the creation of our present deficits, and working together through this Commission is a necessary first step to solving the problem.

□ 1140

MILITARY FORCE SUBSTITUTES FOR DIPLOMACY IN GRENADA

(Mr. DYMALLY asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, while the Secretary of State was briefing this body on keeping the peace in Lebanon, his colleagues in the Pentagon were in the final stages of planning for the invasion of Grenada.

Once again the Congress of the United States was in on the landing, but not the takeoff. Once again this administration has committed U.S. troops outside our borders—and the Congress was not consulted.

We in the Congress learned through the mass media that some 1,900 troops were sent to Grenada as part of an invading force.

We now discover that the British Government expressed grave concerns about that decision. We now are told that the request for U.S. intervention was not agreed to by all of the Caribbean states.

It is becoming increasingly clear that this administration took the decision first, and asked questions later. This administration chose to use U.S. military force, once again for unclear objectives, once again when other options were available.

This Nation has chosen yet again to substitute war for diplomacy. We in the Congress cannot continue to bury our heads in the sand and allow Americans to continue on so dangerous a course. We have the legislative tools at our disposal—we must use them—before it is too late.

IS AMERICA'S ONLY MISSION "MISSION IMPOSSIBLE"?

(Mrs. BOXER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, this is Wednesday, and we must be in Grenada or Nicaragua or Lebanon or God knows where tomorrow. If we follow the reasoning put forth by many of my colleagues on this side of the aisle, we may well be cheering on American forces in dozens of countries all over the world.

Mr. Speaker, there is a feeling of anxiety sweeping over this country. My constituents are calling me and saying they are afraid to turn on the radio for fear of yet another military involvement.

This administration is using military force instead of foreign policy. It is relying on bullets instead of brains, the brains God gave us. Before we contact one more mother or father and advise them that their 19-year-old son is dead or limbless or blind for reasons these families do not understand, I ask this President and this administration to develop an achievable and responsible foreign policy instead of turning America into a nation whose only mission is "Mission Impossible."

SHOULD THE MARINES STAY IN LEBANON?

(Mr. NICHOLS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Speaker, the American people are sharing a great sense of national mourning over the horrible bombing of our Marine headquarters in Beirut. As a Member of Congress who visited these marines in that headquarters less than 1 month ago, I assure the Members that I feel a great personal loss of my own.

For the past few days now, I have been asking myself, what do we do now? Furthermore, I have asked myself what contribution a force of 1,200 marines can make toward resolving the multitude of problems that are facing people in this turbulent part of the world.

We have put our marines in a defensive position in a nation wracked by civil war and in an area of the world that fights peace as strongly as it fights for war. I believe that ultimately a withdrawal may be our best alternative.

Others have been asking themselves the same questions. Yesterday the *Aniston Star*, an award-winning newspaper in my congressional district, ran as its lead editorial an article entitled "Should the Marines Stay?" This is a thought-provoking article. It is one that I believe is worth sharing with my colleagues, and I submit this editorial for the RECORD.

[From the *Aniston Star*, Oct. 24, 1983]

SHOULD THE MARINES STAY?

If it achieves nothing else, the loss of 165 or so American lives in the terrorist bombing in Lebanon will force a needed reassessment of the U.S. role in Lebanon.

Why are the Marines in Beirut? Should they remain there? If so, for how long? These questions are not answered with simplistic, emotional responses like, "Stop the killing, bring the boys home," or "We can't cut and run," or "Our Marines must fight back and revenge the deaths."

Keeping our Marines in Lebanon, asserting their "right" to be there is not an end in itself. The Marines should remain there only if they are serving an important function.

At present there are 1,200 Marines in Beirut. They are there at the request of the Lebanese government, part of an interna-

tional peacekeeping force consisting of French, Italians and British troops as well as Americans. The French also lost 31 lives in a similar suicide terrorist bombing Sunday.

The international force was sent there to maintain peace in the Beirut area as Syrian and Israeli troops pulled back, to help the Lebanese government maintain order. It was hoped they would be an impartial, stabilizing influence.

It hasn't worked. Fighting has erupted among a number of Lebanese factions vying for control of the divided nation. There has been more, not less, fighting since the international peacekeeping force arrived. The fighting has continued, at a lower level, since the most recent cease-fire agreement.

The Marines, then, are making little contribution towards maintaining the peace—because there is no peace to keep. Because they are Americans, however, they are natural targets. Extremist groups (are they any other kind there?) will continue to attack them by various means. The Marines must be allowed to defend themselves, but how? Against whom? They can hardly wage aggressive combat in a nation they have come to pacify, against civilian or irregular forces that melt back into the urban population.

Should the Marines remain in Beirut? Only if the situation allows the international force to perform its original function. The Lebanese factions are scheduled to meet in Geneva this week to try for some sort of national reconciliation. If this process begins and seems to hold some hope for peace and unity, the Marines should remain and help.

If, however, the meeting doesn't take place, or fails in its purpose, the Marines should come home. They can make no contribution during continued civil war in Lebanon. It is not their job to enforce peace on all factions. At present their dying is serving little purpose.

WHITE HOUSE ACTIONS IN GRENADA AND LEBANON

(Mr. DANIEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Speaker, I have two points to make, if I may.

It seems to this Member that the President should make an announcement to the world that there will be no more Cubas in the Western Hemisphere, and then everyone who has an interest including Members of Congress, can make the determination as to which side they wish to support.

The other point I would like to make is with respect to Lebanon. In that area of the world we are reaping the whirlwind of terror unleashed when Khomeini replaced the Shah of Iran as the head of that country.

Mr. Speaker, I have just talked to the national commander of the American Legion, Mr. Keith Kreul, who just met with the President this morning. He has issued a news release as a result of that meeting. I include that news release in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C., October 26, 1983.—The leader of America's largest veterans organization emerged from a White House briefing on the situation in Grenada and Lebanon this morning talking of strong support for President Reagan's actions. Keith Kreul, Commander of The American Legion, told reporters he found it "appalling that some Americans believe we should cut and run from Lebanon."

Kreul expressed sadness and dismay over the loss of American lives in Lebanon and Grenada but said "we recognize that America's role in the world demands sacrifice in support of our allies and our own interest wherever they may be threatened in the world."

Kreul said Reagan's action in the Caribbean basin region "sends an unmistakable message to Marxist revolutionaries that the Western Hemisphere is not theirs for the taking."

Following his briefing by White House staff members, Kreul spent time on Capitol Hill meeting with Congressional leaders concerning the current world situation.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CASUALTY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE

(Mr. HUBBARD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUBBARD. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply distressed about the inability of the U.S. Department of Defense, overseer of the strongest and most sophisticated military force in the world today, to adequately and expeditiously inform the next of kin about the status of their marine sons who were either injured or killed or are safe after the brutal bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in the early morning hours of October 23 in Beirut, Lebanon.

My offices in Washington and in the First Congressional District of Kentucky have been besieged with frantic phone calls from relatives of marines who were either in Beirut or en route to Lebanon.

This morning at 7:20 a.m. my administrative assistant, Jim Kanouse, a former military officer, received a telephone call from Mr. and Mrs. Charles A. Norfleet, Sr., of Pembroke, Ky. Mr. Norfleet said that their son, Lance Corporal Charles A. Norfleet, Jr., was somewhere in Lebanon, but thus far he had been unable to obtain any information concerning his welfare.

Using his military experience, my administrative assistant was able to obtain limited information and at least inform the parents that their son's unit was not in Beirut at the time of the bombing. However, on this the fourth day after the terrorist attack, Mr. and Mrs. Norfleet are still uncertain about the whereabouts or safety of their son. How many more next of kin are in their same situation?

Mr. Speaker, there must be a better way in this computer age of 1983.

OECS ACTION SUGGESTS "AUNT JEMIMAISM" IN GEOPOLITICS

(Mr. SAVAGE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. SAVAGE. Mr. Speaker, I want this body to know that, along with my colleague, JOHN CONYERS of Michigan, I walked out of the ill-conceived Congressional Black Caucus briefing yesterday, on Grenada, by Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica and chair of the hastily formed aberration called the Organization of East Caribbean States. I walked out because I felt insulted by her deliberate misinterpretation in referring to article 8 of the OECS charter as giving legal authority for the U.S. invasion. That citation only confers the powers to, and I quote: "coordinate the efforts of member states for collective defense and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression * * *." Unquote.

This puppet of our President represents "Aunt Jemimaism" in geopolitics. The total populations of the few nations she claims to represent are only about as many as reside in one of our congressional districts.

Our Nation has no right, legal or moral, to dictate by military might the internal affairs of any sovereign nation. It raises to an international level Reagan's ante-bellum attitude toward blacks in this country, as evidenced in his firing of the more than half of the Civil Rights Commission yesterday.

Further, this gunboat imperialism is an extension of his fraudulent policy of constructive engagement in South Africa.

Contrary to statements of the President, England has declared that he was aware that it does not support the U.S. invasion, and no evidence has been given that any Americans were in danger from the Government of tiny Grenada. Indeed, I do protest the official lies and wrongs of the past few days.

HOUSE LEADERSHIP COMMENDATION FOR ACTION ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

(Mr. SUNDQUIST asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SUNDQUIST. Mr. Speaker, as a Republican who usually has a distinct difference of opinion with the leadership of this body on any number of issues, I think that credit needs to be given where credit is due. I commend the Speaker and the distinguished majority leader for their leadership in pushing for nationwide unity during the past 24 hours as we have witnessed the Marine landing—along with the five free nations in the Caribbean—on the island of Grenada. The Speaker

and the majority leader have put politics aside, and I am grateful for their leadership this week.

I must confess, however, to being dismayed at the reaction of many members of the majority party. As I sat through the closed-door briefing yesterday with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, I was amazed to hear the lamenting and walls of dissent from Members who were sharply critical of our involvement in Grenada. Their criticism of the President was especially disconcerting in light of the time element involved.

The President made this decision after days of consideration and consultation with the nations affected by the events in Grenada, but there I sat, hearing the cries of foul play only hours after the operation began.

I couldn't help but think that had the administration done nothing to protect the lives and security of Americans on Grenada, those same Members of Congress who leveled such harsh criticism would be the same ones who would be assailing the President had he taken no action, and if we had indeed been faced with hostage situation we faced in Iran.

Mr. Speaker, now is the time for unity and bipartisanship. I urge in the strongest terms for those members of the majority to pay heed to their own leadership—and put partisan politics aside as the events in Grenada unfold.

□ 1150

RESERVE JUDGMENT ON PRESIDENT'S DECISION ABOUT GRENADA

(Mr. HUGHES asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Speaker, a lot of us have very sincere, and I think, understandable doubts about the wisdom of our invasion of Grenada. But, I am not prepared to say at this point that the President and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States were wrong in their recent actions.

Two points stand out for me. First, Grenada's military rulers had already demonstrated their capacity for butchery when they executed Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, members of his cabinet, labor leaders and a number of private citizens, including women and children. In fact, their takeover was so bloody that even Fidel Castro denounced it.

Second, the 1,000 or so Americans on the island were not being allowed to leave. Their departure was postponed and postponed and postponed, and like the entire population, they were under

a 24-hour curfew with violators subject to being shot on sight.

Does anyone really doubt that they would have done just that and perhaps more?

In 1979 in Iran we were on notice that Americans could be subject to severe violence and we tried to reason with fanatics diplomatically, fanatics that really did not recognize international norms, basic standards of civilized conduct. That was a foolish mistake and that is what the President has stated that he was trying to avoid. He did not want to repeat the mistake made in Iran.

I do not think we can solve international problems through military action, but on a call such as this the benefit of the doubt, I think, must go to the President for now.

In view of the fact that our Armed Forces are now on the ground committed in combat in Grenada, I think that we should reserve judgment on the decision made by the President and the Organization of Caribbean States and ask for the prayers of all Americans for both our combat forces, for the President, and all the leaders of this great Nation of ours.

LISTEN TO THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED LEADERS OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN

(Mr. DE LUGO asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DE LUGO. Mr. Speaker, I would urge my colleagues, as I did yesterday, to resist all temptations to lump together the situation in Grenada with events in Lebanon and Central America. The only thing these events have in common is their timeframe. They are literally and figuratively worlds apart and have to be viewed in that manner or we will make serious and irrevocable mistakes in judgment.

I am seriously concerned that so many, particularly those in the national media, are lumping these events together and fitting them into convenient stereotypes rather than taking the time to understand the history of the region, and listen to the duly elected leaders of the island nations that make up the eastern Caribbean.

These English speaking islands of the eastern Caribbean form part of a chain running from off the coast of Florida to the coast of Venezuela. But they have nothing in common with Latin America or Central America other than the Caribbean Sea. These island nations have no history of bloody coups which have been a common occurrence in the power struggles that have engulfed Latin and Central America for centuries.

Instead the islands of the eastern Caribbean have a history and a tradition of democratic principles. A bloody

coup, such as occurred in Grenada, is an aberration and an abomination to the people of this region where democracy has been the rule rather than the exception.

How then did we get into the situation that exists in the region today? Again, I say, we must look to the history of these islands for the answer. The history of these islands goes back to Christopher Columbus. All the major powers of Europe fought over these islands. Practically all of the islands of the eastern Caribbean, including Grenada, were colonized at one time or another by Great Britain, and for over 300 years Britain extracted enormous profits from her colonies in the eastern Caribbean. But, by the fifties and sixties of this century, the economic balance shifted, and as worsening conditions in the colonies islands fueled an increasing need for subsidies, and an increasing spirit of nationalism, Britain decided to pull out and cut her colonies loose. Granting independence was a pragmatic economic decision by the British.

Tragically, when Great Britain pulled out she left her former colonies without the means to defend themselves from aggression from within or without. We are seeing the consequences of that tragic mistake today. For last week during the bloody coup in Grenada, when individuals seized power by force and brutally executed the prime minister and members of his cabinet, neither the people of Grenada, nor the people of the neighboring eastern Caribbean islands were able to respond. The problem is that these small independent nations of 70,000 to 100,000 people were left with no capacity to protect themselves from violence, within or without.

I ask you to listen to the democratically elected leaders of the eastern Caribbean. They are the ones who cried out for help.

USE THE CARIBBEAN INITIATIVE PLAN

(Mr. MAZZOLI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, like many Members of the House, I spent virtually all of yesterday at different briefings. As a member of the Intelligence Committee I was briefed by the Central Intelligence Agency. As a Member of the House I was briefed by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Candidly, at none of these briefings was the gentleman from Kentucky advised that the U.S. citizens in Grenada were in any danger at any time prior to the U.S. invasion of that island.

So, there must have been another reason to invade Grenada. That was to change its government.

I think all of us abhor Marxist-Leninist philosophies. We abhor communism and can think of nothing worse by way of a government and we would want to do everything possible to be sure that islands like Grenada are not governed by such people. But, there are other initiatives better than invasions of islands and seeking apparently to change governments that I feel would lead to a better life for the people of the Caribbean.

One of the things which this Chamber did barely a few months ago was to adopt the Caribbean Initiative plan, a tough series of votes for many of us.

I fear that if America is in the posture of being once again the invader, the oppressor, the imperialist in the area of the Caribbean, the United States will lose credibility with people of the region, and the whole Caribbean Basin Initiative plan may itself come apart at the seams. To the gentleman from Kentucky the Caribbean Basin Plan seems to offer a greater possibility for a lasting peace and prosperity in the region than invading Grenada.

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON H.R. 3223, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 3223) making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, and related agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ROEMER). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi? The Chair hears none and, without objection, appoints the following conferees: Messrs. WHITTEN, TRAXLER, McHUGH, NATCHER, AKAKA, WATKINS, HIGHTOWER, SMITH of Iowa, and ALEXANDER, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, and Messrs. ROBINSON, MYERS, ROGERS, and CONTE.

There was no objection.

PERMISSION TO HAVE UNTIL MIDNIGHT TOMORROW TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 3223, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS, 1984

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers may have until midnight tomorrow to file a conference report on the bill (H.R. 3223) making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, and

related agencies programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

PROVIDING FOR UPGRADING OF FOUR POSITIONS ON CAPITOL POLICE

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on House Administration be discharged from further consideration of the resolution (H. Res. 343) providing for upgrading of four positions on the Capitol Police for duty under the House of Representatives, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. RES. 343

Resolved, That (a) there are established four additional positions of sergeant on the Capitol Police for duty under the House of Representatives.

(b) Each appointment to a position under subsection (a) shall be made—

(1) by the Capitol Police Board, with prior approval of the Committee on House Administration; and

(2) without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform the duties of the position.

SEC. 2. Four positions of private on the Capitol Police for duty under the House of Representatives are abolished.

SEC. 3. Until otherwise provided by law, there shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House of Representatives such sums as may be necessary to carry out this resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. MINISH) is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, the Committee on House Administration reported the resolution favorably by unanimous voice vote at its meeting on October 25.

The resolution responds to a request by the Sergeant at Arms that appropriate legislation be passed to create four new positions of sergeant to correct a shortage of sergeants available for field supervision resulting from assignment of four existing sergeants in the field to more specialized duties. Two sergeants were assigned to the drug enforcement branch, one to the bomb squad and one to the criminal investigations divisions.

To offset this cost of \$96,084—4 times \$24,021—the Sergeant at Arms requests to abolish four currently vacant positions of private. This savings of \$73,028—4 times \$18,257—will leave a net cost of \$23,056.

It is my understanding that the four new positions of sergeant would be filled by personnel currently eligible for promotion to the rank of sergeant.

□ 1200

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MINISH. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas, the ranking minority member of the committee.

Mr. ROBERTS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

As the gentleman indicated, House Resolution 343 did pass the full committee with no objection this last Tuesday. This resolution does respond, as the chairman has pointed out, to a request by the Sergeant at Arms that we do have four new positions of sergeant. We are in fact correcting the situation where these folks have been assigned to special duties and we need more officers in the field.

This side of the aisle has no reason to object to this bill. I rise in support of it and urge my colleagues to support the bill as well.

Mr. MINISH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his support, and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ALLOWING TRANSFER TO PORTSMOUTH SUBMARINE MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION, INC., OF THE OBSOLETE SUBMARINE U.S.S. "ALBACORE"

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be discharged from further consideration of the Senate bill (S. 1944) to allow the obsolete submarine U.S.S. *Albacore* to be transferred to the Portsmouth Submarine Memorial Association, Inc., before the expiration of the otherwise applicable 60-day congressional review period, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I yield to the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT), for an explanation of the Senate bill.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, S. 1944 would allow the obsolete submarine U.S.S. *Albacore* (AGSS-569) to be transferred to the Portsmouth Submarine Association before the expiration of the otherwise applicable 60-day congressional review period. Depending upon the date of adjournment, the 60-day period could extend into next year. The bill is identical to H.R. 3980,

which was reported favorably by the Armed Services Committee on October 25, 1983. No objection to the transfer or the waiver of the notification period was expressed during committee consideration of H.R. 3980.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate bill as follows:

S. 1944

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That clauses (2) and (3) of section 7308(c) of title 10, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to the transfer by the Secretary of the Navy under section 7308(a) of such title of the obsolete submarine United States ship *Albacore* to the Portsmouth Submarine Memorial Association, Incorporated, a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the State of New Hampshire.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill (H.R. 3980) was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the bill (H.R. 4185) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes, and that I may be permitted to include tables and extraneous material in connection with the bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1984

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 4185) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. ADDABBO).

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of

the bill, H.R. 4185, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Tuesday, October 25, 1983, the Clerk had read through line 19 on page 7 and pending were amendments offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) and a unanimous-consent request to consider the several amendments en bloc.

Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) to consider the amendments en bloc?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendments.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, the amendment would add back \$82,700,000 in the operation and maintenance title of the bill. It would restore certain reductions made by the committee as follows: for the Army bachelor furniture, \$8 million; Army libraries, \$6.7 million; theater Army repair program, \$25 million; and real property maintenance, \$43 million. It would specifically appropriate an additional \$39.7 million for O&M for the Army; \$11.3 million for O&M Navy; \$4.3 million O&M for the Marine Corps; \$22.5 million for O&M Air Force; \$1.9 million for O&M defense agencies; \$720,000 for O&M Army Reserve; \$540,000 for O&M Navy Reserve; \$40,000 for O&M Marine Corps Reserve; \$350,000 for O&M Air Force Reserve; \$650,000 for O&M Army Guard; and \$700,000 for O&M Air Guard.

Mr. Chairman, since the markup by the subcommittee, we have received further information from the Department of Defense and we feel that the original reductions which we made in the subcommittee should be reconsidered. The military can always use additional money for O&M and on their behalf I offer this amendment.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DANIEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO), and express appreciation not only to the chairman, the ranking minority member, but to his staff for working this matter out.

I think it will redound to the credit of the committee, and certainly will contribute to the readiness of our military forces.

I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendments offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO).

The amendments were agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk proceeded to read the bill. Mr. ADDABBO (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the balance of title III be considered as read and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any points of order against title III?

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I would like to open a colloquy with the chairman.

As I read page 24 of your bill, it states that the funds for the battleship reactivation are for the U.S.S. Wisconsin.

It is my understanding that the U.S.S. Missouri was supposed to be the next battleship reactivated.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ANDERSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The gentleman is correct, and I have recently discussed this matter with the Department of the Navy, and they have advised me that the battleship Missouri is in much better condition than the Wisconsin. They hope to use funds appropriated in fiscal year 1984 to reactivate the Missouri on the west coast and we will be working out the details of this issue when the bill goes to conference with the Senate.

Mr. ANDERSON. I thank the gentleman for his explanation.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. MINISH). The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California (Mr. LUNGREN).

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I wanted to make mention of the matter just discussed by the gentleman. Since I represent the naval shipyard into which the Missouri was originally supposed to come last year, I am concerned that a decision in the other body denied that opportunity. That has created a tremendous difficulty for people in my district.

The employment level at the Navy shipyard has been affected, and private shipyards up and down the west coast have been affected as a direct result of it since previous planning had taken place. I am encouraged to hear the exchange that just took place, and I am hopeful that the Navy's preplanning on the reactivation of the Missouri will not be lost. I am also hopeful that the many shipyard workers in and around my district and

the district of the other gentleman from California and several others will not lose their jobs or will not be in jeopardy from a future decision not to proceed with the Missouri.

This decision to reactivate the Missouri has been made by the Department of the Navy in the national interest and does affect my district in a very direct way, and I am hopeful that his problem will be worked out in this Congress.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LUNGREN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to commend the gentleman from New York for his action, and to say that I think that the performance of the New Jersey has well justified the refurbishing of the Missouri, and I again commend the committee.

□ 1210

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any further amendments to title III?

If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE IV

PROCUREMENT

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, ARMY

(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

For construction, procurement, production, modification, and modernization of aircraft, equipment, including ordnance, ground handling equipment, spare parts, and accessories therefor; specialized equipment and training devices; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, without regard to section 4774, title 10, United States Code, for the foregoing purposes, and such lands and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public and private plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned equipment layaway; and other expenses necessary for the foregoing purposes; \$3,116,748,000, and in addition, \$22,500,000 to be derived by transfer from "Aircraft Procurement, Army, 1983/1985", to remain available for obligation until September 30, 1986.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. BETHUNE. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. BETHUNE. Does the point of order to any line in this particular title have to be made before the amendments to the title are commenced?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair would advise the gentleman that the bill is being read by paragraph.

Mr. BETHUNE. The answer is until we get to it, my point of order on a particular paragraph would be protected until we get to the paragraph?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Unless the title is open by unanimous consent.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. MONTGOMERY

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MONTGOMERY: Page 18, line 8, strike out "\$3,116,748,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,198,448,000".

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, what this amendment does is add back to the Army aircraft six C-12's, it adds 16 AH-64's, it adds production of the UH-60, and it implements the JSTARS program.

The Appropriations Committee on Army aircraft reduced this program by 10 percent. My amendment would reduce the cut to 7.1 percent, so it still is a reduction under the Appropriation Committee.

The C-12, this amendment would add \$11 million to procure six C-12 aircraft for the Army National Guard. Under the bill it says that this would be a provision for leasing and they provided in the bill to lease these C-12's for \$1 million. In my opinion, that is not enough.

To summarize the C-12 issue, leasing is just not feasible economically and it should delay the C-12 program. So we would like to buy the C-12's instead of leasing them.

The AH-64 Apache, I would add \$41 million to restore procurement of 16 Apaches, and these Apaches, by adding them, there is a good possibility they would go to the Army National Guard.

We are also adding the UH-60 Blackhawks and this amendment would restore \$23 million of the \$49 million cut in the UH-60 programs and allows the program to proceed in a stable manner taking advantage of the net savings in the program.

My last part to this amendment is known as JSTARS, Mr. Chairman. This is a Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar. This is one of the most promising of the emerging technologies that we have before us.

Gen. Bernard Rogers, testifying before our committee, urged that we be able to deploy JSTARS as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, this is a reasonable amendment. A lot of this equipment would go to the National Guard and Reserve. If it had not been for the Authorization Committee on Armed Services of this House and also Appropriations Committee, which bill I am trying to amend at this time, we would not be getting the proper equipment for the National Guard and Reserve.

This is a reasonable approach. I hope this amendment would be accepted.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

As the gentleman knows, his authorizing committee added \$1.2 billion for the Guard and Reserve and the Appropriations Committee fully funded almost all of the programs for the Guard and Reserve. The C-12 aircraft go to the Active Army and six U-21 aircraft are transferred to our Reserve components, our bill permits this to occur.

I would like to ask the gentleman a question relative to the JSTARS program which he is seeking to increase by \$5 million. I was wondering why he would be increasing the appropriation by \$5 million for procurement when the gentleman's own committee had reduced the RDT&E funding by some \$54 million for this program? Why would you want to start procurement in a program while reducing RDT&E on the same program? Isn't procurement premature?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. After review we felt like the \$5 million would be reasonable and it would send a message to the DOD that the Congress wants this program accelerated, and that was the reason for that action.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the committee bill includes more than \$3.1 billion in this appropriation. We have carefully reviewed all of these programs. We support the C-12 program. But we have found that it is less costly to lease rather than to buy, and we placed in the operation and maintenance account \$1 million so that all of these planes, the additional six, can be leased.

There is no reason to buy them. If we lease, we save money because the contract is based on competition and the manufacturer must then maintain and support them and not the services. The Guard and the Reserve have no objection to the action of the subcommittee since these new aircraft will go to the Active Army as directed in the House Armed Services Committee's own report.

Relative to the AH-64, the gentleman adds an additional \$41.8 million to procure 112 rather than 96 AH-64 gunships. Last year the Congress appropriated procurement funding for 48 gunships. This was fully supported by the Appropriation Committee. At the time, the program was to ramp up to 96 aircraft in fiscal year 1984.

Now they wish to go from 48 to 112. Such a large ramp up invites cost overruns and waste. By keeping their so-called feet to the fire we have been able to bring this program cost down. Increasing it from the 48 to 112 makes

no sense at this point in time. The \$41.8 million is not needed.

As to UH-60 Blackhawk, the amendment proposes to give them, or throw to them, \$23.1 million. My colleagues, I would ask you to listen very carefully to this. I know we want to give our services the best of everything. But, the \$45.8 million reduction in the bill for this program was based on a paper prepared by the Army itself. It was not our findings. The paper is dated June 21, 1983, and shows savings amounting to \$14.5 million in fiscal year 1983 and \$34 million in fiscal year 1984.

These savings result from the net effect of production acceleration, economic price adjustments, and business base adjustments. So, therefore, we do not in any way reduce the number of UH-60 Blackhawks requested in fiscal year 1984. The numbers remain the same. We are procuring them all. All we did was take the reduction of \$45.8 million which the Army had given up.

Turning to the last item, \$5 million for the JSTARS program. The budget request for JSTARS was \$163.9 million in RDT&E. The authorizing committee made a reduction in this request because they felt that amount of money was not justified.

The money that we are requested to place back in this budget is \$5 million for procurement that was not requested by the Pentagon, and I believe the authorizing committee reduction in RDT&E is evidence that this additional funding is not warranted.

Therefore, my colleagues, I would ask your support in defeating this amendment. We believe that the \$3.1 billion the committee has appropriated in this bill for the aircraft procurement, Army, is sufficient.

□ 1220

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, let me preface my remarks here by saying that I think that the Appropriations Committee has worked long and hard—sometimes they work too long.

We all seek the same thing and I would hope that the members of the committee and the Members of the House would not consider the offering of several amendments by our committee as in any way a reflection or a comment on our part as to the actions of the Appropriations Committee.

It is just that in certain areas we have legitimate, bona fide differences of opinion and we think in certain areas the cuts were too deep.

We too spent a great deal of time studying the subject matter. Based on our findings and our facts, we feel the cuts were too deep in certain areas and we are seeking to restore them.

The statement of the ranking member (Mr. EDWARDS) and the chairman (Mr. ADDABBO) yesterday, as to their deliberations and their agreements with our committee and the jurisdictions involved, and so forth, are absolutely right. Two years ago we met, had an agreement which, as I understand it, is just a restatement of the law.

We have no quarrel with appropriations over what was appropriated. That is not involved here.

What we felt should happen was that we would like to see appropriated the things that we did authorize. We are not concerned about things that were being appropriated that were not authorized.

They have, as far as I know, kept faith and done a great job in that regard. Also, I drew an inference from what was said, though, that it was felt that if we did not accept the product of that committee that somehow we were breaching the agreement because they were not violating it by appropriating more than was authorized.

That is not the case at all. I feel that there are certain areas where the cuts are too deep, they were unnecessary and I think will be detrimental to our defense posture.

As was pointed out in the general debate yesterday we started off with a request by the administration for over 10 percent real growth. Then it got back to the House and the Senate and our Budget Committees took this up and started working on it and it came back to a 4-percent real growth, at one time, then it went back to 6 percent. And it generally wound up with a little over 5 percent real growth that the Committee on the Budget authorized and was the bogey or the mark for our committee.

We set to work to live up to what the House told us to do. We endeavored as sincerely as we could to meet what we thought was the mandate put on us by the House to prudently prune the administration's requests down to which the House said we could live with.

And we did this. We spent some 4 months surgically reducing in all of the areas. We did this and it was painful. A lot of programs fell out, a lot of people felt they were being hurt by it.

By trying to live up to what the House told us to do, we did it, we passed it on the floor and the House accepted it.

That is the authorization bill.

Then in talking with some of the members on the Appropriations Committee, I said, "Well, what do you think about it?" And they said, "Well, we think you did a good job and we do not think there is going to be any violence done, substantial violence done to the efforts of the authorizing committee."

But, Mr. Chairman, when you look at the final product, we took out over \$12 billion from what the President asked, to come up with about a 5-percent real growth figure.

Now the Appropriations Committee has taken several billion dollars more than this, several billion dollars less than the amount that the House has already authorized, and cut out many programs and deleted programs or reduced programs that we feel are very serious indeed.

So, I am making these comments in a general sense because there will be several amendments offered during the course of the afternoon to restore certain line items.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Now, the amendment offered by my colleague from the other side of the aisle, Mr. MONTGOMERY of Mississippi, addresses four elements which are in aviation: The six C-12's; we looked at these. I heard what the chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations said but we really felt that this was probably the most prudent way to go. That is what the services asked.

Now, the UH-60 and the JSTARS are included but at this time I would like to focus my remarks and address one element of the four with which I am most familiar.

I am talking about the Apache helicopter. This is a program that we have been working on now in one mode or another for 10 or 12 years. It started out with the Cheyenne helicopter program and it got too expensive, and after spending about \$3 billion the program was canceled, and we started off with a new one called the Apache. That is the one that is before us today.

Just last month, after many years of deliberation and debate here on the floor, and with the Senate, and in conference, they went into production and last month the first Apache rolled off the production line in Mesa, Ariz. It is a very formidable weapons system. It is quite an advance in the state of the art. It is something that the Army desperately needs. It is the first new helicopter that has been fielded now in 20 years, a fighting ship, a gunship.

We need it and everybody has agreed that "OK, we need it." So then we have to make a decision: "Well, how much is it going to cost? And at what rate should we produce it?"

Well, the DOD request came up. This action of the committee deletes or cuts back 16 Apaches and cuts the funding approximately \$90 million below the authorization.

We did not just arbitrarily pick a figure; the Army told us what they needed for a production rate. We looked at it, we studied it, we heard the testimony and we approved an authorization at a set level of production, and the House approved it.

It was not attacked, but now the action of the Committee on Appropriations is to cut out the funds for 16, cut out the funding of \$89.9 million or approximately \$90 million.

Our amendment would restore 16 birds. What does this mean? First let me say that the program is on cost and ahead of schedule.

What they came in and asked for, we approved, we authorized it and it is in production and on cost and ahead of schedule.

So why are we going to cut it? What would be the effect? According to what the Army tells us, and I have spoken with them personally, the reduction of the production rate to 96 would increase, increase the unit cost, that is each aircraft would increase the unit cost by \$1 million per aircraft and increase the program total cost by \$450 million.

□ 1230

We need the Apaches in quantity to counter the 3-to-1 advantage in heavy armor and artillery and tanks of the Warsaw Pact. We need the Apaches to counter the 3-to-2 advantage on attack helicopters of the Warsaw Pact.

The Army intends to ramp up production rate to 12 per month. And I am told by the Army—and they were concerned about this—that in this deletion it will slow the delivery rates of those planes that they very desperately need, it will make the cost of each one—now, this does not say we will not ultimately get them, we get them later—it will increase the cost of each helicopter by about \$1 million. It will cost \$450 million more than we need to spend for them.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DICKINSON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKINSON. So you have to ask why. What is the rationale? What good does it do? We have presented the program. It has not been attacked. It is on cost. It is ahead of schedule. We have no problems with it now. To delete the production rate and slow it down by 16 birds, aircraft, this year simply adds to the cost of the total of each aircraft and simply adds to the total cost of the program. It benefits no one. There is no rationale that I can think of why we should delete the funding for these 16 aircraft this year.

And this is a part of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY). They were

offered en bloc. And I am speaking only to that one portion, but I think probably similar facts would appertain to other elements of the amendment also.

So I would ask the members of the committee and this is not an assault or trying to undo the work of the Appropriations Committee, we need it. It does not save money. It costs. This is what the Army tells us. It is not just a figment of our imagination.

I am disappointed that the Appropriations Committee felt constrained to make this reduction in production numbers.

I would ask the Members of the House to look at the figures, examine the facts, and support our committee in this add-back amendment of amounts that the House has already authorized and that we very desperately need.

I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can get this all out of our system on this amendment as far as the discussion between the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee is concerned and deal with the future amendments as they come up on the merits.

But I do think that we might just as well have it out here a bit. We understand that the Armed Services Committee is supposed to authorize the items that we then deal with in Appropriations. And we understand their responsibility and I do not feel very comfortable up here opposing amendments to provide more for defense because it is a little out of keeping with my basic approach to defense.

But after the authorization process is over, and after the Congress has dealt with it, then somebody has to try to put dollars to what is authorized. And it is not a happy circumstance to be in, to feel in your bones that you would like to put a little more money here and a little more money there.

But we come to you with a \$247 billion bill. These four items add \$87 million. Insignificant in the scheme of things. But if you do not deal with these small items from time to time \$247 billion becomes \$257 billion and \$260 billion and somewhere there has got to be a limit.

And I think our committee has done a good job. We have not gutted the Apache. What we did was go with the Army's original schedule. It appeared to us to be a normal ramp up in production rates. I do not apologize for trying to approach the procurement of the Apache in an orderly and proper way and I think that is what we have done.

We tried to save some money on the C-12 by leasing instead of buying. And

the money that would be added back here, over the budget, would be to procure, to buy, rather than to lease.

We think what we did on the Blackhawk was responsible. We found the money to provide for the helicopters. And we knocked out \$5 million add-on over the budget for JSTARS.

I do not think that is some sinful approach to the defense of this country. It is an effort to try to find an orderly way to bring the needs of the defense together and find the dollars to pay for them. And I think that is what our job is. Not to stay in hot water with the Armed Services Committee, not to stay in hot water with the Pentagon or the President, but we are looking at a \$200 billion deficit. And we have got to find some way to deal with that.

We have come in with 2½ percent real growth, not enough for me, I said that in my opening remarks. And I am quite sure that when the Senate finishes with this bill that we will have some compromises as are in order and we will come up with something larger than 2½ percent real growth.

But if we start picking away at this simply because the other committee does not like everything we have done, then we are not going to have an appropriations process that works in the proper way.

The Army has not required any of these items. They have not come to us and said, "Gee, you have done wrong. You have ruined us." They have never done that. The Army has not asked for these amendments.

I submit that our subcommittee did an adequate job on these four items.

And I would urge the Members to vote down the amendment.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, I want to take this opportunity to commend the gentleman in the well, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) for his leadership in the markup. As the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee, I sat in on a lot of that markup and I want to commend the gentleman for his statesmanlike leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. CONTE and by unanimous consent, Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes).

Mr. CONTE. I commend the gentleman in forging a very delicate balance on this bill. I know that he does not agree with some of the cuts that have been made and I have been in disagreement with him. I have sided with the chairman of the committee on some of the cuts that he offered.

The gentleman from Alabama showed great leadership. He is one of

the most outstanding Members of the House and I know of no one in the House that knows more about the military posture and the defense bill than JACK EDWARDS of Alabama.

There are many items in this bill—and I am sure the gentleman from Alabama will agree with me—where amendments were offered in subcommittee, and the proponents said, "Put more money in it and we will save, we will save money in the long run."

□ 1240

And we would add another \$100 billion to this bill to save \$25 billion.

It is just like my wife going broke buying bargains out of the bargain store. And you cannot do this. You have got to draw the line somewhere. I think the gentleman has come out with a decent, responsible bill, and I hope this House will support it and defeat this amendment.

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. PICKLE. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I am not knowledgeable on the specifics of this amendment. I assume that the planes are needed and that the Army would like to have them in its arsenal. Whether it is an emergency nature or whether they should have the planes, I am not questioning. I would, though, like to have the House consider that you are now talking about whether you lease these planes or whether you purchase the planes.

Now, our Committee on Ways and Means had considerable hearings on this subject, and that particular item is or will be a part of the tax bill that is pending to come before us, that is the question of sale or lease. I think the House ought to be mindful that whenever you lease, under normal circumstances, it costs more than if you make an outright purchase. I do not think anybody disagrees with that as a premise. Sometimes a lease is a proper way, and certainly that ought not be discouraged if it is proper.

Earlier this year we saw where the Navy was going to lease some 25 prepositioned ships for the Indian Ocean, and they claimed that it would save the Navy's budget almost \$20 million. The truth of the matter is that it would cost the taxpayers, that is the Federal budget, about \$250 million more almost immediately, within the first few years. Now, that is an added cost to the Treasury. I do not know whether that Navy contract will be maintained, because actual contracts have been let and I do not know whether they will be able to stop that.

But I say to the Members that the question ought to be raised in this Committee in reference to this amendment or other leasing amendments: If you have a lease that is for a specific, fixed price, and at the end of that lease, a culmination of it can be made where we can actually buy it for that amount, then that is a normal lease sale transaction and I do not think tax credits will be involved and, under normal circumstances, that would be approved.

But if you are talking about a lease here, as the committee apparently is talking about, that is not at a fixed price, and if it is just optional, to be negotiated, then I say to you that tax credits, the investment tax credits, the accelerated depreciation, all of these credits that the third-party entrepreneurs will get, come into question. That would cost the Federal budget millions of dollars.

So I think that whatever you do about this amendment with reference to the C-12 and the other things pending, this Appropriations Committee and the Congress must keep in mind that if you are talking about leasing, that sounds good, but normally, if you are not careful, it is a back-door way of financing a back-door budget figure. I would hope that the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee will help us, the Congress, determine what is a definite policy that we should follow, not alone with respect to this particular amendment, but to the overall policy that if you lease, you normally will cost the taxpayer a great deal more than if you just buy.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for his contribution. I am sure the gentleman would not want to leave the impression that all leasing is bad and all buying is good.

Mr. PICKLE. I did not say that. I made it clear that I did not.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. And I want to reiterate what the gentleman has said, that is not the purpose of the gentleman's comment.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I will tell my friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PICKLE), that this matter has been fully investigated by the Air Force, and the Treasury Department has concurred in the Air Force study which concludes that, when considering all tax aspects, in this case leasing would be cheaper for the military.

Under the lease, the contractor, the company that produces the plane, they must maintain and support it. It does not fall upon the Department of Defense. That saves the taxpayers dollars.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ADDABBO. If the gentleman will yield further, on the question of buying or leasing, if the gentleman's amendment is passed, I think it is detrimental to the Department of Defense. We have said that we support the C-12 program. The planes are needed. And if they find leasing is detrimental, they can come back either on a reprogramming or a supplemental for procurement funds. But under the study we have received, where we can save defense dollars and maintenance and support, and in the final analysis, we feel that the leasing is less costly at this point in time. I would add that the DOD has already signed leases for 40 of these same planes.

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, I will say to the gentleman that I am not questioning the study, and I am not familiar with it in this particular case; so I cannot take issue with the gentleman on that.

I do say to the gentleman, though, that there is a tendency on the part of the various committees of Congress to lease, preserve a sale—and lease back procedures, that costs the Federal Treasury much more under normal lease and sale back procedures.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I am inclined to just make a few comments on the colloquy that has just taken place between our ranking minority member on the Appropriations Subcommittee, as well as the members of the Armed Services Committee.

A long time ago, this Member has the real honor of serving as a member of the Armed Services Committee, and I know how diligent the members of that committee are, and I know they stand for a strong national defense. They spend a lot of time, a lot of hours, in their meetings and in their hearings. If there is another group on Capitol Hill that spends more time and is more involved in trying to understand the defense requirements of our Nation, it is the Appropriations Subcommittee on National Defense. Most of us would like to provide all of the funding, and in some cases even more funding, that the Armed Services Committee authorized. The problem we face is that funds are just not unlimited. We have to be reasonable in the requests that we make to the American taxpayer for the dollar that we spend, we have got to do the very best we can to provide a strong national defense at the best price possible. And that becomes the job of the Appropriations Committee.

I agree with the gentleman from Alabama. I think we have done a pretty good job. There are a few places I would make my own changes, I would add a little more here and I would take a little more, possibly, in some other place. But, generally, we have before the House a pretty good appropriations bill. I do not think it is going to create any negative situation as it relates to our national defense capabilities.

I see the possibility this year, as happened last year, of a number of amendments coming from my former colleagues on the Armed Services Committee, and they may very well be the kinds of things we would like to do. But just understand, we have spent a long time balancing our needs, recognizing that we need more than just the particular pieces of hardware at issue in this particular amendment. And I would hope that the Members of the House would pay close attention to what the Appropriations Committee has done and recommended.

I compliment the gentleman from Alabama for taking the position that he has taken, because I know that he too would like to be able to spend more money in certain defense areas but he also knows the limitations under which we work.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in strong support of the Montgomery amendment. I am disturbed that the House Appropriations Committee bill leaves a real decrease of 1.3 percent rather than real growth in the procurement account. With the funding of tremendous increases in strategic programs like the B-1 and MX and other nuclear systems like the Pershing II this means that the appropriations bill makes major and disproportionate cuts in conventional modernization programs for which there should be the strongest support.

Two cuts, in particular, which disturb me are the reduction of 16 Apache and a \$49.5 million cut in the UH-60A Blackhawk program.

Last year the AH-64 program was under assault in Congress because of cost growth. After considerable pressure from the Congress, the Army and the contractor worked out what was, in effect, a contract with the Congress to reduce program costs. Part of the plan was a decision to accelerate production to make maximum savings from economic rates of production. The Appropriations Committee recommendation to reduce AH-64 procurement from 112 to 96 would undo all the progress we have made in reducing cost. Ironically, the argument the Appropriations Committee used in cutting the program was that GAO said there was still a potential for cost growth. Well, the surest way I know of

to make that cost increase a self-fulfilling prophecy is to stretch out the program.

The Army is already almost through with negotiations for 112 aircraft and to force them to go back now and start all over negotiating with subcontractors and vendors for quotes on 96 aircraft could delay contract definitization by 6 to 9 months. Such delays are costly.

The Montgomery amendment would allow us to procure the 16 aircraft for \$41.8 million—a cost of \$2.6 million per aircraft—provided we allow the Army to fund the program services contract annually—as the costs are increased.

I know the Appropriations Committee feels strongly about the full funding principle but we make exceptions to it regularly where it makes sense to do so.

And in this case, full funding is pennywise and pound foolish. We have a chance to buy AH-64's at \$2.6 million apiece. If we adhere to full funding of program support costs—which are really only estimates anyway—then next year we will have to pay \$8-9 million each for the same 16 aircraft. That just doesn't make sense—especially since we need the helicopters.

I am also concerned about the UH-60A cut of \$49.5 million because I think the Appropriations Committee misunderstood the Army testimony.

A program manager is given the authority to manage his program funding to produce end items. In every program there is not one but several contracts he has to negotiate to produce that end item. In some negotiations he does better than expected—in others he may not do as well in the negotiations as he had planned for. But we allow the program manager flexibility. We give him one total budget, not a series of contract budgets. He has to have the freedom to use savings on one contract to offset increased costs in other contracts.

The Army testified to the Appropriations Committee that there would be savings of \$49.5 million on one contract—the airframe multiyear contract. The Army did not say there would be savings of \$49.5 million over the entire program. Some of those airframe savings must be reapplied to other contracts to support accelerated production—without which most of the savings in the airframe contract would evaporate.

The Montgomery amendment would reapply \$23.1 million on the airframe contract to other contracts. If we do not do this—if we do not spend the \$23 million to support acceleration to a monthly production rate of 10 per month, we have a catch 22—that is the airframe savings will disappear and there is a serious doubt we can avoid a production line break in May 1985.

I urge the adoption of the Montgomery amendment.

□ 1250

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think the gentleman has made an excellent point that the Committee on Armed Services has already labored over this bill and has made cuts to accommodate the strategic spending.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out something else that I do not think has been touched on with regard to the attack helicopter. We have talked about the fact that members of the Committee on Appropriations Defense Subcommittee would like to spend on a number of programs if they had the dollars available to do it, but they are constrained by the budget not to do it.

The attack helicopter that we are building, the AH-64, is going to be the main counterforce that we will have in Western Europe to counter the massive tank buildup that the Warsaw Pact nations have made. Right now they have about 30,000 tanks in Western Europe. We only have about 7,500. We have stationed almost half a million American servicemen and servicewomen in Western Europe who are threatened by those tanks. The attack helicopter is really late in coming. It is a counter that will fill a void that has existed for many years. Right now our people are threatened by that tremendous tank imbalance.

This helicopter is one of the weapons that is going to cure that imbalance. I think we are doing a disservice to our people, if we are going to keep them in Western Europe. Those half a million people may deserve to have the weaponry that they are going to need to counter that massive Warsaw Pact tank force.

Mr. MAVROULES. I thank the gentleman for his comments.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) has expired.

(On request of Mr. GLICKMAN and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. GLICKMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, one of the items in this amendment concerns adding funds for the C-12 utility aircraft. As the gentleman in the well knows, and my colleague from New York, these items are to be provided by reason of a leasing situation.

My concern is that if perchance the gentleman from Texas (Mr. PICKLE) or some other Members of this body or the other body succeed in either kill-

ing or substantially modifying the leasing provisions so that that type of situation is not allowed to occur, will my colleague from New York come back and recommend that those C-12's actually be procured through the normal purchase route?

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would assure the gentleman from Kansas that the subcommittee fully supports the C-12 program, all of them that have been authorized. We have only made this change because we feel, and I say this based on an Air Force study, that this is the cheapest way to go.

If we find that because of a change in law or conditions that this is not the best way to go, that to procure them is the best way to go, we have already stated that they may come back for either a supplemental or reprogramming and they would have the full support of the subcommittee.

Mr. GLICKMAN. I appreciate the response of my colleague.

Mr. MAVROULES. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support the Montgomery amendment.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say, in line with what the gentleman has already pointed out and what has been said before, these cuts are not forced by the budget. The process, as we all are aware, is that OMB first looks at what they think they can afford Government-wide, not just DOD, and they give their input to the administration that sends the budget over.

Then the Congress looks and says what it thinks it can, in the budget process, afford.

So there is an administration budget, then the Congress came along and said that is too much, we want to cut that 10.2 percent real growth in half, so that is the Congress budget, and we did that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. MAVROULES) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. DICKINSON and by unanimous consent, Mr. MAVROULES was allowed to proceed for 4 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKINSON. If the gentleman will yield further, then we are coming to deal with this on the authorizing committee, see that the ceilings put on us by the Committee on the Budget, we start taking things out that have been requested in the 10 percent real

growth to come down to 5 percent. We did this. We met the budget. We did what the full House said they wanted done. We did this.

Then we came back with our package and we said this is what you told us to do, this is the ceiling. We have done it, and we ask you to authorize it. They did. They accepted the product of our committee. They authorized it in these amounts, so we cut the budget for the administration, we cut the budget for the House itself.

So there are no budget constraints driving us down several billion dollars below this. Everything that we are asking for here can be put back in and it will still be under what the House said they would be willing to pay for, that we need, that we have authorized. It does not violence and is not driving up the deficit over what we already agreed in this House we are willing to accept in the authorizing process and in the budget ceiling that was passed.

So what we are saying is that these particular programs, out of all the cuts that have been taken, we feel strongly are not wisely made and should be restored because you have already agreed to this amount, we have done what you said. We are not over the budget; we are under the budget. Now these additional cuts to the budget are not required to do what the House told us to do. They are needed. They should be restored and I would urge that the House restore them.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman makes an excellent point that even under this amendment we are still under the budget. The Committee on Appropriations cut the Army aircraft by 10 percent. My amendment only adds back 3 percent, so there is still a 7.1-percent cut in Army aircraft by the Committee on Appropriations.

This is a reasonable approach.

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, one of the figures we should pay close attention is that in the procurement account it is minus 1.3 percent.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MAVROULES. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad the gentleman restated that minus 1.3 percent for the procurement budget. We know the reason for that minus 1.3 percent is the fact that last year in the procurement account we had two aircraft carriers that are not in the bill this year. That was over \$6 billion.

I would hope that the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON), is not saying that the Committee on Approp-

riations is not supposed to review what the authorizing committee has done or what the Committee on the Budget has done, just because we have reached a certain goal. We do not go by goals. We go by what is proper and justified for funding. When the military itself says, "We have a \$45 million in savings," then we should take those savings, not because we are looking for a 3- or 4-percent growth. The authorizing committee says, "We have reduced so much, we have reached our goal; therefore, we should not go below that goal." I am hoping that the gentleman from Alabama did not mean that we should do the same thing.

Mr. DICKINSON. If the gentleman will yield for a response, that is not what this gentleman intended to say. Of course, we recognize the function of the Committee on Appropriations. That is your function and duty, to review.

My point was that in the Apache helicopter, the Army does not say that what you have done is a savings. It is a dead loss, \$450 million added to the program, and \$1 million a helicopter added over what it would cost as they were originally funded. They did not tell you this was a saving.

So what I am saying is that the budget has not forced the reduction here; it has been done for other reasons. We could put the money back in, agree to the amendment, and still be well under what the budget is.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY).

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 219, noes 193, not voting 21, as follows:

[Roll No. 418]

AYES—219

| | | |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Akaka | Brown (CA) | Dickinson |
| Albosta | Bryant | Dingell |
| Anderson | Burton (IN) | Dorgan |
| Andrews (NC) | Byron | Dowdy |
| Andrews (TX) | Campbell | Dreier |
| Applegate | Carney | Duncan |
| Archer | Carr | Durbin |
| Aspin | Chappell | Dyson |
| Badham | Chappie | Eckart |
| Barnard | Cheney | Edwards (OK) |
| Bartlett | Clarke | Emerson |
| Bateman | Coleman (MO) | English |
| Bedell | Coleman (TX) | Erdreich |
| Bennett | Courter | Erlenborn |
| Bereuter | Craig | Evans (IL) |
| Bevill | Crane, Daniel | Feighan |
| Biaggi | Crane, Philip | Fiedler |
| Bilirakis | D'Amours | Fish |
| Bliley | Daniel | Flippo |
| Boggs | Dannemeyer | Florio |
| Boner | Daschle | Frank |
| Borski | Davis | Franklin |
| Boucher | de la Garza | Frost |
| Breaux | Derrick | Gephardt |
| Britt | DeWine | Gibbons |

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|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Gilman | Lungren | Rose |
| Gingrich | MacKay | Rowland |
| Gore | Madigan | Rudd |
| Gramm | Marlenee | Schaefer |
| Guarini | Marriott | Sensenbrenner |
| Hall, Ralph | Martin (NC) | Shelby |
| Hall, Sam | Martin (NY) | Shumway |
| Hammerschmidt | Mavroules | Siljander |
| Hance | McCain | Siskiy |
| Hansen (ID) | McCloskey | Skeen |
| Hansen (UT) | McCollum | Skelton |
| Harkin | McCurdy | Smith (IA) |
| Hartnett | McEwen | Smith (NJ) |
| Hatcher | McGrath | Smith, Denny |
| Heftel | Mica | Solomon |
| Hillis | Molinar | Spence |
| Holt | Mollohan | Spratt |
| Hopkins | Montgomery | Staggers |
| Hubbard | Moody | Stark |
| Huckaby | Moorhead | Stenholm |
| Hunter | Morrison (WA) | Stratton |
| Hutto | Murphy | Stump |
| Hyde | Neal | Sundquist |
| Ireland | Nichols | Synar |
| Jenkins | O'Brien | Tallon |
| Johnson | Oakar | Tauzin |
| Jones (NC) | Olin | Taylor |
| Jones (OK) | Ortiz | Thomas (CA) |
| Jones (TN) | Oxley | Thomas (GA) |
| Kaptur | Packard | Valentine |
| Kazen | Panetta | Vander Jagt |
| Kennelly | Parris | Vandergriff |
| Kindness | Pashayan | Volkmer |
| Kolter | Patman | Vucanovich |
| Kramer | Patterson | Watkins |
| Lagomarsino | Pease | Weber |
| Latta | Pepper | Wheat |
| Leath | Pickle | Whitehurst |
| Lent | Price | Whitley |
| Levitas | Quillen | Whittaker |
| Lewis (FL) | Ratchford | Williams (MT) |
| Livingston | Ray | Wise |
| Lloyd | Reid | Wright |
| Loeffler | Richardson | Wylie |
| Long (LA) | Ridge | Yatron |
| Lott | Rinaldo | Young (AK) |
| Lowery (CA) | Roemer | Young (MO) |
| Lujan | Rogers | Zablocki |

NOES—193

| | | |
|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| Ackerman | Ferraro | Levine |
| Addabbo | Foglietta | Lipinski |
| Alexander | Foley | Long (MD) |
| Annuizio | Ford (MI) | Lowry (WA) |
| Anthony | Ford (TN) | Luken |
| AuCoin | Forsythe | Lundine |
| Barnes | Fowler | Mack |
| Bates | Frenzel | Markey |
| Beilenson | Fuqua | Martin (IL) |
| Berman | Garcia | Martinez |
| Bethune | Gaydos | Matsui |
| Boehlert | Gejdenson | Mazzoli |
| Bonker | Gekas | McCandless |
| Boxer | Glickman | McDade |
| Brooks | Goodling | McHugh |
| Broomfield | Gradison | McKernan |
| Brown (CO) | Gray | McKinney |
| Broyhill | Green | McNulty |
| Burton (CA) | Gregg | Michel |
| Carper | Gunderson | Mikulski |
| Chandler | Hall (IN) | Miller (CA) |
| Clay | Hall (OH) | Miller (OH) |
| Clinger | Hamilton | Minish |
| Coats | Hawkins | Moore |
| Coelho | Hefner | Morrison (CT) |
| Conable | Hertel | Mrazek |
| Conte | Hightower | Myers |
| Conyers | Hiler | Natcher |
| Cooper | Horton | Nelson |
| Coughlin | Howard | Nielson |
| Crockett | Hoyer | Nowak |
| Daub | Hughes | Oberstar |
| Dellums | Jeffords | Obey |
| Dicks | Kasich | Ottenger |
| Dixon | Kastenmeier | Owens |
| Donnelly | Kemp | Paul |
| Downey | Kildee | Penny |
| Dwyer | Kogovsek | Perkins |
| Dymally | Kostmayer | Petri |
| Edgar | LaFalce | Porter |
| Edwards (AL) | Lantos | Pursell |
| Edwards (CA) | Leach | Rahall |
| Evans (IA) | Lehman (FL) | Rangel |
| Fascell | Leland | Regula |
| Fazio | Levin | Ritter |

| | | |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|
| Roberts | Shuster | Udall |
| Robinson | Sikorski | Vento |
| Rodino | Simon | Walgren |
| Roe | Slattery | Walker |
| Rostenkowski | Smith (FL) | Waxman |
| Roth | Smith (NE) | Weaver |
| Roukema | Smith, Robert | Weiss |
| Roybal | Snowe | Whitten |
| Russo | Snyder | Williams (OH) |
| Sabo | Solarz | Wilson |
| Savage | St Germain | Winn |
| Sawyer | Stangeland | Wirth |
| Scheuer | Stokes | Wolf |
| Schneider | Studds | Wolpe |
| Schroeder | Swift | Wyden |
| Schulze | Tauke | Yates |
| Schumer | Torres | Young (FL) |
| Seiberling | Torricelli | Zschau |
| Sharp | Towns | |
| Shaw | Traxler | |

NOT VOTING—21

| | | |
|----------|-------------|-----------|
| Boland | Fields | Mineta |
| Bonior | Gonzalez | Mitchell |
| Bosco | Harrison | Moakley |
| Collins | Hayes | Murtha |
| Corcoran | Jacobs | Pritchard |
| Coyne | Lehman (CA) | Shannon |
| Early | Lewis (CA) | Wortley |

□ 1310

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Corcoran for, with Mr. Hayes against. Messrs. FOGLIETTA, SMITH of Florida, and FOLEY changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Ms. OAKAR, Mr. GORE, and Mr. GUARINI changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

I am quite concerned about language appearing in the committee report apparently blocking implementation of the new authority to pay travel and transportation for dependent children of members stationed overseas until the committee has reviewed the plan for implementation. Section 910 of Public Law 98-94 authorized payment for one annual round trip between school in the United States and the member's duty station overseas for children of members of the military. This section, added through my amendment, attempts to bring military children up to parity with the children of other Federal employees stationed abroad. Further, it is a small, but important, way that we can make a military career more attractive and less destructive to traditional family life. I think it would be dreadful if we did not fund this program.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I would like to provide the gentleman with some assurances for myself and the Committee on Appropriations. We strongly support the decision to provide one annual trip at Government expense for the dependents of military personnel.

I fully support, and I believe the majority of my committee fully supports this program. Our problem was that

we could not get decent information from the DOD. First, they said it would cost \$1 million per year, and then they said \$2.4 million a year, although the basis for this estimate is still unclear.

We did not want to appropriate a fixed sum of money until we know what funds are actually needed.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I understand your position because I was unable to get decent information from DOD also. My concern is that I want DOD to be able to start paying for these trips as of October 1 so that children can visit their parents for Christmas or Thanksgiving this year. I do not want DOD reading your committee report as saying that they cannot go ahead and provide transportation for dependent students immediately.

Mr. ADDABBO. If the gentleman will yield further, I believe the DOD should start providing this transportation immediately and should pay for it out of existing O&M funds.

The law clearly states, whenever possible, the Military Airlift Command or Military Sealift Command should be used on a space-available basis for such travel. While I believe DOD should go forward immediately to provide this kind of benefit, I still would insist on better budget justification from DOD for operating this program.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I really appreciate the assurance of the chairman that that is the intent of the committee in helping to clarify it.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. CONTE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

At the outset I want to commend the gentleman from Colorado. I want to rise to state my support for the effort to correct an inequity which exists in our present overseas military dependent benefits. It is a recognized requirement for the dependents of our overseas diplomats and civilian officials to be able to come back to the States to pursue postsecondary education. Yet, this benefit is denied our uniformed services dependents.

As our senior noncommissioned and commissioned officers contemplate retirement or further reenlistment, one of the major factors is the education of their children who have reached college age. As you can imagine this is not only a matter of inequity that exists between our civilians and our military, but if we do not have this benefit, its absence becomes a major factor in keeping experienced soldiers, sailors, and airmen on active duty.

The program will not cost much and would certainly be limited in the number of trips that can be taken. Nonetheless we should approve it and provide the funds that are necessary to effect the program.

The gentleman is absolutely correct, I was going to offer an amendment to straighten this out, and I am glad that we have had this dialog here today with the chairman, and I want to thank the chairman and we have straightened this matter out.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, because I am sure that will straighten it out.

You are right, fairness dictates this is long overdue.

Mr. CONTE. Thank you.

Mrs. SCHROEDER. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Colorado (Mrs. SCHROEDER) has expired.

The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

MISSILE PROCUREMENT, ARMY

(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

For construction, procurement, production, modification, and modernization of missiles, equipment, including ordnance, ground handling equipment, spare parts, and accessories therefor; specialized equipment and training devices; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, without regard to section 4774, title 10, United States Code, for the foregoing purposes, and such lands and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public and private plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned equipment layaway; and other expenses necessary for the foregoing purposes, as follows: For Other Missile Support, \$9,200,000; for the Patriot program, \$885,000,000; for the Stinger program, \$100,500,000, and in addition, \$37,300,000 to be derived by transfer from "Missile Procurement, Army, 1983/1985"; for the Laser Hellfire program, \$218,800,000; for the TOW program, \$189,200,000; for the Pershing II program, \$407,700,000; for the MLRS program, \$532,100,000; for modification of missiles, \$123,300,000; for spares and repair parts, \$261,702,000; for support equipment and facilities, \$108,200,000; in all: \$2,807,702,000, and in addition \$37,300,000 to be derived by transfer, to remain available until September 30, 1986: *Provided*, That within the total amount appropriated, the subdivisions within this account shall be reduced by \$28,000,000 for revised economic assumptions.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the language on page 19, line 5, after "\$100,500,000" through "1983/85" on line 6 constitutes a reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations and thus is not in order under rule XXI, clause 6.

The \$37,300,000 that would be transferred from the Army missile funds, 1983-1985, would be extended in availability to September 30, 1986.

Such an extension of these funds through appropriation is prohibited by the rules.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from New York wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is sustained.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. DREIER of California. Does the ruling of the Chair on the gentleman's point of order mean that title IV is underfunded by \$37.3 million for Stinger missile procurement in fiscal year 1984?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that the gentleman is not making a parliamentary inquiry.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ADDABBO

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ADDABBO: On page 19, lines 8 and 9, strike "for the Pershing II program, \$407,700,000," and on line 11 strike "\$261,702,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$236,602,000" and on line 12 strike "\$2,807,702,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,374,902,000".

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

We have passed this some time ago, and I would like to take this a bit out of place, but I would like to point out to the body that there is a funding for some 5,000 sea-air mariner program slots.

I think that this is in the right direction. However, I would like to see that at a higher strength level; but as I say it is moving in the correct direction. This is a very important program. As we know, reserves of all branches are terribly important, but even according to your report here, the Navy Reserve needs bolstering, and this is probably the best and most cost-effective way of doing it, and I would certainly urge your continued interest in this particular area. I guess they call it the SAM program.

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee fully supports the program and continues to monitor it to make sure it is properly funded.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, I think the gentleman from California has a request.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman know whether there are any funds in this bill earmarked for the disestablishment of the Marine barracks at Mare Island Naval Ship-

yard or for removal of marines for that facility?

Mr. ADDABBO. I am aware of no funds in the fiscal year 1984 appropriation bill for that purpose, and I have been assured by the Commandant of the Marines that the matter is being fully investigated and before any decision is made, there will be full discussion with the Congresspersons from that area, and also with our committee.

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the gentleman. That confirms my understanding. I further understand that the Navy and the Commandant of the Marines will take no such action without first discussing it, not only with me but other interested Members of Congress. Gen. P. X. Kelley made that comment to me and I wanted to make sure it was in the RECORD, and I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. ADDABBO. The amendment I have just offered would strike \$432.8 million for the Pershing II procurement.

Many of my colleagues ask why I am again moving to strike Pershing II funds. That question has been answered in previous years.

We have offered amendments in previous years to cut the procurement because the research and development had not been complete. As of this date, there have been 18 test shots of Pershing II missiles. The test program was originally supposed to have concluded 28 shots, but was curtailed because of technical problems and a fixed, inflexible deployment date. There have still been no long-range shots against land targets and none are planned.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, to those who say we must honor our agreements with our NATO allies, I reply that this amendment would in no way affect that agreement.

We already have nine Pershing II missiles ready for deployment in Europe. That will meet the December 1983 IOC date.

□ 1330

We have already appropriated in the 1982 and 1983 fiscal years sufficient funds to procure 112 Pershing II missiles. The full deployment in Europe is defined as 108 missiles.

As I said before, we have already appropriated funds for 112, so the number required for full deployment has been fully funded in the 1982 and 1983 appropriations.

My amendment would simply strike the procurement funds for the Pershing II in the 1984 fiscal year appropriation.

Why do I recommend that? First, they are not needed. Second, if the arms control talks continue and they are successful, we have been told that this program will be canceled. But if a procurement contract has already

been signed, there will be millions and millions of dollars spent on cancellation costs.

Under my amendment, we would continue the research and development, so the program continues. We must have additional research and development because we know that there are problems with the Pershing II that still have to be corrected. If we allow another procurement contract in fiscal year 1984, and if we find in R&D that changes must be made, then our Defense Department must pay for those changes.

If on the other hand we do not sign a procurement contract, we proceed as we would under my amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. ADDABBO was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ADDABBO. If we proceed under my amendment, we will continue the R&D, but stop the procurement in fiscal year 1984. Then we will be able to make any changes that the R&D program indicates are needed. Further production missiles would not have to be altered after they have been built. If arms control agreements have not been signed, then we can sign a procurement contract for a missile that will fly, and will work.

We do not have those assurances right now.

So, therefore, let me repeat: we have already appropriated procurement funds for 112 missiles. The planned total deployment is 108 missiles. This does not in any way affect our agreement of deployments with any of our allies. My amendment simply calls for a proper appropriation procedure.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Ladies and gentlemen of the House, you have heard the siren's song and I want you to be a little careful now because the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) has been singing that song for a number of years. He just happens to find that this is the vehicle he can use this particular year to try to stop the Pershing II.

I admire him for his tenacity. But we have fought this battle before. This is not a new issue. This is not something that has all of a sudden come up for the first time on the floor of the House.

We have voted on this issue of the Pershing II time after time and the Congress has voted to carry it forward for every good reason.

If you want to bring Ambassador Paul Nitze home, you tell him that he is going to get zero this year in Pershing II money.

It is fine to say that all you need in Europe is 108 missiles. But you know

better than that. You have got to have spares and the program calls for some 24.

You have got to have training missiles back in the States and the program calls for 172.

That is a total of 304 Pershing II's. That is not 108.

So you can send every wrong signal in the book if you stop Pershing II now.

We have not done what we have set out to do. We will not continue to be able to bargain with the Soviets if we stop now.

We simply must go forward with this program.

This is what I called in the full committee a "blink" amendment. The question is who is going to blink first.

We have a program going forward. It is the program that has brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. It is going to keep them there if we keep going forward with it. They will go home and we might as well come home if we stop this program now.

I urge that this amendment be defeated.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I want to compliment the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS).

I think all of us in this House are concerned and troubled by the circumstances that we find ourselves in with the Soviet Union.

I have been one of those who have urged that we try to merge the INF and the START talks because I think it would give us an ability to more effectively come to grips with the issues that must be dealt with to get an arms control agreement. I cannot think of one thing that would do more damage to our credibility in the NATO alliance today than procurement if this signal would go out throughout Europe, that the U.S. Congress had voted to terminate the Pershing II program. Yes, the chairman can talk about the fact that we have procured 112, but I think to get 108 in the field we probably have to have 300 Pershings or more. So it would have a drastic effect on the program.

I hope that we can have an arms control solution to this problem, but I am convinced that it would be a mistake for the United States, from a credibility point of view, and from a foreign policy point of view, to terminate this program at this point. I think it would send the wrong signal to our allies and to the Soviets, and I think it would undercut the ability to get the arms control agreement that we all so desperately want.

I hate to oppose my chairman but I think on this particular issue he is wrong. His amendment was rejected in

the full committee and in the subcommittee.

I commend the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. EDWARDS) for presenting the other side of this case.

Mr. PURSELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. PURSELL. I congratulate the gentleman for an excellent statement and I think you are right. It is the wrong signal at the wrong time.

Negotiations are in place. I think it is critically important that our NATO allies have the confidence that we have consistency in our negotiation policy.

To that effort it would be a mistake to backtrack on a key issue that is part of the negotiating comprehensive arms control discussions and therefore I support the gentleman for his remarks in regard to this effort.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and I rise in support of the amendment.

While we have raised the specter of arms talks failing and the NATO alliance coming apart if we do not procure more than 112 Pershing missiles, let us try and put some of this discussion in perspective.

There is not a person in this room that does not believe that the best way to deal with the question of Pershing deployment is at the bargaining table and hope that we do not have to deploy them. But if that fails, we then are faced with a different set of questions.

The two-track decision that was made in 1979 anticipated that we would continue with the SALT process, and would not have the major buildup of arms that we have had.

The Europeans, while favoring the two-track proposal, were never as excited about deploying Pershing and cruise missiles as we were.

Now consider the fact that over the last few years, and actually since the flexible response doctrine of Secretary McNamara in 1967, we have had in Europe about 6,000, 6,000 nuclear weapons. A lot of them are atomic demolition munitions. Some of them are used to stop invading armadas of airplanes. Many of them are located right on the border in West Germany, and they are in a position where if they are not used right away in the event of a conflict in Europe that these weapons would be lost to the invading Soviets.

Former Secretary of Defense McNamara writes in this quarter's Foreign Affairs that the whole notion of adding nuclear weapons, more nuclear weapons in Europe is madness.

West Germany is about the size of Oregon.

A U.S. report suggests that if 150 nuclear weapons were used in a conflict just in the theater in West Germany that anywhere between 5 and 6 million Germans would die. The opportunity for the war to escalate wildly out of control would be staring us right in the face.

So what does the gentleman from New York want to do about this?

□ 1340

What he sensibly asks for in this amendment is not that we stop deployment, since that is not what the amendment is about; it is a careful recognition that nuclear weapons in Europe serve absolutely no purpose other than to deter the other side's nuclear weapons.

We cannot conceivably think of a rational use of nuclear weapons in a conventional force in Europe that would not do us more harm than good.

That is quite clear. What the gentleman is suggesting is that the money is there, for 108 Pershing weapons, that we do not need any more than 108 and I would argue, though this is not what the gentleman's amendment is about that we do not even need the 108.

For authority on this question of military need for these weapons I would cite no less an authority than Richard Perle who said, off the record, though he has not denied the statement, that the Pershing missiles, the 108 Pershings and the other complement of cruise missiles are political weapons, they are not military weapons. They serve no military purpose.

Do we need more weapons that serve no military purpose? The gentleman from New York has answered that question for us. We do not. We can continue the talks, we can continue to hold the threat of deployment of 108 over the Soviets because that money is not touched.

What the gentleman is saying is more than 108 are not necessary.

I would hope that the Members listening to this debate will recognize that this in no way inhibits our negotiation. It is just a rational attempt to begin the process of limiting weapons that serve no military purpose in Europe.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the gentleman from New York's (Mr. DOWNEY) excellent remarks and I hope that Members have listened because he speaks sense.

This issue involves a roll of the dice. We are being asked to fund a weapon that has no military value but has a political intent.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman (Mr. Downey of New York) has expired.

(On request of Mr. AuCoin and by unanimous consent, Mr. Downey of New York was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. AuCoin. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield?

Mr. Downey of New York. I will continue to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. AuCoin. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, that intent is that it will frighten the Soviet Union into a negotiation and a treaty.

What I worry about is that deploying these destabilizing weapons might have some other effect. I would ask the gentleman if it is not just as likely that the Soviet Union would adopt countermeasures against the United States rather than rush, frightened, with its tail between its legs, to a treaty? And, what might some of those countermeasures be, if in fact that is the option available to the Soviets?

Mr. Downey of New York. The gentleman raises an excellent point. Sometimes we are loathe to recognize, that we are not as candid with one another as we should be. The idea that you would actually raise the notion that deployment of these weapons will beget deployment of Soviet weapons, is greeted with the sort of derision that one usually associates with attempts at unilateral disarmament.

The fact is that once these weapons will be deployed, the Soviets will probably deploy the SS-22 somewhere in Eastern Europe or somewhere in the eastern portion of the Soviet Union and threaten, though they already threaten us with hopeless redundancy, targets in Alaska and we will have a greater escalation of the number of nuclear weapons.

So there is no purpose served by this. It is unfortunate that we cannot tell the members of the Politburo as well, the fact is we cannot, but we can tell each other what makes sense and what does not make sense because this is a democracy where, presumably, decisions are made rationally, though one wonders.

Mr. AuCoin. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's comments.

Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, these arguments have been made over and over and they will continue to be made over and over. In addition, every year this appropriation bill comes up there will be another vehicle by which the gentleman from New York (Mr. Addabbo) will attempt to stop or derail the Pershing program.

But I would say to my other friend from New York (Mr. Downey) and my friend from Oregon (Mr. AuCoin) that it is quite in order if the intention is a political intention, and our intention is

through political means of deploying this missile, to somehow persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate in a real and effective manner and to negotiate in a way that will seriously cause a certain amount of disarmament to take place in Europe. I would remind my friends that the Soviet Union has been deploying for 4 years the SS-20. There are now some 275 to 300 SS-20's with triple nuclear warheads deployed that have not been answered by the United States nor by NATO.

Since we have not answered this deployment, have they done, as the gentleman from New York said? Have they exhibited any good sense whatsoever? Have they exhibited any moderation? Have they slowed or hesitated their deployment?

Of course not. They continue to deploy at the rate of two or three per month and we continue to talk.

I would submit that our European allies have already taken the political heat. There is a government in place in Italy that ran on the platform of deployment of the cruise missiles in Sicily. There is a government in place, by a handsome margin, in West Germany that ran on the platform of deploying the Pershing missiles that the West Germans asked us to develop in the first place. There is a government in place in the United Kingdom that ran on the platform of deploying cruise missiles in that country. I would say to you that the Europeans have taken the heat, and they are at the present time suffering demonstrations and it would be unmentionable at this point in time for the United States to pull the rug out from under them.

I would also say that the Soviet Union has 277 in place and they have not yet begun to negotiate. We have none in place.

The Europeans, in a public opinion poll, show themselves to be totally in support of our two-track system.

Certainly I do not believe there is anyone in the Chamber who honestly believes that the Soviet Union will begin to negotiate seriously until the Pershings are in place and until the cruise missiles are in place.

I respectfully ask for your vote on this amendment.

Mr. Addabbo. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Wilson. I will yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. Addabbo. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman (Mr. Wilson) is a very active and diligent member of the subcommittee. He knows the testimony we received is that 108 missiles is the total planned deployment and that we have funded 112 missiles in fiscal years 1982 and 1983. Now does it make any sense to procure additional missiles which, and the gentleman has heard the testimony, have problems, as revealed by the

18 test shots? Even Under Secretary Thayer has told us that Pershing II has uncertainties. GAO say it is not prudent to go ahead with procurement at this time. Should we not look ahead to that third buy when we have already procured the number of missiles necessary to complete our agreements on deployment? Should we not now pause to make sure that it meets all requirements?

Mr. Wilson. The Chairman, certainly better than anyone else, knows that if you are going to deploy 198 you have to have additional training missiles and you have to have spare parts. The Chairman knows that.

Mr. Addabbo. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. Wilson. I yield further to the gentleman.

Mr. Addabbo. I thank the gentleman once again for yielding. As far as training is concerned, some has already taken place. Other training lies in the future. Regarding spare parts, as the gentleman knows, separate funds for spare parts have been appropriated in fiscal years 1982 and 1983. I say again that we have already funded 112 missiles and their associated spare parts, and we still continue the R&D. Why procure more missiles until the full results of R&D testing are available?

Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. Wilson. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. Dicks. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is important for the Members to get a total perspective on this issue. I compliment the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wilson) for the way he has presented it because I think he does present the political realities that we must face.

The total procurement in this program to get 108 missiles in the field would be around 300 missiles. So in essence what this amendment would do is stop one third of the way through the program, and I would suggest that that will undercut our efforts and send the wrong signal right at the time when we are coming up to the date of deployment.

□ 1350

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wilson) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Wilson was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. Dicks. I would differ with the gentleman from Texas on this one point—I would hope the administration would make its best and final offer in Geneva before deployment. We could have a period where the talks fall apart and there be further

deterioration in superpower relations which I think would be very dangerous at this point in time, and we should make every effort to avoid such a possibility.

I would hope that the gentleman from Texas would join with me in urging the administration to do its level best to get that arms control agreement that I know we both want.

I think the gentleman from Texas is correct. Sending the kind of a signal this amendment represents at this time would be terribly damaging to our relations. Sometimes we in the Congress do not realize the impact of these votes and these amendments when they are portrayed in the European press. All of a sudden, people who have been standing with us on going forward with this deployment, would be undercut. I think it would be a tragic signal to send.

This amendment, as the gentleman knows, was rejected overwhelmingly in both the full committee and in our subcommittee. I would hope that we would stand pat, especially since we are coming up on the very critical date of deployment.

Mr. WILSON. I thank the gentleman and I certainly agree with the fact that we should make our best and final offer before deployment.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose this amendment, and I do so for several good reasons.

For many years, NATO has relied on the presence of short-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons to deter possible attacks by the Warsaw Pact. There are now a number of Pershing IA intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe that will be replaced by the Pershing II. In addition, there are nuclear capable Lance missiles now deployed within the NATO area as well as a number of nuclear capable aircraft. While the exact numbers of Soviet intermediate-range missiles are now known, there is no disagreement that the Soviet Union's intermediate-range forces outnumber those of NATO by about 600 to 0. The SS-20, for example, is considered by Western Europeans to be the most threatening and coercive of all Soviet nuclear weapons. They can strike within minutes with more than 1,000 warheads.

We must remember how the decision to either negotiate a ban on intermediate-range missiles or to deploy counterbalancing NATO missiles came about. Our NATO partners closely observed our bilateral negotiations with the Russians to limit strategic nuclear weapons in SALT I and SALT II. They saw that these negotiations and the SALT agreements did little to enhance the security of Western Europe.

NATO agreed, in December 1979, that the United States would engage in good faith negotiations with the Russians to limit or eliminate the intermediate-range ballistic missiles that then threatened, and now threaten, Western Europe. It was believed then, and it is believed now, that if the INF negotiations fail to decrease the threat and danger, then NATO must deploy similar weapons in its own defense. A 4-year waiting period was established. That period is now approaching its end, and we are still at the negotiating table.

I should note that, prior to the December 1979 NATO decision, the Soviet Union was never willing to negotiate on the subject of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. While the NATO decision did bring the Soviets to the negotiating table, it has not brought about serious negotiations on their part nor have they made the slightest concession. In fact, it is the opinion of all the experts with whom I have spoken on this subject, both here and abroad, within government and outside of government, that the Soviets will not negotiate seriously until they see that we are in fact prepared to deploy the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile within NATO.

As the December deadline approaches, the Soviet Union has pulled out all of the stops of its propaganda organs. Soviet propaganda argues that the Pershing II is a destabilizing first-strike weapon. Yet, the Soviets fail to explain how only 108, single-warhead, limited-range Pershings could make a disarming first strike on some 2,000 Soviet ground-based ballistic missiles. They also fail to convince the world how the more than 350 Soviet triple warhead SS-20's, and some 300 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, are not destabilizing first-strike weapons.

The purity of the Soviet's so-called peaceful intent was also called into question when during the negotiations on SALT II they deployed 200 SS-20 warheads. Since the 1979 NATO decision, they have deployed approximately 600 additional SS-20 warheads. These are in addition to the approximately 600 Soviet intermediate-range warheads that they had deployed prior to 1978.

The Soviets opened the Pandora's box of intermediate-range missile deployment even while they were negotiating on the subject of nuclear arms limitations. Having done this, they now argue that the United States would begin an irreversible escalation of the arms race if it deploys even the small number of Pershing II missiles in Germany this year. I would say to those who might use that argument, that this deployment would not necessarily be irreversible. Neither is the SS-20 deployment irreversible. Those decisions are for the Kremlin to make.

Mr. Chairman, we debated this matter extensively on June 16 and July 26 of this year. On June 16, an amendment to prohibit the use of funds to procure Pershing II missiles was rejected by a vote of 73 to 319. On July 26, an amendment to delay deployment of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles until December 31, 1984, was defeated by a vote of 101 to 320.

Mr. Chairman, adoption of this amendment would be most harmful to our arms control negotiations in Geneva. It would be disastrous to the NATO alliance. It would be bad diplomacy. We are now negotiating in good faith and we will continue to negotiate as long as the Soviets remain at the negotiating table. If we remove the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate, with this amendment, the Soviets will have won their battle through propaganda and without any concessions to NATO. I urge the House to soundly defeat this amendment as it has done on two previous occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. BYRON) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. WILSON and by unanimous consent, Mrs. BYRON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BYRON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WILSON. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Does the gentlewoman agree with me that if we intend to deploy 109 Pershing missiles that more than 109 must be built in order to have spare parts and tests and training?

Mrs. BYRON. I could not agree more.

Mr. WILSON. I thank the gentlewoman.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BYRON. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentlewoman on what I consider to be a very thoughtful statement that clearly explains to this House the issues that are at stake here.

And I particularly want to compliment the gentlewoman for again, as the gentleman from Texas did, pointing out the fact that during this time frame when we have been talking, the Soviets have been deploying SS-20's. There are some 250 SS-20's that have been deployed over this last 4 years and a number of additional ones have been deployed east of the Urals.

I frankly hope that somehow we can get an arms control agreement, and the course advocated by the gentle-

lady provides the best prospects for this.

Another point that the gentlewoman made that is important for Members to realize is that the President has said that we are not irrevocably committed to the continued deployment to the full planned 108. We may start deployment, then if an agreement could be reached, we could take out the Pershing II's, if that was the basis for the agreement that both sides agreed to.

So I think those two points should be emphasized.

I want to compliment the gentlewoman for an excellent statement. I know of the gentlewoman's work on the Armed Services Committee in this area and I think the gentlewoman is doing a great service to this House.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and rise in favor of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, some of my colleagues on the Defense Subcommittee have told the Members of the House that we need the Pershing II because that alone is going to produce a treaty.

Those Members are betting. They are placing a bet that funding of this weapon, destabilizing though it may be, is going to produce that treaty.

I bet otherwise. I am betting they are wrong. And so is the chairman of the subcommittee and our allies.

Who can say with confidence which of us is right? You really cannot. So it is up to Members to think hard about this issue and decide.

On my side of the issue are these facts: This weapon represents a threat of a strike some 8 to 10 minutes away from the Soviet heartland.

The Pershing II will strike no target within the Soviet Union that cannot be hit by other means. The SS-20 that has been mentioned today gives the Soviets the ability to hit nothing that they would not otherwise be able to hit.

□ 1400

The Pershing II does not counter the SS-20 since the SS-20 will arrive on target regardless of the Pershing II.

So the real question is where we are placing the bets.

My bet is that the funding and deployment of the Pershing II in the climate we have in the world today is going to not produce a treaty, it is going to cause the Soviet Union to adopt countermeasures that the gentleman from New York (Mr. DOWNEY) and I discussed a few minutes ago.

Among those countermeasures could be the deployment of their rockets in some of their eastern satellites, which would destabilize the situation in Europe even more than it is today.

Among those countermeasures also could be—in fact we have been told very well may be—the stationing of

Soviet submarines off the coast of America with new, quick-strike weapons pointing at the United States in a comparably destabilizing way.

So I would simply say, if those risks are at least as likely as successful negotiations that so far are going nowhere, why run the risk of this roll of the dice, funding of a destabilizing weapon.

I hope that the Members of the House will approve the chairman's amendment, strike funds for a weapons system that has no military requirement. Even Richard Perle has said so, as the gentleman from New York has indicated. It does not have a military requirement. We have the ability to hit all of those targets anyway with all the rest that is in our arsenal.

Let us just back off for a moment, let both superpowers catch their breath, at a time of real tension and real danger in the world. Let us pass the Addabbo amendment.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Addabbo amendment. I think it would be a big mistake for the House of Representatives to pass this amendment, particularly at this time of testing for the Free World.

The single most important foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union for 1983, I believe, is to drive a wedge between the United States and our allies in the Atlantic alliance.

The single, most important undertaking that today commands the unanimous support of the NATO Alliance is the theater nuclear force modernization program beginning in December with the deployment of the Pershing II and the groundlaunched cruise missiles.

The single thing the Soviets most want to do in 1983 is to make sure that the West does not deploy those missiles.

Failing that, the second most important thing they want for 1983 is to delay their deployment.

The gentleman who was the previous speaker, who is a friend and a very thoughtful member of the Appropriations Committee on which I serve, suggested that it might be the United States' deployment of the Pershing missile which is going to destabilize the balance of power in Europe.

My friends, the balance of power has shifted for the first time in our lives from Western Europe to the Warsaw Pact East with the massive Soviet military buildup of the last two decades. In Europe the deployment of the destabilizing SS-20 has brought an entire new category of weapons arrayed against our allies. To date, the Soviets have fielded 350 SS-20 launchers, each reloadable, each missile capsule containing three independently targetable warheads, capable of strik-

ing every major capital and every industrial and military installation in Western Europe with virtually no warning time.

This strategic goal of the Soviet Union, I think, would be greatly enhanced if the U.S. House of Representatives were to deny funding for NATO TNF modernization. I apologize if that sounds harsh, but I am a little bit disappointed that it would be suggested on the floor of the House that the United States was somehow going to upset the balance, when over the past few years, it is the Soviet Union that has added 3,000 new warheads on modern missiles, while the United States has withdrawn 1,000 nuclear weapons from Europe. As Hans Genscher, Chancellor Kohl's Foreign Minister, pointed out, this Western alliance's two-track decision in 1979 to negotiate while preparing for deployment was tantamount to "a one-sided moratorium that lasted 4 years," while the Soviet Union pursued a massive unilateral buildup, directly threatening the security of the West.

Francois Mitterand, the socialist leader of France, was speaking in Belgium earlier this month, and he said that the real disequilibrium between West and the East is that the East alone has the Euro missiles and the West alone has the pacifist movement, the peace movement. The thing that Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl have in common is not economics, or monetary policy, or international trade; it is their determination that the West must modernize its deterrent forces in Europe in order to restore the balance of power between the West and the East, and maintain the peace.

It seems to me that it would be a terrible signal, just a few weeks and days before the deployment was to begin, for us in this body to undercut our allies in Europe in their struggles to provide for NATO's defense needs. How can America, as leader of the Free World, split from our allies on this most critical issue?

Stop and think for a moment. Italy, which has just gone through a wrenching political campaign, which has a left-of-center government, as does France, is willing to work with the United States. In meeting our mutual defense needs, Italy is playing an integral role in the Atlantic alliance, in NATO, and they join with Germany and the United Kingdom in their determination to meet the unprecedented threat to the security of the West that is posed by the massive Soviet buildup.

Japan, too, is united with the West in this effort. Now, imagine Japan taking a foreign policy position in support of the deployment of the Pershings and the GLCM's in December. That is a risk for Japan. In recent

months, the Soviets have directly and crudely threatened Japan and Prime Minister Nakasone for his outspoken support of a strong West. The Japanese have solidly supported United States and Western European foreign policy since the Williamsburg Conference, which was so successfully held under the aegis of this country and our President.

How can we falter in our resolve, when our allies have been so determined and steadfast? I beg you, do not send this signal to the world at this critical moment in the history of our country and the free world.

Another statement was made that we cannot guarantee an agreement between the Soviets and the United States in the theater nuclear weapon talks. It is true, we cannot. But I will tell you one thing: If you cut this money out of the Pershing II program, I will guarantee you there will be no agreement. This will absolutely sabotage any negotiations going on between the United States and the Soviet Union because it would simply tell the Soviets that if they hold on, if they keep the pressure on, if they send more people into the streets, they will achieve their objection of disrupting NATO's defenses. Now, let me say parenthetically that I am not suggesting that the peace movement is totally driven by the Soviet Union; but you can bet that they are doing their best to exploit it to handicap the ability of Western governments to meet their defense requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) has expired.

(On request of Mr. HUNTER and by unanimous consent, Mr. KEMP was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. KEMP. Does anybody not recognize that it was the Soviet Union, in a heavy-handed way, with Mr. Andropov coming to power, that tried to influence West German elections? Does anybody doubt their interest in this critical decision?

I suggest urgently that we must not send this very negative signal to our allies, and to the Soviet Union. If the U.S. Congress should cut funding for NATO TNF modernization, our European allies certainly will question America's commitment to their security, and in an atmosphere of doubt, our allies would be more likely to accommodate than resist Soviet pressure. The Soviets would be encouraged in their intransigence, and rewarded for their vast military buildup. If we forgo our commitments to NATO, we would only be forcing the finalization of Europe and increasing the risk of war.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEMP. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman for his statement. I think he has hit the heart of the problem here, and that is that our Western allies and their leaders have been subjected to intense pressure to refrain from installing the Pershing II. They have right now maintained a very fragile resolve, and I think it is ironic that we are undercutting that resolve on this side of the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. DICKS and by unanimous consent, Mr. KEMP was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield.

Mr. KEMP. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentleman from New York, and I will be very brief.

I think it is very important what he said about undercutting negotiations. I asked Ambassador Nitze, who is, I think, on both sides of the political aisle respected as a knowledgeable individual, as an individual who helped craft the very thoughtful walk in the woods proposal that was made, and Ambassador Nitze said that if this Congress killed the Pershing II program or stopped it, he might as well pack his bag and come home. There would not be anything to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

We have got to be prepared to give something up in these negotiations. And what Ambassador Nitze said was that if you stop this, first of all, it will devastate the alliance and, second, "I might as well come home because there is nothing to negotiate with the Soviet Union."

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's remarks on the floor are equal to the remarks he has made in our committee on this issue, and I commend him for it. I want to say that I appreciate his efforts on behalf of not only this issue but many others that affect our country's security.

In the INF negotiations at Geneva, we are seeking to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Why should the Soviet Union have any interest in dismantling one missile in their huge inventory if through patience and intransigence they succeed in disrupting U.S. modernization, without having to give up anything? Cutting funding for our modernization effort would undercut our ability to reach a stabilizing, verifiable, and equitable arms control agreement which is so important to this country, and to Members on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEMP. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

□ 1410

Mr. McEWEN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add to what the gentleman from Washington has said: That we have some history on this, and that is that for 3 years we sought to negotiate this issue with the Soviet Union, during which there was no response. It was not until the United States submitted to the request from the allies, as has been mentioned, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and France, that the Soviet Union ever even went to Geneva for the INF talks.

Now to somehow insinuate that we withdraw that commitment, that somehow or other we abandon the commitment that President Carter made to go to the negotiating table, that that is going to begin an agreement, is sheer folly.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. KEMP was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. KEMP. I would like to wrap this up and thank my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. Chairman, I guess the thing that bothers me the most in this debate, and I want to say this as candidly as I can without offending anybody, is the idea that somehow the United States of America, or the administration, or those Members on both sides of the aisle who believe in a strong modernization program, are somehow provoking a Soviet buildup, or that we are responsible for destabilizing the situation.

I think that is a wrong reading of reality. I think the Soviet Union, I would say to my friend from Oregon, is going to go ahead and take steps to test this country irrespective of what we do with regard to the Pershing II; but I respect him for his very honestly and sincerely held view.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEMP. Let me just finish my comment and then I will be glad to yield to the gentleman, because I know he has been a thoughtful participant in this debate.

Words are so precious. What we say in the U.S. Congress with regard to these issues is critically important to the rest of the world, which is looking to us not only for leadership, but for signs of whether events are moving in favor of the free world, or against us.

What we do here affects the course of disarmament negotiations. What we do here in this body affects the course of history. What we do here affects not only our adversaries but particu-

larly affects the confidence of our friends; and they are precious to us, those friends, because they are relatively tough to come by in a dangerous world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. KEMP was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. KEMP. It reminds me a little bit of the 1930's when Sir Stanley Baldwin was debating in Britain with Neville Chamberlain over whether or not Britain, in the face of the Fascist and Nazi expansion of their influence in Europe and in Northern Africa, whether or not Great Britain would even have a defense ministry. Britain in 1936, in the wake of the massive violation of the Versailles Treaty undertaken by the Nazis and the Fascists, did not even have a defense ministry; and Sir Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister, was debating the issue with Neville Chamberlain.

Chamberlain said, "Why do we not give Winston Churchill what he wants most? Why do we not give him a Defense Ministry?"

Baldwin said to Chamberlain, "We could not do that. It would be provocative to Mr. Hitler."

I do not mean to suggest that the gentleman's arguments are the same, but there is an element of this debate which sounds eerie to me. It disturbs me that we have people in this country who are saying so loudly that the United States and our democratic allies are the ones who are provocative. We are not provocative. I will tell you what is provocative. Weakness is provocative. Weakness causes wars, not the strength and the resolve of the democratic West. I beg you not to give in to those who want to cut our critical defense efforts at this critical moment in the life of this Nation and our allies.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEMP. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the gentleman that I respect his views, as well.

Mr. KEMP. I appreciate that.

Mr. AuCOIN. I disagree with his views, but I do respect them.

Mr. KEMP. I understand the gentleman does.

Mr. AuCOIN. I want to say to the gentleman further that I do not think it is a question of a repeat of Chamberlain or any of that. People can have honest differences over the Pershing and what its effects are without having to be typecast into that mold. I know the gentleman means that, even though by repeating the denial a

number of times one would wonder what his point is.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. KEMP) has again expired.

(On request of Mr. AuCOIN and by unanimous consent, Mr. KEMP was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, I want to take my time back just long enough to say to my friend—

Mr. AuCOIN. I want the gentleman to yield one more time.

Mr. KEMP. I will yield again.

I have stood on this floor for the last 2 days and heard the United States of America called outlaws.

Mr. AuCOIN. I understand.

Mr. KEMP. I have heard the United States of America, our President and the administration called provocateurs. I have heard this administration and our country's word being challenged less from the Soviet Union than from the floor of this House and I could not stand it any longer.

That is why I rose to say: Do not undercut your country in a time of international crisis. I am not asking you to suspend your criticism; I am simply saying let us think about the lessons of history.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEMP. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman did not hear this gentleman say any of those things, though I disagree with the gun-slinging the administration is doing in the world. Right now, I would like the gentleman to engage in a colloquy with this gentleman over the Pershing II.

Mr. KEMP. I would be glad to and please be assured I know the gentleman to be a man of honor and one who has not undercut our Nation's foreign policy.

Mr. AuCOIN. I would like to ask the gentleman: If we see a collapse of the negotiations and the production of no treaty, and if instead the "other bet" ends up materializing, which is my bet, that this present Pershing deployment course is going to lead us not to a treaty but to military countermeasures against the United States on the part of the Soviet Union—

Mr. KEMP. May I take a minute to answer?

Mr. AuCOIN. In that case, my question to the gentleman who is so convinced that our arms buildup is going to lead to arms control instead of to catastrophe, is this: Would those Soviet countermeasures not create a more unstable world than the one we have today?

Mr. KEMP. For purposes of debate, I would grant the gentleman his premise.

Mr. AuCOIN. That is exactly the point that the gentleman from Oregon was making.

Mr. KEMP. May I have my time back for just a second? I would like to answer the gentleman.

Mr. AuCOIN. Certainly.

Mr. KEMP. If the gentleman's hypothesis were to be true, it would be predicated, I think, on a separate scenario, and that would be the one that the gentleman seems to be pursuing.

Let me say to the gentleman that I think the Soviets would not even be at the negotiating table if it were not for the resolve of the United States of America, the Carter administration, the Reagan administration, and this Congress, thanks to the leadership of some very lonely battlers for a more modernized weapons program for this country, to build up our defenses. I do not think they would even be talking to us. I think it is empirically true that that is the case. As Churchill said, "We arm to parlay." Our strength is the key to the prospects for negotiations, and our future security and peace.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague from New York to strike the funds for the Pershing II. In so doing, I would like to make a number of comments.

First, I would like to speak briefly to the historical context within which the decision to go forward with negotiations or deployment are taking place; second, to give you this Member's view with respect to what the Soviet response will be to that deployment if the decision is to deploy in December; third, to give you my thought with respect to what I believe the political response will be among the individual NATO countries and the implications for our involvement in the NATO alliance.

Third, and finally, I would like to assert as strongly and as powerfully as I can that if we deploy this weapon in Western Europe in December in an effort to reduce Soviet SS-20's, we will not reduce SS-20's, but we will set in motion a set of objective realities that, in my estimation, will bring the world in a quantum fashion to the brink of thermonuclear war, and I would like to try to assert that in my arguments.

First, to the historical context very briefly. In 1979, the United States and our NATO allies came together and they said, in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20's directed at Western Europe, intermediate nuclear force, that we should go to Geneva, engage in talks that would hopefully arrive at a satisfactory arrangement whereby we would limit the deployment of intermediate range nuclear

weapons. If the talks did not produce a satisfactory agreement, we would then go forward in December 1983 with the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles.

□ 1420

First of all, in terms of historical context, take your minds back to 1979. What the Europeans were saying in 1979 was that we had to bring together two factors: First, to reduce our intermediate range nuclear force; and second, bring some stabilization to our strategic nuclear force.

In 1979, the thought was that the strategic arms limitation talks No. 2—SALT II—would go forward, that there would indeed be some stable strategic situation arising, and against that backdrop, we would limit the number of intermediate range nuclear weapons.

First, I would suggest to the Members that in the fall of 1983, we do not have a strategic arms limitation agreement, and we certainly do not have a stable strategic situation, so there is no stable strategic backdrop against which we can, in my estimation, negotiate a satisfactory limit to our intermediate range force.

Now if we go forward with deployment in December 1983, this is my humble opinion with respect to what the Soviet Union's response will be: Instead of the limitation or reduction of Soviet SS-20 weapons, I believe that the Soviets—and they have already said this; a number of Eastern European nations have already said this—will increase their weaponry, and that what will happen is not a reduction of SS-20's but an increase in more modern, sophisticated intermediate range nuclear weapons—SS-21's, SS-22's, SS-23's, maybe SS-24's, and God knows what else.

If indeed, instead of the Soviet Union coming to the table, as a result of our deployment, if indeed the response is not a reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe but an increase of weapons in Europe, then that leads me to my next point. What will be the political response and the political consequences of this deployment?

I believe, first, that people in Western Europe, when they look around and realize that the promise of deployment did not produce the Soviet Union at the table, reducing the number of weapons, and that the weapons were increased, will recognize what is going on, and I am saying that great tension will emerge in all the Western European countries because they will see an escalation in the arms race, not a deescalation. That is going to produce incredible political turmoil in virtually every single one of the individual nations that make up our NATO alliance.

Now, I say to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, particularly those

who are supporters of the NATO alliance, that there are grave implications.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. (Mr. WATKINS). The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, for those who support our involvement in the NATO alliance, I would simply say this: I think that they must consider very carefully the potential political response and realize that it may very well be to blow the alliance asunder if indeed there is a deployment.

So I believe that, first, the Soviets will increase their weapons, and I believe the political response in Western Europe, in the individual countries, may be so powerful that it may topple governments; and second, that it may blow the alliance apart.

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. Let me finish my comments first, and then we can engage in a colloquy. I would like to present the totality of my arguments.

Now, Mr. Chairman, if we deploy the missile, we will set in motion, as I said earlier, a set of objective realities that will bring the world close to the brink of thermonuclear war.

Why do I say that? No. 1, to deploy the Pershing II missile is to deploy a war-fighting weapon, not a deterrent weapon. The Pershing II missile is considered to have the most accurate warhead ever devised by the United States. It has the capacity to travel between 1,000 and 1,200 nautical miles.

We have, No. 1, increased the range of the Pershing missile. Let us ask ourselves the intelligent question. Do we increase the range of a weapon simply for deterrent purposes, or do we increase the range because we want to have a war-fighting capability? We have increased the range of the Pershing missile.

Second, we have improved the accuracy of the Pershing missile. Do we improve the accuracy of a weapon simply to leave it sitting there for deterrent purposes, or do we improve the accuracy because we contemplate going beyond the intellectual, the political, and the military threshold to make nuclear war unacceptable or unthinkable? No, we cross that threshold to increase the accuracy because we contemplate the potential of nuclear war.

Third, we bring the proximity of the weapon closer to our so-called adversary. We have the capacity to build the Pershing II missile, but if we deploy the Pershing II missile in the United States, traveling 1,000 to 1,200 miles, and we push the button, it drops into the sea. So to make it effective, we have to have some other place

to deploy it so that it can strike. In West Germany, it can strike. That means that we have improved the accuracy, improved the capacity to destroy, increased the range, and moved the proximity of this weapon closer to our adversary.

All of these factors lead this Member to believe that this weapon is not a deterrent weapon; it is a war-fighting weapon. And I say to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that we must understand the enormous implications of moving beyond nuclear deterrence to war-fighting capability. I believe we should never cross that threshold, and anyone who believes that we can fight, survive, and win a nuclear war is, in my estimation, by definition, certifiably mentally disturbed.

We have to preserve the integrity of this planet, we have to preserve the integrity of our people, and the only way to do it is to not engage in the deployment of war-fighting weapons.

Let me make a second point, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that this point does indeed frighten the Members. The 6- to 10-minute timeframe has been discussed. Let us talk about it in some detail. If we deploy the Pershing missile in West Germany, we would be deploying a weapon 6 to 10 minutes from the Soviet Union. It would not be able to reach Moscow, but it certainly could strike deeply into the Soviet Union. Six to 10 minutes, in my estimation, is an insane amount of time when we contemplate the result of the exchange of thermonuclear war materials that might result in the deaths of tens of millions of human beings. But take that 6- to 10-minute traveltime, from launch to explosion, and put it up here in your mind's eye because I would like to come back to it.

I would suggest to all my colleagues that there are more occasions than the American people would be comfortable with and more occasions than many of us on this floor or many of my colleagues who are observing this debate would feel comfortable with. American computer systems have malfunctioned and made mistakes, communicating to the power through our monitors of these computers, and indicated that we have been under attack from the Soviet Union. Now, it takes between 25 and 40 minutes for a missile to travel from the Soviet Union to the United States. So while many of us were asleep, someone was evaluating whether this information that was communicated through this computer was correct and whether the computer was making a mistake or not. Well, 25 to 40 minutes is an insane amount of time, but at least we have had 10 to 15 minutes to evaluate the integrity of the information flowing from the computer. We have had that 10 to 15 minutes.

Now, let us come back to the 6- to 10-minute timeframe. We had 10 to 15 minutes to determine whether those computers were malfunctioning. Thank goodness for that. If we had to launch simply on the warning, we probably would not even be here; the world would have been engulfed in thermonuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) has again expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask this question: Suppose the Soviet Union's computer malfunctions; with a weapon deployment 6 to 10 minutes from them, how much time do they have to evaluate the mistake? Do they have 10 minutes? Do they have 15 minutes? Do they have enough time for Andropov to consult with the Politburo? Do they have time for Ronald Reagan and Andropov to get on the hotline? Do they have time for Ronald Reagan to meet with the National Security Council in a 6- to 10-minute timeframe?

To deploy the Pershing II missile is to render obsolete all of our efforts at diplomatic arrangements to preclude the horrendous possibilities of thermonuclear war.

Now, I think that one can, as a result of this, make the following intellectual argument: If we deploy the Pershing missile in West Germany 6 to 10 minutes from the Soviet Union, the entire future of this planet—listen to me—the entire future of this planet may hang on the credibility of the Soviets' computer system.

Now, are the Soviets No. 1 in computer technology? No. We are. And in the last 10 years, we have had a number of mistakes that could have led us to thermonuclear war.

Is the Soviet Union second in computer capability? No. Japan is.

Are they third? No. They may be fourth or fifth.

The interesting contradiction is that the President of the United States has gone on television and said that we must never provide the Soviet Union with sophisticated new computer technology. Well, if we deploy the Pershing missile and the world may hang on the credibility of the Soviets' computer system, we had better give them the best computer technology known on the face of the Earth if we are crazy enough to deploy this heinous weapon.

So here we are with bated breath hoping that the Soviet Union does not make a mistake with its computer system.

□ 1430

I believe that their response will be to increase their weapons. Their response may be to place their weapons

in a lock-on warning situation, which would take the world to a totally irrational posture.

So we are setting in motion today objective realities.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, for those in this room who remember the Cuban missile crisis, the world stood on the brink of thermonuclear war when we said to the Soviets that placing missiles in Cuba essentially 6 to 10 minutes from the United States is so thoroughly unacceptable to us that we are prepared to risk thermonuclear war.

I offer this observation. If we thought that deploying weapons in Cuba, directed at the United States, was a hostile act, what makes anyone believe that deploying missiles in West Germany 6 to 10 minutes from the Soviet Union would not be perceived as provocative?

Mr. Chairman, we are setting in motion a permanent Cuban missile crisis. We may stand here and talk about sending messages, but the message I want to send is a message to our children that this is not a futureless society, that they have a right to the future and that we will guarantee their future.

To deploy this absurd and dangerous weapon and assume that it is on military grounds is to belie the reality.

To argue that we have to employ this weapon on political grounds is an absurdity. We are setting in motion objective dangers here. The world is not going to come to an end if we do not deploy this Pershing missile.

All these arguments, Mr. Chairman, as I see it, go clearly and powerfully to stopping this deployment. It is not necessary. I do not believe anyone would march into this well and assert with any degree of integrity and any straight face that not to purchase this weapon or to deploy it would mean that we would be the victims of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. I do not think anyone is bazaar enough to make that argument; but I think that one can make the intelligent argument that if we deploy it, we may very well trigger in factors that will take us far beyond anything we have ever known.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken some time to try to make an argument and I make it very powerfully and I do not take the well every day, but I believe so strongly that the most destabilizing act that we can engage in at this moment is to deploy these weapons in Western Europe in December.

I plead with you to support this amendment to stop going forward. We have already, by the threat of the deployment, got the Soviet Union to offer three responses. They may not be acceptable to us, but at least they have begun to react.

To deploy these weapons changes the situation dramatically and drastically and very frighteningly.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. GEKAS. Just one question I would like to ask. Is it not so that if we adopt the gentleman's position that we would be in effect canceling out our commitment to our allies, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the very people who, on behalf of the free world, have requested this American action?

Mr. DELLUMS. I think the gentleman has asked a good question.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. WATKINS). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be granted 1 additional minute.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I ask for 2 additional minutes. I cannot answer the gentleman in 1 additional minute.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has asked a good question. I have tried in part to answer it by stating the historical context within which this request was made.

In 1979, the emphasis of that request was not deployment, and I have gone to Western Europe. I have talked with the Social Democrats who were in power at the time that this decision was made and they said that our emphasis was not on deployment of the weapon. Our emphasis was on negotiation. We simply said deployment, if you cannot negotiate.

The problem, as I see it, is that there are great dynamics that are moving us toward deployment of these weapons, rather than more creative energy toward negotiations.

No. 2, if we buy the gentleman's argument No. 1, he has already stated that we have purchased a number of these Pershing II missiles already. To not purchase anymore certainly does not back off our word.

No. 3, to move back away from December, as if in some way we have to walk in lockstep toward a particular date of deployment and not have the creative dynamics of negotiation is an absurdity.

Finally, we know as politicians that we cannot control the movement. All I am saying is that rigid adherence to a deployment time schedule is not what will reduce weapons in Europe, but the tenacious clinging to the concept of peaceful political negotiations is what it seems to me will bring us to that point. So I do not believe that.

Finally, I have talked with Willie Brandt and other members, other leaders and former leaders in Western Europe. In my estimation, they believe

that the emphasis ought to be on negotiation.

Willie Brandt came to the United States and gave the historical background and then said to an ad hoc hearing of Members of Congress here on Capitol Hill that, at a minimum, we ought to defer and delay this deployment for at least 6 months, giving us an opportunity for successful negotiation, not deployment.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to my colleague.

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman would agree, would he not, that there has been no request from these very same allies in the context of recent developments not to deploy.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has again expired.

(At the request of Mr. ADDABBO, and by unanimous consent, Mr. DELLUMS was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman repeat the question?

Mr. GEKAS. The question was, in view of all the gentleman has said has transpired and all the gentleman's conversations about what has happened in the last few months, there has been no request from those very same allies not to deploy. There has been no request from our allies to postpone deployment. There has been no request from them not to supply the wherewithal within which to go ahead with deployment. Is that not a correct statement?

Mr. DELLUMS. No, it is not a correct statement. It is a very simplified statement. Let me try to answer it in some detail.

First, the leader of England, Margaret Thatcher and the leader of West Germany has said that we ought to go forward, but in other countries this is clearly a question and even in those two countries the latest polls show that the overwhelming majority of the people in these allied nations totally oppose and are terribly frightened by the potential of the deployment of these weapons.

In Amsterdam, for example, they have not made the decision in the Netherlands. I would risk this prediction, that when the vote is taken on the question of deployment in some of the Western European countries, that the vote will be "no." I believe in the Netherlands the vote will be "no." So there is no unified approach. You have some leaders in Europe who say go forward, but you have got millions of people who live in those countries and who believe that they may very well be the first nuclear battlefield.

I would suggest to the gentleman that we may not be the first battlefield, but we certainly will be engulfed

in some nuclear war if we go down that road. I think that is an open question.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

We know that the Pershing II would not have helped us in Lebanon or in Grenada. I do not even think the Pershing II is going to help us in Europe, especially if it does not work.

Referring again to my amendment—my amendment just says to stop the procurement until the Army completes development and testing and has a missile that we know will work.

We have, as I said before, already appropriated the money for 112 of these missiles. Stop the procurement now. See what happens in our arms control discussions; but more important, complete the R&D so that when we do procure the remaining missiles, we are assured they will work.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I will not prolong the debate, but I would like to make just a few points, because I think it is very important that we realize where some of our colleagues are coming from.

I have great admiration and respect for my colleague, the gentleman from California; however, it should be pointed out that he has a very differing view than many of us, I think most of us, on the defense of this Nation.

In addition to opposing the Pershing II missiles, the gentleman has opposed almost—I will not say almost all, but many of our defense systems which are vital to the security of our country.

In one period earlier this session, the gentleman sent us five letters in 1 week.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a personal privilege?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I do not have time. I want to make a couple points.

Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman has challenged my credibility.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Well, let me finish.

At one point during this session, the gentleman sent five letters in 1 week which proposed to cut off all funding for the B-1 bomber; all funding for the peacekeeper missile, the MX; all funding for the Pershing II and ground cruise missiles; all funding for the M-1 tank. The gentleman wanted to cut our civil defense back to almost zero, and he also wanted to cut our military forces, our actual manpower, back by 15 percent over a 5-year period at a level of 3 percent a year.

Now, I think the people of the United States of America need to know that in many of our minds that is unilateral disarmament. The Soviet Union and its allies and its colleagues and surrogates are a menace to world peace and to the future security of the United States of America and unilateral disarmament invites aggression.

In 1938 in this country, Winston Churchill said:

Does anyone believe that a call to a strong military defense is a call to war? Quite the contrary. The only guarantee of peace is to have a strong defense.

That is just as true today as it was then.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we need to provide for an adequate defense for this country. We need to work with our NATO allies to preserve the security of their countries as well as our own. They have asked for us to deploy these weapons and we need to go ahead with it.

□ 1440

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from California for one quick question. That is all, just one.

Mr. DELLUMS. I would not dignify that response.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my colleague for yielding.

I am more than willing to yield. All I have ever asked was to allow me to state as cogently as possible the full range of my arguments. In response to the gentleman, I would make several quick points.

First of all, one of the tactics that we tend to use here is to challenge the personal credibility or the integrity of the individual Member. What this gentleman feels is important but the other important aspect, perhaps more importantly, is the argument that this gentleman makes is not a cogent argument.

Attack the argument. The gentleman attacks the credibility of the individual Member, and that is a gross insult, and I have never attacked the integrity of any individual Member here.

I try to listen to the intellectual comments of the argument presented by my colleagues.

Finally, the great bad word of the 1980's for a Member of our political body to be referred to is "You, unilateralist, you."

That is enough to start a fight. The guy says, "No, I am not a unilateralist, I am a multilateral, verifiable," so on and so on, but I am not a unilateralist.

My argument is simply this: The tragedy of this body, including colleagues on my side of the aisle, including a number of my liberal colleagues on this side of the aisle, is that they can only fight one weapons system at a time.

I am trying to fight a concept. I am trying to fight a mentality. There are a number of assumptions on which we establish foreign, and military foreign policy. That does not make me any less an American. That does not make me any less concerned about the national security of this Nation.

What this gentleman has been trying to do is to force my colleagues to think in different terms.

I have worked very hard to present my arguments. None of you have marched into the well and said my 6- to 10-minute timeframe is absurd. Dignify the credibility of the argument. Do not spend time challenging the personal integrity of any individual Members. That detracts from us, and it detracts from this body and from a debate around the question of nuclear arms which I perceive to be the moral issue of our time.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of California. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think it is very unfortunate when any individual of this House is characterized as a unilateral disarmer. That does no one any service.

My colleague from California and I agree on some issues and disagree on others, but he always takes the floor and makes a very intelligent case for his point of view, and I think we all ought to listen to what he is saying, because all perspectives should be heard in this Congress.

The gentleman from California spends a lot of time in preparation. He comes here prepared to debate these issues, and I think he does a service to this House in presenting his point of view.

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank my colleague.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO).

The amendment was rejected.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DREIER OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DREIER of California: Page 19, line 5, strike out "\$100,500,000" and all that follows through "1983/1985;" on line 6 and insert in lieu thereof "\$137,800,000;"

Page 19, line 12, strike out "\$2,807,702,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$2,845,002,000".

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, my amendment is straight-

forward. It reinstates the \$37.3 million that the gentleman from Georgia's point of order has struck out.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DREIER of California. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

As I understand it, the point of order being conceded on the Stinger, it is now necessary to come back with an amendment to put that money in at this point on this side of the aisle.

We have no problems with it, and we accept the amendment.

Mr. DREIER of California. I thank the gentleman for his support.

I believe that it is very important for us to do everything possible to move ahead with this. All we are doing is supporting the committee position, and the committee has strongly stated in their report that it is important for full funding of the Stinger program. Based on the committee report, they were making no attempt to bring about any kind of reduction.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DREIER of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to rise in support of the gentleman's amendment.

I think it is important that we recognize that the Stinger is a substitute for the Red Eye.

These are both hand-held anti-aircraft weapons, but the Red Eye which is the standard weapon for that purpose at the present time is a heat-seeking missile, and that means that the missile has to go up the tail pipe of a departing aircraft, so by the time you are ready to fire the Red Eye, the enemy has already dropped his ammunition and moved on.

The Stinger will make it possible to get an oncoming aircraft, and therefore, the money that the gentleman is proposing to add to the bill would provide for the development of the advanced Stinger, and I think it is a very important system.

Mr. DREIER of California. I thank the gentleman for his fine addition, and I will say in closing that all we are doing here is supporting the committee's position. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment and yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words and I rise in opposition to this amendment.

What this amendment does is add \$37.3 million to procure the basic version of the Stinger. It does not procure the advanced version of the Stinger, which we support.

The Army says that the basic Stinger has limitations against the postulated threat. Indeed, the Army has start-

ed prototype production of an advanced model, and plans to begin development of yet a third version in fiscal year 1984.

The Army has already contracted for over 8,000 of the basic Stingers. That is more than enough of an inventory of basic Stingers, which may not adequately meet the threat.

What we are saying is, go ahead with the advanced version. Next year we will further fund the advanced versions, but to spend \$37.3 million to buy additional deficient Stingers makes no sense at all, and that is what this amendment does.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I thought the amendment that was being offered was very simply replacing the money in the same program that was knocked out on a point of order because it was funded through another source.

What is being done with this amendment that would change what the committee set out to do?

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee position was to provide the requested sum of \$137.8 million, made up of \$100.5 million in new funds, and \$37.3 million transferred from the prior year appropriation. Our report spoke to the second generation, and said that no more than the absolute minimum of basic Stingers should be procured. By providing an appropriation of \$137.8 million, as this amendment does, more funds are made available for the basic Stinger and that is what we are opposing.

□ 1450

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I am not aware that that was the gentleman from California's intention.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. It is my understanding, I would say to the chairman, is it not, that the committee has originally proposed to spend \$137.3 million in the bill for the Stinger. But on a point of order \$100 million of that \$137.3 million has to be dropped.

However, the proposal of the gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER) is simply to take that remaining \$37.3 million and use it for as many Stingers as we can buy. And not all of these, I would say to the chairman, as I understand it, would be basic Stingers. Some of these would be advanced Stingers.

And since it is necessary to have this weapon, I think we ought to spend at least the money that still remains.

Mr. ADDABBO. It is the intention of the gentleman from New York, the

chairman of the committee, to support the Stinger in this second version.

Funds remain available in the 1983 appropriation for the basic Stinger. We said that more basic Stingers should not be bought, so we move that funds out of 1983 and into the 1984 budget for the advanced Stinger.

If this amendment carries, this gives the Army an additional \$37.3 million which will continue to permit them to buy the basic Stinger, which is inadequate.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want this thing to go off in the wrong direction. I think everybody in this room dealing with this subject understands what it is we are trying to do. I do not want, because we end up with a confused vehicle, to do the wrong thing.

As I understand it, it is the gentleman from California's intention to do with this money now offered exactly what it is that the subcommittee set out to do through another source of funding.

I do not see anything that is wrong with what he is trying to do and I do not see any reason why we cannot do that through this amendment.

We can certainly say here as a matter of legislative history that it is our intention that this money be used not for the basic Stinger, as was the desire of the subcommittee in its original language, that the purpose of the committee is to provide the funds for those Stingers that were contemplated by the subcommittee's effort.

Is that the intention of the gentleman from California?

Mr. DREIER of California. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DREIER of California. Absolutely. I thank the gentleman for yielding and I will say what we are doing is responding to the point of order that was ruled on earlier today by the gentleman from Georgia. Our response is simply to implement the committee recommendation.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I would say as a matter of legislative history, fine. Let the Army take that \$37.3 million we could not move forward and reprogram it or turn it back to the Treasury. But I do not think that ought to defeat what it is the subcommittee is trying to do and what the gentleman was trying to do.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

If it is the legislative history that the transfer of funds was stricken by the point of order, and that the Army is not to use those funds to buy the

basic Stinger, our concerns are satisfied. If those funds and the funds we are appropriating in this bill are for the second and third generation Stinger, then I would accept the amendment with that legislative history. We could possibly clarify this point further when we get into conference.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. And I would agree with the gentleman that that is the legislative history.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DREIER).

The amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED
COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY
(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

For construction, procurement, production, and modification of weapons and tracked combat vehicles, equipment, including ordnance, spare parts and accessories therefor; specialized equipment and training devices; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, without regard to section 4774, title 10, United States Code, for the foregoing purposes, and such lands and interests therein may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public and private plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned equipment layaway; and other expenses necessary for the foregoing purposes; \$4,542,196,000, and in addition, \$83,800,000, to be derived by transfer from "Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army, 1983/1985", to remain available for obligation until September 30, 1986.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would have liked to offer an amendment at this point to allow the Army to provide a second source for the M1 tank engine but I recognize that because of the action on the authorization bill I am unable to under the Rules of the House.

I just simply want to remind this body that second sourcing provides an opportunity to save \$10,000 per engine and over \$60 million over the life of this program, based on the bids that were received by the Army.

I would hope that at some point in the legislative process we will have an opportunity to reconsider what I continue to believe was a very unwise decision, and restore some competitive pressure on this program.

Just the other day the Vice Chief of the Army came to my office and I said to him, "What about this engine dilemma? What about the problems? Is the contractor now providing those engines on a timely basis?"

And the Vice Chief of the Army told me, he said, "Congressman, after the authorization bill was passed with that amendment barring competition," he said, "we have not received engines on

a timely bases from the prime contractor."

Just as I expected, as soon as the threat of competition was removed we have gone back to the same kind of sloppy work that we had before.

I have never been so disappointed in my career in this House as I was when we voted to do away with competition, competition that would have provided a savings to this Government.

I hope that the other body will find a way to come forward with an amendment that will allow the Army and the Defense Department to have the competition that they request.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the chairman.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

As a general proponent of dual sourcing but an opponent of the gentleman's amendment to the Armed Services authorization bill, I must again point out—and I do not want to waste the time of the committee at this point to rehash what we have found out—but there may be no real savings. The Army says, well, there may or may not be a savings.

Until we know for sure that there is going to be a savings, we should only spend money for surveys. When we know there is going to be a savings, then we could move ahead.

On what the Vice Chief has told the gentleman, we had our surveys and investigations staff as well as GAO continually monitoring Defense Department programs. Sometimes the savings by giving to a second source are offset by the cost of Government-furnished equipment or other start-up costs which are millions and millions of dollars, also, a second source might make sense if we know we are going to go ahead with more than 840 tanks per year. Then the committee would look at it. But at this point in time there was no savings, no proof of savings except alleged savings.

Mr. DICKS. I only point out to my chairman that I appreciate the fact that he has said he is prepared to look at this issue if in fact we get from the contractor a bid that shows that real savings can be achieved.

I would point out that the bid that was received did have the contractor providing the basic facilities as part of that bid.

Second, there would be a \$10,000 per engine savings.

So I think the gentleman has made his point.

Mr. ADDABBO. But there are other costs like Government-furnished equipment.

Mr. DICKS. If I can respond to my chairman, I appreciate the fact that he has demonstrated a willingness to reconsider this matter and that the only objection he had to competition

was on the question of whether in fact it would save us some money.

There is no one who I respect more in this House for the kind of dedicated work that he does to try and hold down wasteful defense spending than my distinguished chairman. He has served this country and this House very, very well as the chairman of our subcommittee. And he has always acted in a way that is trying to be frugal with the taxpayers' money and no one respects that more than the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I would be delighted to yield to another great patriot, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DANIEL).

Mr. DANIEL. The only point I would like to make is would the gentleman agree that this engine contract was competed?

Mr. DICKS. All I can tell the gentleman from Virginia is that the Army felt it was not getting quality work done by the incumbent contractor.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. DICKS. The Army wanted to have a competition to determine whether they could get another contractor to come in and provide part of the work. The gentleman is correct, the incumbent contractor did originally win the competition, but they were not doing a good job, and that is why the Army wanted go to a second source.

The bids were received and it is my information from the Army that had the second source been accepted we would have saved \$10,000 per engine.

□ 1500

Now why would this Congress want to stand in the way of competition? Why would this Congress want to say that the Army cannot consider a second source? Why would this Congress want to stop the competitive process, which is what we need to do if we are going to get defense spending under control?

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I, of course, yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DANIEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, did the gentleman ever inquire of the Army as to why they did not cancel the contract when the contractor was not performing, rather than waiting until after he had spent millions of dollars to upgrade his equipment as the Army requested him to do?

Mr. DICKS. The problem is that the Army needs to get those engines be-

cause we have the tank program underway.

What they were trying to do is to bring in competition, first, to increase their surge capability; and second, to put pressure on the incumbent contractor on the threat of losing a substantial part of the business, to do a better job.

I would like to tell the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. DANIEL) that the moment the Armed Services Committee amendment went into place suddenly we are now getting shoddy work done by the incumbent contractor. I think it is unfortunate that we have stepped in and said that there cannot be competition on these tank engines.

Mr. DANIEL. I think the gentleman is perfectly correct up to a point. But the point I was trying to make, Mr. Chairman, is that the Army should recognize the deficiencies in these contracts or in the performance, before they request a contractor to upgrade the equipment so that they can meet the performance standards.

To do otherwise, it seems to me, is to destroy the industrial base.

Mr. DICKS. We want to expand the industrial base, that is one reason why we want more competition, that is why we want somebody else to build these engines.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I of course yield to the distinguished ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services, someone whose judgment I respect on most matters.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I can assure the gentleman that my judgments, and what I will be saying here, are based on facts and not fiction.

I can understand what the gentleman has said. Much of what he has said I have no quarrel with. The basis on which he makes a plea for second sourcing, I agree with. We went over most of this in the authorization process.

But the gentleman is saying something has happened subsequent to that time.

Mr. DICKS. That is true.

Mr. DICKINSON. Which is contrary to the facts as I know them. I did not want that left without being corrected.

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman from Alabama be prepared to sit down with me, and with the Army and hear what they have to say about this competition so that there cannot be any misunderstanding?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield further?

Mr. DICKS. I of course yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding further.

Mr. Chairman, I would be very pleased to do so. Let me say that I, subsequent to the authorization bill, discussed this with the Army and I am told, whether it is right or wrong, I am told by the Army that Avco-Lycoming is in fact producing on schedule and they have no complaint with the product.

But let me say that the gentleman based this on the premise that we are trying to stifle competition. Nothing could be further from the truth. There was a competition when the contract was originally let.

How many competitions should you have in the life of a contract? Well, maybe that is problematical. But now the problem is, the gentleman knows, that the Army had trouble initially with the manufacturer. They got at cross purposes. They got very dissatisfied with Avco. That has been the history of it.

Mr. DICKS. If I could take back my time for just a minute, I talked to the Vice Chief of the Army last week. He says they are still dissatisfied with Avco, the incumbent contractor.

I would suggest competition is in the national interest and what we did on the authorization bill was not a very wise decision.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, let me just set the record straight, and this is on my time: We have never tried to stifle competition. We believe in it. When the contract was originally completed, there was a competition and it was selected through a competitive process.

There was trouble with the manufacturer subsequent to that time. We have a difference in fact, between what the gentleman from Washington has from what I have, so we can resolve that as to what the Army says the situation is now. However, the fact is that when the authorization bill came up we debated all this. We have never been opposed to competition. It is a question of how many times must you make them go over this same hurdle?

Now, prior to the bill and prior to going into conference, I personally sat down and talked with Mr. Ambrose, Deputy Secretary of the Army. We discussed this. He came up with a whole new set of figures that had never, never surfaced during our hearings.

We started out and we talked about buying 7,000 tanks. Nobody questions that.

Then they were going to require an additional 3,000 engines, spares, parts.

Three days before we were to go into conference he comes up with a figure of 13,000.

The question then was: "Well, now, if you are going to start a second source, a new source has to be facilitated, and has to come on line. They have to build up a learning curve so that they can then be competitive." If you are only going to buy 7,000 engines or 10,000, at what point during the buy would the second source come on so as to effect these savings?

If you have to facilitate upfront and make the gross capital investment, will you have enough engines left to produce then to make a significant savings? Only by adding the additional 3,000 engines that they came up with—and they never did explain where they came from—but only by stretching the buy over what we had been told in committee and in subcommittee and had debated, only then could you justify going to the second source.

That is the reason we opposed opening up for a new competition, a second source. But I have subsequently talked to people from Garrett; I have subsequently talked to the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) who is very interested in this, and I subsequently talked to the Army, and I said, "We are for a savings if it can be done. We have no objection to a second source if you can justify the additional tanks."

Mr. DICKS. Why then did you put language in the bill that says you cannot have a second source?

Mr. DICKINSON. If the gentleman will allow me to complete on my time, we would be very pleased to have a second source if the gentleman can show the justification for enough engines in the buy to make a second source profitable, or where it saves money.

So that comes up to how solid the figures are on how many engines you are going to have to have and how soon the second source could come on board.

So the gentleman and I start from the same basic premise, we would like to save money, we would like to have good competition which drives the cost down. It is a question of how many we are going to buy and how soon they can come on line.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I offered to the author of the bill provided that you could not have a second source unless the Army could certify that it was cost-effective.

I am surprised, with that kind of language, that the gentleman and the Members of the committee opposed

my amendment. It says only if it is cost-effective.

Mr. DICKINSON. Unfortunately, this sort of gets into conflicts and personalities. But knowing some of the people involved in the program in the past, we knew the Army was determined to take this contract and take it away, contrary to law. We were not going to allow that.

If they could justify it on the facts, fine, but personalities got involved and we just did not want to do that.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY

For construction, procurement, production, modification, and modernization of aircraft, equipment including ordnance, spare parts, and accessories therefor; specialized equipment; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, and such lands and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public and private plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned equipment layaway; \$9,994,245,000, to remain available for obligation until September 30, 1986.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. NICHOLS) seek recognition?

Mr. NICHOLS. Yes; I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment relating to page 20, line 9, of the bill.

The Clerk proceeded to read the page and line numbers of the amendment.

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. ADDABBO (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against the amendment. We have already passed that section.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman was on his feet but did not know that he was seeking recognition.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, I was at the microphone. I was standing. I was prepared to offer my amendment had the Chairman recognized me.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will have to make the observation that the gentleman from Alabama was not seeking active recognition. The Chair recognized the gentleman was on his feet but did not notice that he was seeking recognition by any vocal expression.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, I of course must abide by the Chair's decision on it, but I would ask the chairman of the Subcommittee on Appropriations who saw me standing if he

would relinquish his position on that matter.

□ 1510

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I cannot relinquish it, because if I relinquish it to the gentleman, there are other Members who are not here who have amendments they wish to offer, and I would not go back to them.

So I deeply regret my position.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to offer my amendment at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY (INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

For expenses necessary for the construction, acquisition, or conversion of vessels as authorized by law, including armor and armament thereof, plant equipment, appliances, and machine tools and installation thereof in public and private plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned equipment layaway; procurement of critical, long leadtime components and designs for vessels to be constructed or converted in the future; and expansion of public and private plants, including land necessary therefor, and such lands and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended, as follows: for the Trident submarine program, \$1,398,400,000; for Trident submarine program advance procurement, \$306,500,000; for the T-AK cargo ship conversion program, \$900,000; for the SSN-688 nuclear attack submarine program, \$1,988,000,000; for the reactivation of the U.S.S. Wisconsin, \$57,700,000; for the aircraft carrier service life extension program, \$95,900,000; for the CG-47 AEGIS cruiser program, \$3,200,550,000; for the DDG-51 guided missile destroyer program, \$53,000,000; for the LSD-41 landing ship dock program, \$405,500,000; for the FFG-7 guided missile frigate program, \$218,000,000 which shall be derived by transfer from subdivisions of "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 1980/1984", "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 1981/1985", and "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy 1982/1986" and "shipbuilding and conversions, Navy 1983/1987", and in addition, not to exceed \$100,000,000 may be transferred pursuant to this provision to the FFG-7 guided missile frigate program from other subdivisions of this account, provided that the FFG-7 guided missile frigate shall be constructed with an upgraded MK-92 fire control system and an X-band phased array radar; for the T-AO fleet oiler ship program, \$349,900,000; for the MCM mine countermeasures ship program, \$221,000,000; for the MSH coastal mine hunter program, \$65,000,000; for the T-AGS surveying ship program, \$34,500,000; for the T-AKR fast logistics ship program, \$219,000,000; for the T-AH hospital ship

program, \$210,000,000; for the T-AFS combat stores ship program, \$11,000,000; for the LHD-1 amphibious assault ship program, \$1,365,700,000; for the strategic sealift program, \$31,000,000; for craft, outfitting, post delivery, cost growth, and escalation on prior year programs, \$1,040,600,000; in all: \$10,913,650,000, and in addition, \$218,000,000 to be derived by transfer, to remain available for obligation until September 30, 1988: *Provided*, That within the total amount appropriated, the subdivisions within this account shall be reduced by \$140,500,000, as follows: \$27,500,000 for consultants, studies, and analyses, and \$113,000,000 for revised economic assumptions: *Provided further*, That none of the funds herein provided for the construction or conversion of any naval vessel to be constructed in shipyards in the United States shall be expended in foreign shipyards for the construction of major components of the hull or superstructure of such vessel: *Provided further*, That none of the funds herein provided shall be used for the construction of any naval vessel in foreign shipyards.

Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I have to say that I was somewhat surprised to be sitting in my office and hear my good friend from the west coast move once more into the foray of the M1 tank engine.

I heard comments that the work was sloppy. I heard comments that things had deteriorated. I heard comments that the Army was dissatisfied.

Mr. Chairman, I have to tell my colleagues that 12,700 of my constituents work in the Avco/Lycoming plant and make that engine. They have had incredible problems throughout the history of that engine, mainly because the design of the entire tank had some intrinsic problems. One of the problems obviously was the fact that the engine, being a turbine engine, has to take in a great deal of air. There were dust problems, grit problems. Those were not of Avco/Lycoming's design.

And I would just like to say to the Members of the House that I really feel it is somewhat sad that union members, over 10,000 of them; non-union members, over 2,000 of them, worked night and day to solve the problem of that engine. Some did not get paid extra for that work, but they believed in the plant and themselves and the engine. They have solved the problems. The Army assures me that they are satisfied. We had problems with the Chrysler Corp. We had problems with too much Army surveillance. They are ahead of production. Local 1010 of the United Auto Workers has shown themselves to be in the very basic concept we talk about now, not antagonism, but cooperation with both management and the military to build an engine that is superlative.

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKINNEY. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DANIEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have just been advised by staff that the Army has sent a letter of commendation to the workers at Avco for superior work. I thought this should be made a part of the record.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1983.

To All Avco Employees:

It is well known to many of you that I have, during the two years I have been in office, both been critical of the rate of improvement in product quality for the AGT 1500 engine and have personally pressed hard for additional actions to achieve high quality levels. It is clear from the latest data that in recent months Avco has achieved substantially better levels of quality performance. I am pleased to acknowledge your efforts and encourage you to sustain and better the results of recent months.

It is very important to both Avco and the Army that this engine be a standout component of the M1 Tank. The importance includes not only operating performance, but also durability, maintenance requirements, and overhaul costs.

I am confident that sustained effort of the kind you are demonstrating will make the engine such a standout.

JAMES R. AMBROSE,

Under Secretary of the Army.

Mr. McKINNEY. I am delighted at my friend's comments. And I would simply say I have heard about this and I think that this is a work force in a plant that showed a can-do spirit for this country. We argued this issue throughout the authorization bill and as far as I am concerned, it is settled. I felt that I had to run over here and turn around to the members of local No. 1010 and say, "Guys, I know what you did. I know how late you stayed. I have watched the whole process. And these ladies and gentlemen of Avco have turned around in a grindingly poor industrial city in the northeast and made a 35-year-old Navy plant turn out some of the best damned engines in the United States of America."

POINT OF ORDER

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to a point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his point of order.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the language on page 25, line 2, after "\$218,000,000" through "1983/1987", on line 7, and also the language after "\$10,913,650,000", on line 23 through "transfer" on line 24—all in the paragraph "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy"—constitute a reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations and thus is not in order under rule XXI, clause 6.

The language would extend the availability of the funds until 1988 and would make them available for purposes different than those for which they were originally appropriated.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) wish to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. ADDABBO. I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. For the benefit of the Chair, would the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) please delineate the precise page and line.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the language on page 25, line 2, after "\$218,000,000", through "1983/1987", on line 7, and also the language after "\$10,913,650,000", on line 23 through "transfer" on line 24—all in the paragraph "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy"—constitute a reappropriation of unexpended balances of appropriations and thus is not in order under rule XXI, clause 6.

That is the precise language.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) concedes the point of order?

Mr. ADDABBO. I do, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is sustained.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ADDABBO

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ADDABBO: On page 25, line 2, after "program," insert the following: "which shall be derived by transfer from subdivisions of the paragraph;"

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, my amendment provides \$218 million for the FFG 7. The committee supports this program. The Navy Department notified the committee that there were prior years unobligated funds that could have been used, but have now been stricken by the point of order.

My amendment proposes to fund the FFG 7 program within the current shipbuilding account. We were advised by the department that there were sufficient prior year funds to construct the FFG 7. Now we are saying that \$218 million of the funds in this paragraph are to be used for the FFG 7, plus the additional \$100 million in transfers which are set forth further in the bill.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I have tried to follow the chairman in his explanation. As I read it, the chairman's language refers to \$300 million which shall be derived by transfer from subdivisions of the paragraph.

Am I reading that correctly?

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding. We are now stating that the \$218 million "shall be derived by transfer from subdivisions of the paragraph," because we did provide for the additional \$100 million to

make the \$318 million on line 7. So now we fully fund the FFG 7 within this shipbuilding appropriation.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Then do I understand that under the language proposed by the chairman that this \$218 million could come from anywhere in this account having to do with shipbuilding?

□ 1520

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Is the chairman prepared to suggest where in this account those funds would come from?

Mr. ADDABBO. We have been informed in various discussions that the Department could absorb substantial sums of money within this \$10.9 billion appropriation.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Since this gentleman has not been so informed, would the chairman enlighten us as to who informed the chairman that that money is available in those accounts?

Mr. ADDABBO. Well, in various discussions with the Navy they needed authorization to appropriate funds and transfer some of the funds they could find from previous years and the balance could be absorbed within this years account.

We do know that they have over \$200 million left over from prior year funds they can possibly reprogram or transfer these funds forward with the approval of the legislative and appropriations committees. But, again, within this account I believe there are sufficient funds to provide this \$218 million.

Again, this gentleman and I know the full committee fully supports the FFG-7 frigate program. And if they find that they do not have the available funds, they can show us how they are being hurt by this amendment.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Let me see if I understand what the chairman is saying. That while the amount of money that we provided in our bill for the FFG was ruled out of order because it was prior year money, the chairman is saying they can take that same money and reprogram it, with proper approval, and build the same ship with the same money?

Mr. ADDABBO. Very possibly. And if they cannot do it, again, we can correct it when we meet with the Senate in conference. The subcommittee fully agrees that the FFG-7 should be funded, and we believe there are sufficient funds within this account or other accounts to build it without giving them any additional new money.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this issue is an issue which I had expected to address in an amendment to restore the funds for various ships which the committee in its euphoria thought could be obtained by getting funds that had been otherwise appropriated.

I therefore took this up with the Secretary of the Navy, and he wrote me on October 25:

I am writing in response to your questions regarding the adequacy of the total Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy appropriations recommended by the House Appropriations Committee.

In the past three years, we have made great strides toward rebuilding the Navy with new and more capable ships. At the same time, we have worked to improve the management of the shipbuilding program to deliver ships on time within cost. Our management efforts have been predicated upon introducing more realistic cost estimates into our budget submissions and then working closely with industry to see that the ships are built in the most efficient manner. As you may recall, Navy's efforts to avoid overpricing of the FY 84 SCN budget received considerable publicity in the media, and some even charged that the resulting budget request of \$12,698,800,000 was too optimistic. At my direction, this budget had undergone greater scrutiny and analysis than any SCN budget in recent history to ensure that it was neither overpriced nor underpriced. Moreover, when lower estimates emerged subsequent to the budget submission (-\$113M in escalation projection, and reduced TAH option prices, for example), Congress was informed.

I have reviewed the HAC recommended bill. It appears that the most optimistic economic and management assumptions have been applied in nearly every case, and the issue of full funding has been ignored. Further, I am convinced that the reduction of \$1.1 billion below the authorization, while approving all authorized ships except one mine countermeasure ship costing \$80 million, would result in cost overruns with the requirement for subsequent request to the Congress for the needed additional funds, or construction of inadequately equipped ships.

I will pause, for a minute, from that letter, to say that very recently the General Accounting Office came forth with the statement about cost overruns in the Navy. And do you know what the chief criticism was? Their chief criticism was that the Navy greatly underpriced the cost of ships, and they seriously criticized the Navy for doing that.

The Navy, therefore, is trying to correct those processes and tries to now be absolutely sure that it should neither be overpriced nor underpriced. But the GAO has said that the Navy has repeatedly underpriced, and that is the reason why we have had these tremendous overruns in the Navy. The Navy was trying to be conservative. Now it is trying to be precisely accurate. Therefore, if you did what the chairman of the subcommittee asks you to do, you would simply say you would like to have the ships, but do

not want to pay for them. That is what it amounts to saying.

Now I will go on to read the next part of this letter. I am near the end of it. This is the letter from the Secretary of the Navy:

My second observation relates to the FFG 7 Guided Missile Frigate in the FY 84 Authorization Bill. It is clear that Congress has expressed its will in favor of delaying the end of production of this fine class. However, the HAC directs "that this ship be built with the MK-92 upgraded phased array radar" (a system not yet developed and not possible for any FY 84 ship), but no money is directly provided in the recommended appropriations bill to build this ship. Instead, the bill would make available \$318M anticipated to be saved in the construction of other ships in the fiscal year 1980 through 1984 shipbuilding program. It would be irresponsible for me to agree that an FFG 7 so configured could be constructed for the amount proposed for transfer from FY 84 and prior years, even if such funds could become available.

Now, of course, this amendment makes it worse than the original bill was because this says, "Find the sums somewhere in your cost overruns, or wherever it is." I do not know why that makes sense, but that is essentially what the chairman of the committee has suggested.

I will not deal with each one of those programs, because they will come up in another amendment.

Now, I talked to the chairman of the subcommittee the other day on the floor, and I said, "Why do you not agree to this amendment?"

And he said, "I am not in any way opposed to the ships. I just want you to find the money somewhere else."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BENNETT was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. BENNETT. The Chairman told me that he had talked to the Secretary of the Navy, as I remember it, and the Secretary of the Navy implied to him that he could find them somewhere else in the SCN program. So I called the Secretary of the Navy. I said:

If that is true, I am not going to offer this amendment. I am not going to go forward with this, if you have got that money. I want you to spend it out of the money you have in hand.

So he said, "That is absolutely untrue. I must have misled the chairman in some way."

So the Secretary wrote him a letter. I have that letter before me. This is a letter addressed to the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO), and it is dated October 25:

Attached please find a letter sent this date to Chairman BENNETT outlining my support for his initiative.

We are gratified that the House Appropriations Committee supported the present shipbuilding program for 1984 almost in its

entirety, and we appreciate your efforts in that regard. The House Appropriations Committee's action, however, has raised questions concerning the principles of full funding and adequate long lead in the SCN account. The Department of the Navy strongly supports these principles.

You have not actually said you are abandoning full funding. If you abandon that thing, you ought to say so. But you are not saying that, because that has been our policy in the past.

The Secretary continued to ADDABBO:

Some specific cases involving the full and adequate long lead funding are outlined in greater detail in the attached letter written in response to Chairman BENNETT's queries.

And I have already quoted that letter to you.

In his letter to the gentleman from New York the Secretary said:

In light of the fact that the appropriations bill is so far under the budget resolution, bearing in mind the importance of maintaining the integrity of the congressional budget process, I would urge you to support Congressman BENNETT's amendment on the SCN which is entirely consistent with the congressional budget resolution.

That is the end of the letter which the Secretary of the Navy has written to Chairman ADDABBO and he wrote it at the request of me when I understood from the chairman of the subcommittee that he had talked in some way with the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Navy said they could find the money somewhere. The Secretary of the Navy assured me that there was no way of doing that. And all that the bill before you, if you add the amendment of the chairman, would do, would be just to say, "We are in favor of building ships, but you find the money, even though you do not have the money to fund them with."

□ 1530

Bear in mind that our branch of Government, the legislative branch of Government, asked the General Accounting Office to report to us what were the problems with overfunding in the Navy and very recently came forward with this statement that the problems with overruns in the Navy are primarily that the Navy has underpriced the cost of the ships.

So for him to say, or for anybody to say that the answer to this problem is just to go ahead and tell the Navy:

Even though you underpriced the cost of the ships, we are going to tell you that you can get them even cheaper. You can find them somewhere where you have money running around which is not identified, which does not exist.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I vigorously oppose this amendment.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BENNETT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Will the gentleman agree that this ship, the FFG-7, was not budgeted; that this was authorized over and above the budget and was not requested by the Navy?

Mr. BENNETT. It has been requested by the Navy.

Mr. ADDABBO. All right, but it was not in their budget. Is that correct?

Mr. BENNETT. It was not in the original budget request; that is correct.

Mr. ADDABBO. It was not in the budget.

Mr. BENNETT. In the original budget request.

Mr. ADDABBO. All right. And then they want the ship, and this is when my discussion was had with the Secretary. They said, "Get us the ship. We will find the funds."

The Department gave us a list of all prior-year programs from which funds could be transferred. The gentleman has raised a point of order on those prior-years' funds, but the Navy, I repeat the Navy, gave us a list where they have over \$200 million which they could use for this ship. So what we are doing, we are throwing to them an additional \$218 million if my amendment fails.

What I am saying is, we support the program. We support this add-on. But take the money out of existing funds. They have it. They have pointed out the prior years and they can then fund it this year because they can move money around, as the gentleman well knows. Why give them an additional \$218 million when they, themselves, have given us a list of over \$200 million they have in excess.

Mr. BENNETT. The Navy is not allowed to move money between years without legislative authority. The Secretary of the Navy never in any way implied to me at any time that he had the kind of money that the gentleman is now indicating. The letter which he wrote just yesterday, which I asked him to write if it were true—I asked him if it is true that you do not have the money, do not write the letter, but if you have the money then write the letter and tell us on the floor so we will understand.

The Secretary of the Navy does not have the power to move 1-year money to another-year money.

After all, let us just think about this for just a second before you get up tight. After all, if there is any money laying around somewhere that does not need to be spent, it can go to the General Treasury, so nobody has been hurt by properly authorizing in the past years.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) has expired.

(On request of Mr. ADDABBO and by unanimous consent, Mr. BENNETT was

allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, in the list that we received from the Navy, and this was September 15, on the FFG program in 1980 they have \$26.5 million; in the FFG program for 1981, they have \$4.1 million; in the FFG-7 program in 1982, they have \$23.5 million; in the FFG-7 program in 1983, they have \$2.4 million. This is only part of the list that they gave us.

Mr. BENNETT. Well, we never received any such statement like that from the Secretary to the Navy, and we do have these signed letters from the Secretary of the Navy, both of them signed yesterday, and one of them addresses the specific thing you referred to, saying they do not have adequate money for it. So maybe in September there was something like that floating around. It never floated to my committee. I am not saying the gentleman did not receive it. But it is pretty old; it is outdated. They have not been able to identify any of those funds today.

So if we need to buy these ships, we ought to fund these ships. If there is any money to be turned back to the Treasury, it will be turned back to the Treasury anyway.

We will do a real damage to defense if we accept the chairman's suggestion, his amendment here. We will not do any damage to defense if we oppose this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. ADDABBO) there were—ayes 2, noes 8.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Chair announces that pursuant to clause 2, rule XXIII, he will vacate proceedings under the call when a quorum of the Committee appears.

Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

□ 1550

QUORUM CALL VACATED

The CHAIRMAN. One hundred Members have responded. A quorum of the Committee of the Whole is present. Pursuant to clause 2, rule XXIII, further proceedings under the call shall be considered as vacated.

The Committee will resume its business.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I renew my demand for a recorded vote. A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 287, noes 140, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 419]

AYES—287

Ackerman
Addabbo
Akaka
Albosta
Anderson
Andrews (NC)
Andrews (TX)
Annunzio
Applegate
Archer
Aspin
AuCoin
Barnes
Bartlett
Bates
Bedell
Beilenson
Bereuter
Berman
Bethune
Biaggi
Boehlert
Boggs
Boland
Bonior
Bonker
Borski
Bosco
Boucher
Boxer
Breaux
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Broyhill
Bryant
Burton (CA)
Byron
Campbell
Carper
Carr
Clarke
Clay
Coats
Coelho
Collins
Conable
Conte
Conyers
Cooper
Coughlin
Coyne
D'Amours
Daschle
Daub
de la Garza
Dellums
Derrick
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan
Downey
Durbin
Dwyer
Dymally
Early
Eckart
Edgar
Edwards (AL)
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (OK)
Emerson
English
Erdreich
Evans (IL)
Fascell
Fazio
Feighan
Ferraro
Fields
Fish
Florio
Foley
Ford (MI)
Frank

Frost
Fuqua
Garcia
Gaydos
Gejdenson
Gekas
Gephardt
Gingrich
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gore
Gradison
Gramm
Gray
Green
Guarini
Hall (IN)
Hall, Ralph
Hall, Sam
Hamilton
Hance
Harkin
Harrison
Hayes
Hefner
Hefelt
Hertel
Hightower
Hiler
Howard
Hoyer
Hughes
Jacobs
Jenkins
Jones (NC)
Jones (TN)
Kaptur
Kasich
Kastenmeier
Kazen
Kennelly
Kildee
Kindness
Kogovsek
Kolter
Kostmayer
Kramer
LaPalce
Lantos
Leach
Leath
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Lent
Levin
Levine
Levitas
Lewis (CA)
Lipinski
Loeffler
Long (LA)
Long (MD)
Lowry (WA)
Lujan
Luken
Lundine
Markley
Marriott
Martin (IL)
Martin (NC)
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McDade
McHugh
McKinney
McNulty
Mica
Michel
Mikulski
Miller (CA)
Miller (OH)
Mineta
Minish
Moakley
Mollohan

Moore
Morrison (CT)
Mrazek
Murphy
Myers
Natcher
Neal
Nowak
Oakar
Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Ortiz
Ottinger
Owens
Panetta
Pashayan
Patman
Paul
Pease
Penny
Pepper
Perkins
Petri
Pickle
Pritchard
Rahall
Rangel
Ratchford
Reid
Richardson
Ridge
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Rodino
Roe
Roemer
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Savage
Sawyer
Scheuer
Schneider
Schroeder
Schumer
Seiberling
Sensenbrenner
Shannon
Sharp
Shaw
Sikorski
Simon
Skeen
Skellton
Slattery
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Snyder
Solarz
Spratt
St Germain
Staggers
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Synar
Tallon
Tauke
Tausin
Thomas (GA)
Torres
Torrice
Towns
Traxler
Udall
Valentine
Vento
Volkmeyer
Vucanovich
Walgren

Walker
Watkins
Waxman
Weaver
Weber
Weiss
Wheat
Whittaker

Whitten
Williams (MT)
Williams (OH)
Wilson
Wirth
Wise
Wolpe
Wright

Wyden
Yates
Yatron
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (MO)
Zablocki

NOES—140

Anthony
Badham
Barnard
Baleman
Bennett
Bilirakis
Bliley
Britt
Broomfield
Brown (CO)
Burton (IN)
Carney
Chandler
Chappell
Chapple
Cheney
Clinger
Coleman (MO)
Coleman (TX)
Courtner
Craig
Crane, Daniel
Crane, Philip
Crockett
Daniel
Dannemeyer
Davis
DeWine
Dickinson
Dowdy
Dreier
Duncan
Dyson
Erlenborn
Evans (IA)
Fiedler
Flippo
Foglietta
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Franklin
Frenzel
Gibbons
Gilman
Gregg
Gunderson
Hall (OH)

Hammerschmidt
Hansen (ID)
Hansen (UT)
Hartnett
Hatcher
Hawkins
Hillis
Holt
Hopkins
Horton
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hunter
Hutto
Hyde
Ireland
Jeffords
Johnson
Jones (OK)
Kemp
Lagomarsino
Latta
Leland
Lewis (FL)
Livingston
Lloyd
Lott
Lowery (CA)
Lungren
Mack
Madigan
Marlenee
Martin (NY)
McCain
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCurdy
McEwen
McGrath
McKernan
Molinar
Montgomery
Moody
Moorhead
Morrison (WA)
Nelson

Nichols
Nielson
O'Brien
Oxley
Packard
Parris
Patterson
Porter
Price
Pursell
Quillen
Ray
Regula
Robinson
Rogers
Rose
Roth
Rowland
Rudd
Schaefer
Schulze
Shelby
Shumway
Shuster
Siljander
Siskiy
Smith, Denny
Smith, Robert
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stangeland
Stratton
Stump
Sundquist
Taylor
Thomas (CA)
Vander Jagt
Vandergriff
Whitehurst
Whitley
Winn
Wolf
Wortley
Wylie
Zschau

NOT VOTING—6

Alexander
Corcoran

Porsythe
MacKay

Mitchell
Murtha

□ 1600

Mr. LELAND and Mr. GREGG changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Messrs. WISE, BOEHLERT, EMERSON, ARCHER, and LEVITAS changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

□ 1610

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: Page 24, line 25, strike out "\$53,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$79,000,000".

Page 25, line 2, insert "\$300,000,000,000, and in addition" after "frigate program."

Page 25, line 23, strike out "\$1,040,600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$1,070,100,000".

Page 25, line 23, strike out "\$10,913,650,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$11,269,150,000".

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a division of the three separate issues addressed by the gentleman's amendment.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question will be divided into its four components.

The gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) will be recognized for 5 minutes in support of the first part of his amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, my amendment would restore funds to the authorized level in three ship programs and provide an appropriation for ships of \$11,269,150,000, an increase of \$355.5 million.

As amended, the bill would do three things:

Provide \$300 million for construction of one FFG-7 guided missile frigate, which the committee has approved. The Appropriations Committee itself provided \$79 million for design and advanced procurement for the lead Burke-class destroyer, the DDG-51; and provides \$29.5 million for the procurement of long lead components for the landing craft air cushion.

I am offering this amendment because the reductions made in programs in the bill, unless restored, will result in cost overruns or the delivery of incompletely equipped ships.

This amendment does not add any ships. The Appropriations Committee put these ships in there. It just has not put any money in for the ships.

As members of the committee are well aware, there have been numerous instances of ships costing more than estimated. As a matter of fact, the General Accounting Office recently came out with a published booklet in which they aimed primarily opposition to the Navy's estimates of ships as being too low. They said that that was a cause of the overruns, the basic cause of the overruns.

So the Navy has been trying to correct that and has been accurate in its statements to the best of its ability. If you took the committee's position you would take exactly contrary to what the General Accounting Office says is our chief problem with overruns. The General Accounting Office has issued reports critical of the Navy, strictly critical statements about the budgeting costs, and has said that they should be more realistically estimated.

In fact, the 1984 budget request and the Appropriations Committee recommendation include funds for cost growth on the fiscal year 1981, 1982, and 1983 shipbuilding programs.

In light of this history, it is not reasonable to conclude that the shipbuilding program can be carried out with appropriations more than \$1 billion less than the Navy's estimate for

the program, as would be provided in the bill before us.

I would like to quote from a letter from the Secretary of the Navy on this matter. At this point I will read. I have already read this once but a lot of people did not understand and a lot of people were not on the floor. I am not going to read the whole letter. It has already been put in the *RECORD* and already been read, as a matter of fact.

The Secretary of the Navy told me:

I have reviewed * * * (this) bill. It appears that the most optimistic economic and management assumptions have been applied in nearly every case and the issue of full funding has been ignored. Further, I am convinced that the reduction of \$1.1 billion below the authorization, while approving all authorized ships except one mine countermeasure ship costing \$80 million, would result in cost overruns with the requirement for subsequent request to the Congress for the needed additional funds, or construction of inadequately equipped ships.

This bill has merely said we just do not want to put the money in for paying for them needed and approved ships, and I think that is a very serious error and it should be corrected. We should be realistic about it.

If the Navy was building a lot more ships than it needed, or if the cuts we had already made in the Navy's ships were not sufficient, or if we had not made adequate cuts in defense in 1983, there might be some grounds for this sort of legerdemain which says build ships out of nothing. But there is no justification for this.

The President asked for a 10-percent increase. We are now down to a 2-percent increase in real growth for the Department of Defense. Our committee cut it to 5 percent and it is now down to 2 percent, and it will still be down to 2 percent when you have actually funded these ships which the committee has said it wants to build.

It will be a grave mistake to go into a planned cost overrun for these ships.

Mr. Chairman, I heartily hope that everyone will vote for this amendment because it certainly will be in the interests of strong national defense. It is not adding to anything. It is what was in the authorization bill. The Appropriations Committee says they like the ships and that they are needed. They just said go out and find the money somewhere else.

There is no way to find the money. If I could find the money, then I would be delighted to do it that way, the way the chairman would like, and go out and find the money, but the money is not there.

The Secretary of the Navy, after I confronted the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) with this matter, he said, "Well, the Secretary of the Navy said we could find this money."

The Secretary of the Navy yesterday presented me a letter in which he said we cannot do it, you cannot build ships

out of air, and so please, offer your amendment and please get it passed.

I talked to the chairman of the subcommittee. He said, "Well, the Secretary of the Navy told me he could find these funds somewhere in the SCN account."

So I confronted the Secretary of the Navy and said, "I do not want to offer this amendment if you can find the money. I would much rather find it somewhere." He said, "We don't have that money. There is no way we can do it."

I said, "Well, just don't ask me to, tell the chairman about it. You write a letter to the chairman."

So he wrote a letter to the chairman and said he attached the letter he wrote to Congressman BENNETT, which I have already referred to. He said we do not have the money and we cannot find the money.

Please vote for this amendment.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

There are three parts to this amendment. One is relative to the \$26 million add-on for the DDG-51. The Department was to award this contract for the ship last December. There has been a slip of 1 year. They do not need these funds in the 1984 appropriation. There has been a slip, so they do not need the \$26 million add-on which is part of this amendment.

□ 1620

The gentleman offered another amendment to add an additional \$29 million for the LCAC program.

Again, there has never been the requirement for advance procurement for this program. These are funds which are not needed in the 1984 appropriation bill and therefore that is \$29 million which could be saved.

These are, again, I tell my colleagues, matters that will be in conference and will be looked at. But they do not have to be added into this bill by the Committee on Armed Services.

The gentleman now offers an amendment to add \$300 million on top of the \$218 million this House has just agreed to. This House has just agreed to my amendment which added in \$218 million for the FFG-7.

What the gentleman from Florida wishes to do is to throw another \$300 million on top of that, give them \$600 million for a \$300 million ship. That is what it amounts to. They have the money. I have a list given to me by the Navy where they have over the \$218 million. His amendment would add \$300 million of new money, which would give them a total of \$600 million to build one ship which goes for \$300 million.

I ask for defeat of the amendment.

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to strike the last word. In fact, this House has been traumatized this week by the actions that have occurred in Lebanon, by the problems that we are facing now in Grenada with the invasion of our troops.

We have not counted the bodies in Lebanon; we do not know the outcome of the problems in Grenada.

As I traveled around the House floor and listened to the different Members' conversations, many of the conversations are focused on the international problems we face as a nation.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that it really is inappropriate today for us to be debating this bill, whether it is the amendment of the gentleman from Florida or whether it is key amendments dealing with the MX or neutron weapons or nerve gas canisters or levels of force in the defense bill.

Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to be discussing today and working very diligently in private sessions and in briefings in our response and direction we must take toward Lebanon and Grenada, and we ought to hold for a week or two the specifics of this debate.

Mr. Chairman, let me be specific and brief: All of us, regardless of our position on the level of troops in Lebanon, or the rightness or wrongness of the problems we face in Grenada, are honestly interested in seeking answers to some specific questions.

In the wake of this week's tragedies it occurs to me that we ought to be in thoughtful conversation about the response and direction that we should be going as a nation and that rather than dealing with the amendments to the Defense bill, that can be demagogued one way or the other or can be misinterpreted by the press or others, we ought to rise at this moment and come back to this issue in a week or 10 days after we have clarified the situation in Grenada and after we have mourned and buried our dead and developed a strategy and response to the problems in Lebanon.

I know the good will of our chairman, Mr. ADDABBO. I know the pressures on the leadership to adjourn by the 18th of November.

I know that Members know what the outcome of the debate and the issues are going to be. I know many of us who have voted on all of the major controversial issues pretty much assume what the outcome is going to be. But I think as we deal with this appropriation debate today we deal out of a sense of emotion and not out of a sense of reason. We deal out of a sense of ignorance of the present needs nationally.

I urge the leadership of the House to rise on this issue, to consider some other issues that may be pending, and

to come back to this issue next week or in the next 10 days.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDGAR. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ADDABBO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I fully agree with the gentleman, Mr. Chairman. The only problem I have is that we face a November 10 continuing resolution expiration date. The Senate is moving ahead with their bill.

If we do not take some action and proceed as far as we can with this bill, we can be faced with a continuing resolution with the House not having worked its will.

I fully agree. I would rather have the bill come up 2 weeks from now but the continuing resolution expiration date of November 10 prevents me from doing that.

It is my intention, I will tell the gentleman in the well, after the disposition of this amendment we will probably get to the amendment on the B-1 and then it is the intention of the Chair to rise at that point.

Mr. EDGAR. I thank the gentleman for the clarification.

I would only respond to the gentleman by saying that I think we can meet the November 10 deadline adequately but it seems to me the pressures on us are too great to continue today.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. EDGAR) has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. EDGAR was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chairman's problem in terms of time and speed. I think the leadership has already decided that this bill will not be up for consideration tomorrow.

I think we ought to rise at this point, we ought to come back to this when we can be more thoughtful about the gentleman from Florida's amendment and all other amendments pending to this legislation, when we can have some clarity as it relates to Grenada and when we can come back with a clear and decisive opinion with relation to Lebanon rather than trying to deal with this bill and rushing into the legislative process at a time of uncertainty internationally.

I thank my colleagues for allowing me to express one person's view. I recognize the leadership has, perhaps, a different point of view, but I would hope my colleagues would support rising as quickly as possible on this legislation.

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word and I rise in support of the amendment of the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOGLIETTA. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the chief reason I wanted to be yielded to here is because I wanted to clarify some of the things that have been said.

It has been confused when it was said \$300 million was added, and that \$218 million was already in to make almost \$500 million or \$600 million for the ship.

Well, it might cost that much money. But that is not what this amendment will do.

The \$218 million referred to is the \$218 million that does not exist. It was authorized—\$300 million has been authorized by the authorization committee; \$218 million was appropriated only theoretically by the Appropriations Committee.

It was said, "Well, you can have money if you can find it somewhere." But there is nowhere to find it.

In order to make the last amendment fit into this and make a logical bill out of it, I went back to the authorization figure of \$300 million, and language that follows makes it a bona fide amendment so it will fit in.

You can go to conference properly, you can knock out the \$218 million anyway as it is not real money, just a hunting license.

□ 1630

The amendment does give an appropriation for \$300 million for the ship. The ship will cost at least \$300 million, that is the authorized figure for it.

And so there really is not any real confusion now about this measure.

Mr. Chairman, the essence of this is that we put back in here only the ships which are in both the authorization bill and the appropriation bill. No added ships. That is all it is. Just the ships that are both in the authorization bill and the appropriation bill.

All I am trying to do is make realistic that the ships will be built and not build them out of some dream money that does not exist. Because the money does not exist, according to the Secretary of the Navy, to build these ships with.

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I think we need to understand what we are doing.

Mr. Chairman, I understood Chairman ADDABBO to ask that the amendment be divided into three parts.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair would advise the gentleman that the conversation the gentleman had led the Chair to believe it was divided into four parts.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Well, several parts.

And my concern therefore is, are we going to in fact have four votes. Is that the Chair's understanding?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will advise the gentleman that under the rules there is now pending the equivalent of four separate amendments. There will be four votes and we may have four separate debates.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I would like then to try to direct the Members' attention to one issue and not try to talk in general terms about four issues. And I would therefore like to ask the Chair which of the four amendments is before us.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Chair will read. It is on page 24, line 25, "strike out \$53 million and insert in lieu thereof \$79 million."

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. If I understand the amendment then this is the one that has to do with the DDG 51 program. And I would ask Members then because of this apparent confusion or potential confusion to try to direct our attention to the DDG 51 program and resolve that and then talk about something else.

And I would just like to point out to the Members that the Navy decided last year that it was not going to let the design contract out to private contractors, but it was going to bring design process inhouse and do it in the Navy.

We concluded, that being the case, there was no need for advance funding of the program at this time. Let the Navy do its inhouse design work. Then come back with a program which this committee would be more than happy to fund.

I would urge the Members in that situation then to vote down the amendment on the DDG 51 and let us move on to the next amendment.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) is recognized.

There was no objections.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of the Navy yesterday wrote me this letter as follows and I will just read the one paragraph about the 51:

The appropriations bill would reduce funding for the Burke-class destroyer by \$26 million. The Navy faces block obsolescence of a large part of the destroyer force in early 1990. Accordingly, it is essential to begin construction of the lead DDG 51 destroyer next year if we are to have the ships to replace those that will retire.

The \$79 million is necessary if we are to maintain our schedule and purchase ships at the lowest cost to the taxpayers.

The item that the gentleman referred to was addressed in the authorization committee by striking \$20 million. So the Secretary of Navy has said

that he needs these funds. I am sure he does.

I ask for a vote.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HARTNETT TO THE
AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BENNETT

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HARTNETT to the amendment offered by Mr. BENNETT: On page 25, line 14, strike out "\$221,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$301,000,000".

On page 25, line 23, insert "plus an additional \$80,000,000" before "and in addition".

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, this is an amendment which would in effect add one minesweeper, one mine countermeasure ship to the two that the other body is attempting to add.

When it came out of our authorization by the Armed Services Committee, this bill contained three mine countermeasure ships. It was reduced by the Appropriations Committee to two.

Mr. Chairman, I want to just take a minute. I realize that a minesweeper is not a romantic ship. It does not win wars, it does not really add significantly to our fleet of offensive weapons, but to me a minesweeper is probably one of the most defensive ships that the Navy could possibly have.

Mr. Chairman, with the terrorism of today as witnessed in the terrible bombing in Lebanon over the weekend, it would be very easy for terrorists to mine our harbors and mine our coastal waters. It would be very easy for unfriendly nations to mine our harbors and mine our coastal waters by using commercial freighters to lay these mines, using submarines to lay these mines.

Mr. Chairman, I think the most significant thing that I can say to my colleagues here in the House is that in our entire fleet, our ever dwindling fleet of naval vessels, we only have three minesweepers. One is stationed in Florida, the *Fidelity*, and it is used for training; one is in Charleston, S.C., and one is located on the west coast.

Mr. Chairman, we have been told by the Department of Defense and by the Navy that, "Well, we have other methods of sweeping mines. We have helicopters. We have sleds."

Mr. Chairman, in order for helicopters and sleds to be effective, you must control the airspace in the area in which you are trying to sweep. We should witness, if nothing else from the Falkland Islands, the problems that the Argentines and the Brits had, because neither had adequate mine-sweeping facilities to be sure that those ships would not have been mined as they came and went out of those waters in and around Argentina.

I think it is vital to the defense of the fleet which we already have, and as I mentioned to my colleagues the ever dwindling fleet which we already

have, to be able to move the fleet if and when the time arises. And, Mr. Chairman, not only under actual mining, but the threat of actual mining, we would paralyze, for a period of time, the entire U.S. Fleet that was located in U.S. ports if we were even threatened that those ports were mined. We would have no way whatsoever of moving that fleet. And I have said repeatedly that if you do not want to authorize and appropriate any more minesweepers, that is all right, because every ship that we have in our fleet now can act as a minesweeper once.

As it goes over a minefield, we will know where the mines are, we will have located them, and we will have indeed swept them, we will have sent to the bottom of our coastal waters one of our own naval vessels because of our inability and our lack of desirability in appropriating money to build any more minesweepers.

I have been tireless in my efforts. I have been relentless in my efforts to urge this Congress to give us an adequate number of minesweepers to clear our harbors and to clear our ports in the event they were mined by unfriendly nations or by terrorists.

And time and time again, we have moved to the left and moved to the left the number of minesweepers which we presently have.

I say to my colleagues that over the next 8-year period we will have no longer any minesweepers in our fleet. If we do not modernize that fleet, beginning now, beginning today, with an adequate number of minesweepers, we will have no minesweeping capabilities.

The ships that are assigned to the Naval Reserve Fleet now are more than 37 years old and there are 18 of them. We only have three active duty minesweepers to clear all of our home ports, the Straits of Hormuz if they were to be mined, and any other areas in this world, Mr. Chairman, where we might have to move our fleet.

I think it is a pitiful shame that we have let what was once a very strong minesweeping force degenerate to such an insignificant and incapable force of minesweeping.

I can only urge this Congress, this committee here today, to amend the amendment of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) so as to include an additional \$80 million—I know the chairman must be saying, "When are they going to quite hitting me with these millions of dollars' worth of figures"—to build this much needed and long past due minesweeping.

□ 1640

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to commend the gentleman from South Carolina,

who has brought up this issue of the mine countermeasure ships. I commend the gentleman for his interest in this program because it is one of those programs which is very often overlooked. At a time when we need to cut the defense budget, there is always the tendency to cut the little things. And, unfortunately, mine countermeasures is one of those things that gets classified as a little thing.

Let me ask the gentleman from South Carolina, if I might, How many ships, mine countermeasure ships, does the gentleman say we have?

Mr. HARTNETT. Presently, we have three active duty ships, we have three minesweepers that are capable of performing their function. We have 18 in the Reserve Fleet, all of which are more than 37 years old and which have already been rated by the Navy as incapable of performing their duties that are assigned to them.

Mr. ASPIN. What else do we have in the antitime force? We also have some helicopters, I understand, and some sweepers?

Mr. HARTNETT. Yes; we do. We have helicopters that pull sleds behind them. Now, that would be all right in our home ports. But if we had to carry out minesweeping efforts anywhere else in the world through the vital straits, like Hormuz, we would have to control the airspace in order to use helicopters to sweep mines. And that might not always be the case. We may not always control the airspace, so we would be relying on surface vessels to sweep the mines for us.

Mr. ASPIN. How does this force that we have compare at the present time with the requirements that we might anticipate in time of war? What do we know about that?

Mr. HARTNETT. Well, if you take the ports which we have on the west coast and the ones which we have on the east coast, if a significant number of our ships were in our home ports, we would have to move those three minesweepers around one at a time, and I guess we would have to go through the Panama Canal to get them back and forth to the west coast. I would say to the gentleman from Wisconsin there would be no way that we could quickly and adequately clear our ports to move our ships out.

Mr. ASPIN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I think that, clearly, this is one of the areas that very often gets overlooked in the general debate. I do not know, but it seems to me that the gentleman has got a case. I think we have got at least a case to consider this, and it seems to me that I have been listening to the gentleman talk about this issue before in the House Armed Services Committee. I know he has had a longstanding interest in it, and I know he has brought the issue up time and time again. It seems to me

that we have got a case that we might listen to him.

We authorized three; is that right?

Mr. HARTNETT. I will answer the gentleman's question in the affirmative. We authorized three, and the Appropriations Committee appropriated for two.

Mr. ASPIN. And the appropriation at the moment is for two.

Mr. HARTNETT. Yes.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the committee fully supports the mine countermeasures ship program. But we have found that the original cost estimates for the first ship was about \$87 million. Some 4 months after the Department received its appropriation, we received a request for an additional \$19 million for cost growth funding for the first ship.

Now, the current estimate is about \$119 million, which is about 37 percent over the original estimate.

Our investigative staff, which is currently reviewing this program, has found that this program has serious problems including the potential for enormous cross growth.

I must point out that the committee reluctantly appropriated the funds for two of these ships because we support this program. Why? Why do I say reluctantly?

Because when we look at MCM program, we see that in a short period of time it has gone from \$87 million to nearly \$119 million.

Let me read to you the Department of the Navy letter which points out that the change order funding situation is critical, it has not gotten any better, and the Navy has severe problems with this program. In an internal document from the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repairs, Sturgeon Bay, Wis., the subject of MCM class change order money is discussed as follows:

Attachment 1 is a change order money situation as of 30 August, 1983. As we have discussed the situation is critical and not getting better.

Your attention is invited to Category 2 changes. All Category 2 items are significant changes. SUPSHIP has used every legal contractual maneuver to develop and incorporate the desired changes without committing fiscal resources. The time to pay the piper is upon us. Unfortunately, without additional changes or the money, at least 2 category items will not be adjudicated. Without adjudication the Contractor will not proceed.

Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, this simple wooden minesweeper has design specifications numbering almost 800 pages. Yet the Department has submitted nearly 300 pages of new changes. Our investigation staff now tells us that no one really knows what this program is going to cost. I must point out again we do support the pro-

gram. But let the program proceed in an orderly fashion. Two ships are sufficient to keep this program moving to see exactly where we are going, and how much it is going to cost. At this point in time, to add an additional MCM ship on top of the two that we have appropriated money for would not be prudent and in the best interest of the taxpayers who are looking for a strong and efficient national defense.

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. HARTNETT. I thank the chairman for yielding, and I thank him for his courtesies this morning.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say to you that if the ship is not what it is purported to be, if the cost is not what it is estimated to be, then not only should we not have three, we should not have two, and we probably should not have one.

I know the chairman is interested in mine countermeasures, and I deeply appreciate that. But, Mr. Chairman, the ship is a good ship. It deals with complicated mines. This ship has to be able to sweep mines. There are all types of magnetic mines, percussion mines, medium-depth mines, deep-water mines, shallow-water mines. The mechanics and the mechanisms on this ship themselves are complicated. And to say that because the Trident submarine had serious cost overruns and many thousands of change orders does not mean it is not a good submarine. It is the same with the mine-sweeper.

Mr. ADDABBO. Again, I fully agree that the program is a good one. The ship ultimately may turn out to be a good one. But we should not throw this much money into the program until we have an efficient program.

What we have found is that money has never cured overruns, and never has cured the types of problems this program is incurring. More money oftentimes just creates greater problems. When we keep a tight rein on them, then we find that we get cost-effective ships and we get ships that work and will meet the threat. That is why I tell the gentleman that this amendment is premature.

We will continue to review the program. There was quite a bit of sentiment within the subcommittee not to fund it at all. But to show our intention and our belief that we do need these programs, we are willing to fund two ships. But we must keep a tight rein on it when we find this type of an operation within the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ADDABBO was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one more question?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. HARTNETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding again.

Mr. Chairman, is it not true that, although this amendment calls for \$80 million, and you say that the cost run is as high as \$113 million—

Mr. ADDABBO. Nearly \$119 million for the first ship of the class.

Mr. HARTNETT. \$119 million. Would we not get a better deal on three ships, would we not get them cheaper per copy if we built the three rather than the two and maybe bring the cost down to what it was originally estimated to be?

Mr. ADDABBO. No, because we still do not know the cost of the first MCM ship.

Let me just read the bottom line of this internal memo: "Recommendation. PMS 303 organize a MCM-1 change order relief fund bake sale."

Mr. HARTNETT. I appreciate the gentleman's yielding. I understand his interest in mine countermeasures.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I would like to address the questions that are raised here.

The letter from the Secretary of the Navy about this says as follows, the letter from Secretary Lehman, written yesterday:

The Navy is critically short of minesweeping ships. The few ships in the fleet are more than 25 years old.

The design problems encountered in the MCM program earlier this year are being resolved. Funding 3 ships this year offers the opportunity for cost savings through competition. With 2 shipbuilders in the program, 3 ships is the minimum that can be ordered each year if we are to maintain realistic competition.

□ 1650

Mr. Chairman, I did not offer this as a part of my amendment simply because I wanted to underline in all the other things in this amendment a consistency which was in all the other parts of the amendment. These were places where the committee said, "Yes, we need these ships for the defense of America, but we want the Navy to find the money for these ships."

Somewhere they are supposed to find the money, and the Secretary of the Navy has said as of yesterday there is no way to find the money for those ships which are in the other part of my amendment.

But this is in no way to be construed in opposition to this particular ship. This ship was in the authorization process. It is a greatly needed ship. It ought to be built, and I am happy myself to support this addition to the amendment. I hope sincerely that the

amendment to the amendment will be agreed to.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this amendment to add one mine countermeasure vessel to the bill. The reason I do that is this: I realize the chairman, the ranking member and others are presenting some very valid arguments, but we are a maritime nation. We have at this time 21 minesweepers. The Soviet Union has 388. Some of ours are as old as 30-year vintage. The Soviets have state-of-the-art minesweepers. Ours are obsolete. Many of them are outmoded.

As our Nation moves to build a modern Navy, much attention has been focused on the big-ticket items in the naval budget. However, far too little attention, I think, has been given to protecting our ports and seaways from the dangers of mines. It makes little sense to construct aircraft carriers and refurbish battleships if we cannot move them in and out of our ports during wartime. Yet at the present time, the Navy's 21 minesweepers could keep open only 2 of the 12 ports that are most vital in time of war.

Since we depend on our open sea lanes and harbors as part of our military strategy, it is absolutely vital that we have the wherewithal to keep them open. At the present time, however, we must rely on minesweepers that are over 30 years old. We need a new generation of technology, up-to-date minesweepers to replace the current ships.

World War II technology simply is not going to suffice in a future conflict. In short, to fund only two ships instead of three because of design or technical problems would be to do so under false pretenses. All systems are go, and when all the 14 ships are completed, the United States will be much better defended against the threat of mines.

Vice Admiral Walters and other people in Naval Operations have said that no segment in our naval warfare has been underfunded for so many years as has been the mine warfare community. This becomes apparent, I think, when we take a look at our force of 21 compared to the Soviets 388. If we are going to have security, if we are going to protect ourselves, even if we take all the minesweepers in NATO and other allied countries, the Soviets would still have one-third more than all of us combined.

The fiscal year 1984 defense appropriation includes three minesweepers, one less, incidentally, than the administration requested. For our security, we cannot allow the mine warfare community to be underfunded any longer. Therefore, I would urge that we strongly support the Hartnett amendment which would appropriate

funds for all three mine countermeasure ships, still one less than requested by the administration.

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROTH. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. HARTNETT. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I appreciate his remarks.

There are many who urge us not to go on with this mad nuclear race that the world is experiencing and to build other methods, conventional methods, of protecting America. I would remind the gentleman in the well that the ship that we asked for is not a nuclear-powered vessel. It does not carry nuclear arms. It has no warheads. As a matter of fact, it probably does not even have a gun. All it does is guarantee our other warships that they can move freely in and out of their ports in time of war. It is probably the most simple, peace-loving ship ever constructed by a nation. It is incapable of performing an offensive movement. It is strictly a defensive vessel.

Mr. ROTH. I thank the gentleman for his remarks, because he is right on target. No matter how many millions we spend to rejuvenate the Navy, to build a strong Navy, if we cannot move those ships it is useless. We cannot move those ships unless we have the minesweepers to do it.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I shall try not to take too much time. The gentleman from South Carolina was correct a while ago that if these systems are not ready, if in fact these minesweepers should not be funded then we should have zero instead of the two. In truth, we had no minesweepers in our original markup and we were importuned by Members from Wisconsin and Michigan and the gentleman from South Carolina to go back and reconsider.

We did go back in our markup and I, in fact, was the one who offered the amendment to put two minesweepers in our bill that you now have before you. The reason we held off originally and the reason that we only put two in ultimately was because there are many problems yet to be solved with these minesweepers. The detailed design work is only 40 percent complete on these ships. These systems are really not yet fully up to par and ready to go.

So what we felt was necessary ultimately was, all right, go with two, but do not go any further than that until we get some of these problems worked out. I am mindful of the fact that in the gentleman's own committee, the Committee on Armed Services, you knocked one out. The administration requested four. You knocked one out

and you said in your language during the hearings process:

The committee was informed of design and configuration problems in the MCM lead ship. As a result of the design problems and to slow the program, the committee recommended the reduction of \$80 million and one MCM ship.

We found some of the same problems you found, and we in fact reduced by one further ship. I think we come to the floor probably having done more than we should do because of the requests by Members in this House.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from Alabama summarizes very, very well. Our committee is for mine countermeasure ships. We are just worried that with the technical problems we have with these ships that we ought not to go ahead as fast as the authorizing committee wants to go ahead.

I must tell the people who have an interest in this that the disposition of the committee was to fund none of these ships because of the technical problems. So we have come a very significant way. Some would suggest that we may have even come too far with the kinds of technical problems that are faced.

So I would hope the House, the committee, would stay with the Appropriations Subcommittee that took a hard look at this.

I am for the mine countermeasure ships, and I agree with the gentleman from South Carolina that we need those ships desperately in the Navy. They are critical. But we certainly do not want to buy ships where we have serious technical problems. That is not going to solve the military requirement that the gentleman from South Carolina has so carefully portrayed to this body. I think the gentleman from South Carolina ought to consider that fact in pressing this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. HARTNETT) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. HARTNETT) there were—ayes 15, noes 28.

So the amendment to the amendment was rejected.

□ 1700

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) and the question has been divided into four parts.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my previous request that the question be divided, and that we vote en bloc on the four parts of the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT).

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXIII, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the pending question following the quorum call. Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to their names:

[Roll No. 420]

| | | |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|
| Ackerman | Byron | Dyson |
| Addabbo | Campbell | Early |
| Akaka | Carney | Eckart |
| Albosta | Carper | Edgar |
| Alexander | Carr | Edwards (AL) |
| Anderson | Chandler | Edwards (CA) |
| Andrews (NC) | Chappell | Edwards (OK) |
| Andrews (TX) | Chappie | Emerson |
| Annunzio | Cheney | English |
| Anthony | Clarke | Erdreich |
| Applegate | Clay | Erlenborn |
| Aspin | Clinger | Evans (IA) |
| AuCoin | Coats | Evans (IL) |
| Badham | Coelho | Fascell |
| Barnard | Coleman (MO) | Fazio |
| Barnes | Coleman (TX) | Feighan |
| Bartlett | Collins | Ferraro |
| Bateman | Conable | Fiedler |
| Bates | Conte | Fields |
| Bedell | Conyers | Fish |
| Beilenson | Cooper | Filippo |
| Bennett | Coughlin | Florio |
| Bereuter | Courter | Foglietta |
| Berman | Coyne | Foley |
| Bethune | Craig | Ford (MI) |
| Bevill | Crane, Daniel | Ford (TN) |
| Biaggi | Crane, Philip | Forsythe |
| Bilirakis | Crockett | Fowler |
| Billey | Daniel | Frank |
| Boehlert | Dannemeyer | Franklin |
| Boggs | Daschle | Frenzel |
| Boland | Daub | Fuqua |
| Boner | Davis | Garcia |
| Bonior | de la Garza | Gaydos |
| Bonker | Dellums | Gejdenson |
| Borski | Derrick | Gekas |
| Bosco | DeWine | Gephardt |
| Boucher | Dickinson | Gilman |
| Boxer | Dicks | Gingrich |
| Breaux | Dixon | Glickman |
| Britt | Donnelly | Gonzalez |
| Brooks | Dorgan | Goodling |
| Broomfield | Dowdy | Gore |
| Brown (CA) | Downey | Gradison |
| Brown (CO) | Dreier | Gramm |
| Broyhill | Duncan | Gray |
| Bryant | Durbin | Green |
| Burton (CA) | Dwyer | Gregg |
| Burton (IN) | Dymally | Guarini |

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|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| Gunderson | McCandless | Schroeder |
| Hall (IN) | McCloskey | Schulze |
| Hall (OH) | McCollum | Schumer |
| Hall, Ralph | McCurdy | Seiberling |
| Hall, Sam | McDade | Sensenbrenner |
| Hamilton | McEwen | Shannon |
| Hammerhead | McGrath | Sharp |
| Hance | McHugh | Shaw |
| Hansen (ID) | McKernan | Shelby |
| Hansen (UT) | McKinney | Shumway |
| Harkin | McNulty | Shuster |
| Harrison | Mica | Sikorski |
| Hartnett | Michel | Siljander |
| Hatcher | Mikulski | Simon |
| Hawkins | Miller (CA) | Sisisky |
| Hayes | Miller (OH) | Skeen |
| Hefner | Mineta | Skelton |
| Heftel | Minish | Slattery |
| Hertel | Moakley | Smith (FL) |
| Hightower | Molinaro | Smith (IA) |
| Hiler | Mollohan | Smith (NE) |
| Hillis | Montgomery | Smith (NJ) |
| Holt | Moody | Smith, Denny |
| Hopkins | Moore | Smith, Robert |
| Horton | Moorhead | Snowe |
| Howard | Morrison (CT) | Snyder |
| Hoyer | Morrison (WA) | Solomon |
| Hubbard | Mrazek | Spence |
| Huckaby | Murphy | Spratt |
| Hughes | Murtha | St Germain |
| Hunter | Myers | Staggers |
| Hutto | Natcher | Stangeland |
| Hyde | Nelson | Stenholm |
| Ireland | Nichols | Stokes |
| Jacobs | Nielson | Stratton |
| Jeffords | Nowak | Studds |
| Jenkins | O'Brien | Stump |
| Johnson | Oakar | Sundquist |
| Jones (NC) | Oberstar | Swift |
| Jones (OK) | Obey | Synar |
| Jones (TN) | Olin | Tallon |
| Kaptur | Ortiz | Tauke |
| Kasich | Ottenger | Tauzin |
| Kastenmeier | Owens | Taylor |
| Kazen | Oxley | Thomas (CA) |
| Kennelly | Packard | Thomas (GA) |
| Kildee | Panetta | Torres |
| Kindness | Parris | Torricelli |
| Kogovsek | Pashayan | Towns |
| Kolter | Patman | Traxler |
| Kramer | Patterson | Udall |
| LaFalce | Paul | Valentine |
| Lagomarsino | Pease | Vander Jagt |
| Latta | Penny | Vandergriff |
| Leach | Perkins | Vento |
| Leath | Petri | Volkmer |
| Lehman (CA) | Pickle | Vucanovich |
| Lehman (FL) | Porter | Walgren |
| Lent | Price | Walker |
| Levin | Pritchard | Watkins |
| Levine | Pursell | Waxman |
| Levitas | Quillen | Weaver |
| Lewis (CA) | Rahall | Weber |
| Lewis (FL) | Rangel | Weiss |
| Lipinski | Ratchford | Wheat |
| Lloyd | Ray | Whitehurst |
| Loeffler | Regula | Whitley |
| Long (LA) | Reid | Whittaker |
| Long (MD) | Richardson | Whitten |
| Lott | Ridge | Williams (MT) |
| Lowery (CA) | Rinaldo | Williams (OH) |
| Lowry (WA) | Ritter | Wilson |
| Lujan | Roberts | Winn |
| Luken | Robinson | Wirth |
| Lundine | Rodino | Wise |
| Lungren | Roe | Wolf |
| Mack | Roemer | Wolpe |
| MacKay | Rogers | Wortley |
| Madigan | Rose | Wright |
| Markey | Rostenkowski | Wyden |
| Marlenee | Roth | Wyllie |
| Marriott | Roukema | Yates |
| Martin (IL) | Rowland | Yatron |
| Martin (NC) | Roybal | Young (AK) |
| Martin (NY) | Rudd | Young (FL) |
| Martinez | Russo | Young (MO) |
| Matsui | Sabo | Zablocki |
| Mavroules | Savage | Zschau |
| Mazzoli | Sawyer | |
| McCain | Schaefer | |

□ 1720

The CHAIRMAN. Four hundred fifteen Members have answered to their

names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

RECORDED VOTE

The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) for a recorded vote.

Does the gentleman insist upon a recorded vote?

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I insist upon a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would also like to announce to the Members that this is a 5-minute vote.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 85, noes 342, not voting 6, as follows:

[Roll No. 421]

AYES—85

| | | |
|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| Badham | Hatcher | Packard |
| Barnard | Hertel | Pashayan |
| Bateman | Hillis | Patman |
| Bennett | Holt | Patterson |
| Billey | Hunter | Pepper |
| Boggs | Hutto | Price |
| Britt | Ireland | Quillen |
| Broomfield | Kemp | Ray |
| Bryant | Lagomarsino | Roemer |
| Burton (IN) | Lewis (CA) | Rose |
| Carney | Lloyd | Roth |
| Chappell | Lott | Rudd |
| Coleman (TX) | Lowery (CA) | Schneider |
| Crane, Daniel | Lungren | Shumway |
| Crane, Philip | Marlenee | Siljander |
| Daniel | Martin (NY) | Sisisky |
| Davis | McCain | Smith (NJ) |
| DeWine | McEwen | Snowe |
| Dickinson | McGrath | Solomon |
| Dreier | McKernan | Spence |
| Dyson | Mica | Stratton |
| Edgar | Molinaro | Stump |
| Fascell | Mollohan | Vandergriff |
| Fiedler | Montgomery | Vucanovich |
| Foglietta | Moorhead | Whitehurst |
| Franklin | Neal | Whitley |
| Gilman | Nelson | Wortley |
| Hall, Ralph | Nichols | |
| Hartnett | Ortiz | |

NOES—342

| | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Ackerman | Brown (CO) | Dowdy |
| Addabbo | Broyhill | Downey |
| Akaka | Burton (CA) | Duncan |
| Albosta | Byron | Durbin |
| Alexander | Campbell | Dwyer |
| Anderson | Carper | Dymally |
| Andrews (NC) | Carr | Early |
| Andrews (TX) | Chandler | Eckart |
| Annunzio | Chappie | Edwards (AL) |
| Anthony | Cheney | Edwards (CA) |
| Applegate | Clarke | Edwards (OK) |
| Archer | Clay | Emerson |
| Aspin | Clinger | English |
| AuCoin | Coats | Erdreich |
| Barnes | Coleman (MO) | Erlenborn |
| Bartlett | Collins | Evans (IA) |
| Bates | Conable | Evans (IL) |
| Bedell | Conte | Fazio |
| Beilenson | Conyers | Feighan |
| Bereuter | Cooper | Ferraro |
| Berman | Coughlin | Fields |
| Bethune | Courter | Fish |
| Bevill | Coyne | Filippo |
| Biaggi | Craig | Florio |
| Bilirakis | Crockett | Foley |
| Boehlert | D'Amons | Ford (MI) |
| Boland | Dannemeyer | Ford (TN) |
| Boner | Daschle | Forsythe |
| Bonior | Daub | Fowler |
| Bonker | de la Garza | Frank |
| Bosco | Dellums | Frenzel |
| Boucher | Derrick | Frost |
| Boxer | Dicks | Fuqua |
| Breaux | Dingell | Garcia |
| Brooks | Dixon | Gaydos |
| Brown (CA) | Donnelly | Gejdenson |
| | Dorgan | Gekas |

| | | |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Gephardt | Madigan | Scheuer |
| Gibbons | Markey | Schroeder |
| Gingrich | Marriott | Schulze |
| Glickman | Martin (IL) | Schumer |
| Gonzalez | Martin (NC) | Seiberling |
| Goodling | Martinez | Sensenbrenner |
| Gore | Matsui | Shannon |
| Gradison | Mavroules | Sharp |
| Gramm | Mazzoli | Shaw |
| Gray | McCandless | Shelby |
| Green | McCloskey | Shuster |
| Gregg | McCollum | Sikorski |
| Guarini | McCurdy | Simon |
| Gunderson | McDade | Skeen |
| Hall (IN) | McHugh | Skelton |
| Hall (OH) | McKinney | Slattery |
| Hall, Sam | McNulty | Smith (FL) |
| Hamilton | Michel | Smith (IA) |
| Hammerschmidt | Mikulski | Smith (NE) |
| Hance | Miller (CA) | Smith, Denny |
| Hansen (ID) | Miller (OH) | Smith, Robert |
| Hansen (UT) | Mineta | Snyder |
| Harkin | Minish | Solarz |
| Harrison | Moakley | Spratt |
| Hawkins | Moody | St Germain |
| Hayes | Moore | Staggers |
| Hefner | Morrison (CT) | Stangeland |
| Heftel | Morrison (WA) | Stark |
| Hightower | Mrazek | Stenholm |
| Hiler | Murphy | Stokes |
| Hopkins | Murtha | Studds |
| Horton | Myers | Sundquist |
| Howard | Natcher | Swift |
| Hoyer | Nielson | Synar |
| Hubbard | Nowak | Tallon |
| Huckaby | O'Brien | Tauke |
| Hughes | Oaker | Tauzin |
| Hyde | Oberstar | Taylor |
| Jacobs | Obey | Thomas (CA) |
| Jeffords | Olin | Thomas (GA) |
| Jenkins | Ottlinger | Torres |
| Johnson | Owens | Torricelli |
| Jones (NC) | Oxley | Towns |
| Jones (OK) | Panetta | Traxler |
| Jones (TN) | Parris | Udall |
| Kaptur | Paul | Valentine |
| Kasich | Pease | Vander Jagt |
| Kastenmeier | Penny | Vento |
| Kazen | Perkins | Volkmer |
| Kennelly | Petri | Walgren |
| Kildee | Pickle | Walker |
| Kindness | Porter | Watkins |
| Kogovsek | Pritchard | Waxman |
| Kolter | Pursell | Weaver |
| Kramer | Rahall | Weber |
| LaFalce | Rangel | Weiss |
| Latta | Ratchford | Wheat |
| Leach | Regula | Whittaker |
| Leath | Reid | Whitten |
| Lehman (CA) | Richardson | Williams (MT) |
| Lehman (FL) | Ridge | Williams (OH) |
| Leland | Rinaldo | Wilson |
| Lent | Ritter | Winn |
| Levin | Roberts | Wirth |
| Levine | Robinson | Wise |
| Levitas | Rodino | Wolf |
| Lewis (FL) | Roe | Wolpe |
| Lipinski | Rogers | Wright |
| Loeffler | Rostenkowski | Wyden |
| Long (LA) | Roukema | Wyllie |
| Long (MD) | Rowland | Yates |
| Lowry (WA) | Roybal | Yatron |
| Lujan | Russo | Young (AK) |
| Luken | Sabo | Young (FL) |
| Lundine | Savage | Young (MO) |
| Mack | Sawyer | Zablocki |
| MacKay | Schaefer | Zschau |

NOT VOTING—6

| | | |
|----------|-----------|------------|
| Coelho | Kostmayer | Livingston |
| Corcoran | Lantos | Mitchell |

Messrs. SAM B. HALL JR., FOLEY, and ENGLISH changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. WRIGHT was allowed to speak out of order.)

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to announce the planned schedule for tomorrow and the remainder of the week.

It is my understanding that the manager of the bill, the distinguished chairman, will move that the Committee do now rise upon the termination of this announcement.

That will conclude our legislative business for today and then tomorrow we will take up the Treasury-Postal appropriations bill and hope to complete it.

Having done that, we would plan to take up the Export Administration Act and finish it. Pending is the Gray amendment. We would finish both of those bills tomorrow, if it is at all possible.

There will be a Friday session. We will finish by 3 o'clock, but we would hope to complete the VISTA bill on which general debate already has been conducted, the Domestic Voluntary Service amendments. After that, time permitting, we would take general debate on the domestic content bill but general debate only, and that would conclude the program for this week.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WRIGHT. Of course I yield to my friend, the distinguished minority leader.

Mr. MICHEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Would the gentleman speculate as to when this measure that we are debating today would be up again for consideration?

Mr. WRIGHT. At the present time it appears most likely that this bill would come back for further consideration on Tuesday of next week, not on Monday, but on Tuesday.

There will be votes on Monday, however. There will be business on Monday and Members should expect to be here.

□ 1730

The schedule for next week will be announced tomorrow. But as it now appears, this bill would return on Tuesday of next week.

Mr. MICHEL. If the gentleman would be good enough to yield further, as I understand it, the Gray amendment on the export bill is in the last title, which suggests that maybe that one could be wrapped up rather expeditiously. Would it be in order for that one to be taken up first tomorrow and disposed of prior to the appropriation bill?

Mr. WRIGHT. The gentleman is asking why should we not take the Export Administration Act first. I think because we have a time staring us in the face for the completion of the appropriations process and we

have promised to try to complete the Treasury-Postal appropriation so that we will have done our work at least in this House on all of the appropriation bills in a timely way. We want to finish it.

Then I think maybe the Gray amendment may require as long as 2 hours. I would presume that a great many of the Members may want to be heard on it, one side and the other.

Mr. MICHEL. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the balance of shipbuilding and conversion, Navy, be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, it is my intention now to have a colloquy with a few of my colleagues and then I will ask the Committee to rise.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, if I could have the attention of the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense, the floor manager of the bill. I had planned to offer an amendment to the bill to restore a reduction made in the F/A-18 program.

After considering the matter, I have not called up the amendment but would like to have a colloquy with the gentleman from New York.

The Appropriations Committee funded the additional buy of 84 F/A-18 aircraft in fiscal year 1984 as was authorized. However, the committee cut \$69.5 million from the support funds requested for the aircraft. I believe this additional money is needed to support the future deployment of the F/A-18 in Navy and Marine Corps squadrons and I am concerned if the reductions are allowed to stand the net effect will be to reduce the number of aircraft that can be purchased.

The authorizing committees examined the F/A-18 program very carefully. We examined the GAO reports on the program and were mindful of some of the concerns expressed by the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. The conferees on the authorization bill did make a reduction of \$15.1 million in the F/A-18 program. However, the additional reduction of \$69.5 million, in my opinion, is too severe and should be restored.

Mr. Chairman, 242 production F/A-18 were approved by Congress through fiscal year 1983. By the end of next September, 160 of these aircraft will

be in the Navy and Marine Corps inventory. When assigned to squadrons and placed on aircraft carriers, they must be properly supported with ground and shipboard maintenance equipment. Ground support equipment is required to outfit eight squadrons and two aircraft carriers with maintenance equipment. Also, two repair facilities must be established. The Navy cannot provide for these necessary support items and still procure 84 aircraft for fiscal year 1984 at the level of funding recommended.

We have appropriated about \$9 billion to date for this program. To spend that much money to procure aircraft but not adequate support for them would be penny-wise and pound-foolish. To cut \$69.5 million out of the support money now would jeopardize orderly deployment of the F/A-18.

My review of this with the Navy would indicate that if the \$69.5 million reduction goes through, the effect would be to force the Navy to buy three fewer aircraft than planned. The Navy also informs me that a delay in the procurement of these support items in fiscal year 1984 could add more than \$100 million to the eventual cost in the years 1985-88.

Mr. ADDABBO. I would advise the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee that I have discussed this matter with other members of the subcommittee and, as I pointed out to the chairman, I know of his deep concern about the F/A-18 program.

I know the gentleman from Illinois has worked tirelessly on this matter and in view of his special concerns I will reexamine the funding requirements for this program and assure the gentleman that his concerns will be taken into account when the matter is considered in conference. And I will ask the House conferees to strongly reconsider this matter in conference.

Mr. PRICE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) has expired.

(By unanimous consent Mr. ADDABBO was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, If the gentleman from New York would agree, I would like to engage him in a colloquy on a subject of concern to myself and my friend, the gentleman from California (Mr. LEVINE). That subject is the subject of guarantees or warranties—the words are interchangeable—of defense weapons systems by prime contractors.

Mr. ADDABBO. By all means.

Mr. AuCOIN. It is my understanding that a provision was included in the

Defense appropriations bill in the other body to require prime contractors of defense weapons systems to provide the U.S. Government with a written guarantee that the system will indeed function as required.

This language was originated by Senator ANDREWS, a member of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in the other body, and I understand it was so noncontroversial in subcommittee that the provision was included in the bill with little discussion.

Mr. ADDABBO. I am not familiar with the circumstances surrounding the Senate action but we ought to be demanding weapons that work as they were intended. They ought to be reliable.

Mr. AuCOIN. It is my understanding that requiring guarantees could potentially save this country billions of dollars. For example, according to the Air Force, it will save almost \$2 billion over the 20-year life cycle of its new fighter aircraft engine because it secured warranties for them. This is just one example. There are many others.

Mr. ADDABBO. That is true.

Mr. AuCOIN. The guarantee idea is not new. It is my understanding that in the commercial sector there are warranties for aircraft, communications satellites, and the *Columbia* and *Challenger* orbiters for the space shuttle program. In addition, in the military sector manufacturers in Europe warranty such high technology weapons as short- and long-range air defense systems for their country's defense and NATO forces.

If the guarantee/warranty provision is ultimately included in the Senate-passed version of the Defense appropriations bill, would the gentleman from New York, the distinguished chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, be sympathetic to its inclusion in the version worked out between the two bodies in conference?

Mr. ADDABBO. Yes, I would personally, but there will be other members participating in the conference and I would have to consider their views as well.

Mr. AuCOIN. Would the gentleman agree to explore the idea of guarantees and perhaps agree to hold hearings on it should the provision not survive the conference?

Mr. ADDABBO. Yes, I would. I am generally supportive of it—it would save the taxpayer a lot of money and would put responsibility for the production of a quality product where it belongs—on the contractor.

Mr. AuCOIN. I thank the gentleman.

□ 1740

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AuCOIN) not agree, however, that it would be unwise to have a blanket rule requiring warranties or guarantees on weapons systems generally? Would the gentleman not agree it has to be on a case-by-case basis?

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I would fully agree with the gentleman (Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama). We would have to review it and that would be the main reason for a hearing. I think that if we addressed this issue in conference we would certainly consider the concerns of the gentleman.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further to me?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. AuCOIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would like to ask the gentleman if he would be more specific as to what the gentleman (Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) means as to his comment on a case-by-case basis versus a blanket warranty or guarantee program.

I think I agree with the gentleman. I want to make sure that I understand.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further to me?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding again.

My concern is that any time you have a warranty it is going to cost somebody something. So I think you have to weigh the request for a warranty against the savings that you might bring about because you do not have maintenance or other problems because it is warranted by the contractor.

So while it sounds good and I think that the concept is good, there is a cost. No contractor is going to give you a warranty without putting something in his price to take care of that insurance.

I am sure the gentleman would agree with that.

Mr. AuCOIN. I do agree with that.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. So I think it is important, I would suggest, that if you are going to encourage warranties that we go about it in such a way that we weigh one cost against the other potential cost before we make judgments that all warranties ipso facto, are meritorious.

Mr. AuCOIN. If the gentleman from New York would yield to me again, I would say I certainly agree with what the gentleman (Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama) just stated, and I think we all agree.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from New York yield to me?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MOAKLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Will the gentleman from New York engage in a brief colloquy?

Mr. ADDABBO. It will be my pleasure.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, page 205 of the committee's report makes reference to emerging technology which utilizes recombinant DNA and hybridoma which may be applicable to medical research in infectious diseases. It further states that the Department of Defense should examine this technology to determine whether it should be budgeted in fiscal year 1985.

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. MOAKLEY. If this examination should be completed sooner and the technology appears promising, does the committee's report preclude funding this technology in fiscal year 1984 by means of a reprogramming?

Mr. ADDABBO. No. The Department is free to submit a reprogramming request if it so desires, and such a request will be considered by the committee in accordance with its regular procedures.

Mr. MOAKLEY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. WATKINS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I agree with the committee's finding that "additional RDX/HMX production facilities may be required," as the committee report stated. A recent GAO study of defense materials found that "the most critical shortage is in the explosive RDX/HMX." One hundred percent of the U.S. supply of these explosives, and more than 85 percent of the free world's supply, comes from a single plant. Because this sole source of supply is vulnerable, the Army believes, and I concur, that the production base should be expanded and diversified to various areas of the country. A similar proposal was advanced in the midseventies. At that time, McAlester Army Ammunition Plant was designated as one of the best suited sites for RDX/HMX production. Extensive studies were completed, including the environmental impact study, and everything was in readiness to move forward to production, but implementation was deferred. Significant savings could be achieved if a production and finishing line were added to the McAlester AAP because this work has already been done and paid for. For the same reason, the facilities could be brought on line much

faster at McAlester. In the event the Defense Department advances plans to expand and diversify the RDX/HMX production base, the committee has expressed its intent to review the plans and the site selection criteria. Does the chairman agree that McAlester AAP should be considered as one of the first production sites in any initial phase to increase the RDX/HMX production base following completion of the Longhorn prototype plant?

Mr. ADDABBO. Certainly, the committee is aware of the extensive work that has already been completed at the McAlester AAP. The committee is also committed to strengthening our defense base while achieving all savings possible. All site selection criteria will be taken into consideration, including the factors mentioned by the gentleman from Oklahoma, as well as the available manpower pool and unemployment. And if the need for RDX/HMX production is as great as the GAO and the Army contends, the factors cited by the gentleman will certainly be an advantage to including the McAlester site in the initial production phase.

Mr. WATKINS. I thank the chairman for his consideration and his time.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

On the subject that the chairman and the gentleman from Oklahoma were discussing, I am sure the chairman's answer is intended that there should be a broad approach to this. The chairman is not necessarily recommending Oklahoma or anywhere else but that the matter should be looked at for all available and appropriate sites.

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, with reference to the matter that the gentleman from Oklahoma has just discussed I would like to state that I am concerned over the directive by the committee contained on page 138 of the report regarding a facility to manufacture RDX/HMX explosives. I am at a loss to understand why the committee feels the need at this time to cease efforts on RDX/HMX until the Army can give the committee a master plan.

Surely the committee is aware that DOD is still evaluating the benefits of investing in new RDX/HMX production facilities. In fact, I am informed that a decision should be reached in the November/December time frame,

concurrent with the development of the fiscal year 1985 budget request, and is not formulation of a master plan such as called for by the committee, impossible if the Congress denies the Army the ability to study and develop plant designs for the proposed HMX/RDX production facilities?

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, this is potentially a \$1 billion program. What we are asking of the Department of Defense is to give us a master plan with a funding profile so that we know what the costs are to be. It was not intended that studies leading to such a plan be stopped.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ADDABBO was allowed to proceed for 7 additional minutes.)

Mr. ADDABBO. We need information as to what facilities are to be built. We are asking for a definitive program, dollar-wise and facilities-wise so that we may properly appropriate the funds when needed and where they are needed.

But we are not proposing any site or any final decision by the Army.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. If the gentleman would yield further, I understand, looking at the second paragraph on page 38 where it says:

While the committee recognizes that additional RDX/HMX manufacturing facilities may be required, it directs that no further efforts be undertaken until the Army has prepared and submitted to the committee for review a master plan.

Do I understand the chairman to state that the committee is directing that no further efforts be undertaken until the Army submits its plan?

Mr. ADDABBO. We feel there should be no actual commitments made until the plan has been submitted so that we can see what the entire program appears to be and what the entire cost may be.

So that matter will be fully reviewed by the committee.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. It is not the intent of the gentleman to stop anything going on at this moment.

Mr. ADDABBO. It is definitely not our intention to stop any of the studies leading to submission of a master plan.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. I thank the chairman very much.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the concern expressed by the gentleman from Texas I think is understood.

The point that we are trying to make in this language is, and we do this in other areas and we need to do it more, we get these proposals thrown

at us and they do not really have anything much to support them. We ran into this on the binary.

□ 1750

We did not know where the facility was going, what it was going to look like and all the other things that were involved. We feel like we ought to know more of the overall plan before we move forward on this.

That is the purpose of this.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. ADDABBO) has expired.

(At the request of Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama and by unanimous consent, Mr. ADDABBO was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. WATKINS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I just want to thank the chairman and also the ranking Republican member on the Defense Appropriations Committee for their understanding and consideration of McAlester being included in the initial production phase.

I would like to say I support the position of the gentleman from Texas because Longhorn has been longtime planning, but I did want to elevate the fact that back a few years ago the environmental studies, all the water studies, all economic studies on McAlester AAP was concluded to be in positive and would save the taxpayers a great deal of money. I wanted to make sure that was part of the record and encourage that the DOD and Army to include the McAlester AAP in the initial phase of production.

I appreciate the gentleman's time and allowing us time to discuss it.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. Does the gentleman from Texas want to discuss this subject further?

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. If the gentleman will yield to me, no, sir. All I wanted to do was just protect the interests of the Longhorn Ordnance plant in my district of east Texas, just to be brutally frank about.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. This gentleman understands that gentleman's desire to protect.

If the chairman will continue to yield, I want to be clear on where we left the bill. As I understood the gentleman he opened up all the shipbuilding sections to amendments; is that what the gentleman requested?

Mr. ADDABBO. Before we rise, the Clerk will read the next paragraph. We will then be completed with the shipbuilding portion of the bill.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. So that before we rise there will be one more paragraph read?

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama. And nothing further will be open to amendment at that point?

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. ROEMER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR.).

Mr. Chairman, I take this opportunity to register my disagreement with language contained in the Appropriations Committee report on 1984 defense appropriations. With no discussion of the matter in subcommittee, the committee in its report directs that no further efforts be undertaken at this time by the Army with regard to expanding production capabilities for RDX/HMX. RDX/HMX is a material used as the basic ingredient for explosives used in munitions of all types for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The U.S. Army is the service that manages the production of this critical substance and provides it to the other services for their use. There is presently only one production facility for RDX/HMX and it is not satisfying the present requirement of our armed services. The Army, after studying the peacetime and mobilization requirements for RDX, determined that immediate action is required in order to increase production. To continue the Army's study of RDX production needs requires no new appropriations this year. The Army and DOD intended to utilize existing funding capability to continue this critical study. To simply insert language in the committee report to prohibit further efforts in this regard, without discussion of the matter in subcommittee, seems to me to be unwarranted and unwise.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ZABLOCKI was allowed to speak out of order.)

PRESIDENT REPORTS TO SPEAKER ON DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I ask for this time in order to advise the Members that the Speaker of the House has received a letter from President Reagan which purports to be in compliance with the 48-hour reporting requirement of the War Powers Resolution dealing with the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities.

Albeit, the President did not in that report state specifically and definitively that he is reporting under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Rather, the report states only that it

is consistent with the War Powers Act. Because I believe the President did not properly comply with the law, in order to be helpful to the President I have today introduced a joint resolution which states that section 4(a)(1) of War Powers became operative on October 25. This resolution sets the clock going under the War Power Act, of 60 days plus 30 days, that the marines can stay in Grenada unless the Congress approves additional authorization.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY

For procurement, production, and modernization of support equipment and materials not otherwise provided for, Navy ordnance and ammunition (except ordnance for new aircraft, new ships, and ships authorized for conversion); the purchase of not to exceed one vehicle required for physical security of personnel notwithstanding price limitations applicable to passenger carrying vehicles but not to exceed \$100,000 per vehicle and the purchase of not to exceed six hundred and sixty-seven passenger motor vehicles of which six hundred and twenty-five shall be for replacement only; expansion of public and private plants, including the land necessary therefor, and such lands and interests therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public and private plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned equipment layaway, as follows: For ship support equipment, \$673,909,000; for communications and electronics equipment, \$1,562,750,000; for aviation support equipment, \$686,757,000; for ordnance support equipment, \$926,162,000, of which \$698,000 shall be available only for procurement of 9mm handgun ammunition; for civil engineering support equipment, \$196,622,000; for supply support equipment, \$112,474,000; for personnel/command support equipment, \$267,601,000; in all: \$4,295,412,000, to remain available until September 30, 1986: *Provided*, That within the total amount appropriated, the subdivisions within this account shall be reduced by \$130,863,000 as follows: \$16,863,000 for spares and repair parts; \$20,000,000 undistributed reduction; \$4,000,000 for consultants, studies, and analyses; and \$90,000,000 for revised economic assumptions.

Mr. ADDABBO (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the balance of "Other Procurement, Navy" be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported

that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4185) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

DELAY THE PERSHING AND THE CRUISE

(Mr. OTTINGER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, last night I had arranged for a special order to discuss the placement of Pershing missiles in Europe. I think it is a matter of the most crucial danger to the United States and to the world, having missiles placed within 6 to 10 minutes from Russia.

A number of Members did submit statements. We were unable to have the special order because the House went out so quickly.

Mr. Speaker, I called this special order today because within the next 2 days, we will have our last chance to stand up for military sanity by voting to delay the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. I want to thank my other colleagues who are here to join me in this effort.

The subject at hand is how we can best serve our own security needs and those of our NATO allies in Western Europe. The answer reached 3 years ago was to put U.S. land-based missiles in Europe to counteract the Soviet threat, and supposedly to create an arena for arms negotiation with the Soviets. The plan calls for 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles to be deployed in West Germany and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles to be divided among West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Three years ago, NATO set a target deployment date of December 1983 on the assumption that we would get an arms reduction agreement with the Soviets before that. Today, we are just 2 months from deploying these weapons. We have no agreement, we have fomented outrage in many European nations, and come close to putting a rift in the NATO alliance. The plan that was formed by a President whose policies relied on negotiation, is being carried out by a President who believes only in confrontation.

Deploying these weapons presents the single most destabilizing measure we could take. Not only do these missiles make Europe into a nuclear playground, they place the world in grave danger of nuclear war by accident, not by design. According to the Center for Defense Information:

Deployment of the Pershing II missiles in Europe will increase substantially the risk of nuclear war, as both countries move

closer to putting their forces on a hair-trigger to cope with the increased danger of surprise attack.

The Pershing and cruise missiles are attractive to NATO because they can reach targets within the Soviet Union and because they are extremely accurate; for the same reasons, they are extremely threatening to the Soviet Union. The Pershing has created more of a stir because of its wide range (1,000 miles) and extreme accuracy (within 100 feet of its target). The cruise's advantage is its flight path which imitates that of a plane, and a guidance system which allows it to fly beneath most radar detection beams.

Placing the Pershing II only 5 to 10 minutes from Moscow, is indeed a new threat to the Soviet Union. A warning blip on their radar screen could elicit a hair-trigger response; with only 5 minutes to decide whether or not a threat is real, the chance of accidental retaliation and escalation into war increases geometrically. When we consider a Soviet response, we must remember two things. First, their computer systems are far inferior to ours, and ours produce 120 mistaken alerts each year. Second, the Soviets tracked a plane for 2 hours before shooting it down over the Sakhalin Islands. Do we want to force them to make a 5-minute life-and-death decision based on uncertain computer warnings?

The Soviet SS-20's, the threat to which we are responding, are highly vulnerable weapons. Deployed in groups of nine, the SS-20's are based at a limited number of deployment centers. Moreover, the missiles must be launched from readied launch sites, making them easily targetable by NATO. Furthermore, the advantage that they have given the Soviets is highly overstated. In the 1960's, the Soviets had about 600 SS-4's and SS-5's trained on Western Europe. With the introduction of the SS-20, they now have a total of about 490 missiles (248 older weapons, and 243 SS-20's). The SS-20 does not materially change the Soviet threat to strategic areas in Western Europe. For many years, the Soviets have had a portion of their other strategic forces aimed at Europe, including: almost 200 SS-11 and SS-19 land based missiles as well as submarine based missiles. The "new threat" of the SS-20 is not new at all.

The strategic balance, even with the SS-20's, is such that our European allies can be protected without the Pershing and cruise. We should be striving to avoid a new buildup of our arsenals, rather than heightening the balance of terror, a tactic which historically has not worked. In the 1960's we deployed Minuteman and Titan missiles to close what was then perceived as a missile gap. In fact, no such gap existed, and our missile buildup prompted the Soviets to develop a genuine ICBM threat. In the 1970's, we

deployed MIRV's, refusing to negotiate a ban because of our technological lead. The Soviets responded in kind, and now point more warheads at us than ever before, actually lessening our security because it is much harder to detect the number of warheads with satellite intelligence than simply to count missiles. As former British Defense Minister Dennis Healey testified, "It is certain that Russia will deploy similar weapons in response, so as to maintain the present equivalence. So the West will gain nothing by their deployment any more than it did by installing MIRV's."

The Soviets today have already stated that a new nuclear deployment has begun in anticipation of the cruise and Pershing. We have been given no indication that the Soviets will be more willing to negotiate at the INF talks; rather, they have said they will walk out. Yet the President insists that our bargaining chip is deployment. When the Soviets tried to send missiles to Cuba, we responded with a naval blockade, yet our deployment is supposed to elicit rational and reasonable discourse.

In rushing to confront the Soviets in Europe, the United States should also consider the future of the NATO alliance. Never before has an issue so divided our allies. We have seen demonstrations all over the United States and Europe, the controversy has engendered factionalism within the alliance, and even caused Spain to threaten breaking from NATO. Surely such reaction deserves more than a passing glance. A delay in deployment simply admits that we have more to discuss, and provides a chance to build on the few steps we have made without bringing in the real threat of war.

Finally, I agree with the assessment of former West German Chancellor Willie Brandt and SPD Arms Control Chairman Egon Bahr that "A solution of this set of problems would prove easier if the INF negotiations were connected with the START negotiations at this point." Strategic negotiation makes little sense when one carves up the world of nuclear weaponry. Because nuclear strategy depends on a system of forces for conventional, intermediate range and theater nuclear forces, it is only reasonable to discuss arms control in the broadest context. Equity can be served with much greater ease if concessions in intermediate range forces could be countered with strategic or theater force reduction and vice-versa. This is an eminently practical idea that needs time to gain support. We will have no time to develop that support after deployment.

There is little likelihood of the Soviets capitulating to the United States position in INF, either today or tomorrow. After the December deployments

by the United States, the Soviets will move forward with their own new deployments. The Pershing and cruise missiles have failed and will continue to fail as bargaining chips to make the Soviets see things our way. As Dennis Healey pointed out, "Unless a freeze can be agreed to in the next few months, both sides will embark on new weapons programs which will rapidly destabilize even the existing balance, and make future arms control more difficult." We are deluding ourselves and our allies if we continue to pretend that agreement is around the corner on our terms.

● Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, when discussing the Pershing missiles, we should remember that the decision to deploy them in Europe was not an exclusively American decision—the decision to deploy the Pershing II in Europe was a NATO decision, endorsed by the leaders of our major NATO allies. Nor must we forget why NATO made such a decision: At the time, 1979, the Soviet Union had deployed some 90 SS-20's, aiming them at major European population centers. Since then, Soviet deployments have risen to some 260 SS-20's. To date we have yet to deploy a single new missile in Europe. We had hoped to be able to cancel deployment through negotiations with the Soviets at Geneva. But now, 4 years have gone by and the talks have gotten us nowhere. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to deploy new missiles in the Soviet Union itself and in Eastern Europe. The situation at present is such that even the Socialist Presidents Gonzalez of Spain and Mitterand of France, as well as the conservative leaders of the United Kingdom and the German Federal Republic view deployment of the Pershing II as a necessity.

Over the weekend we heard of the mass demonstrations throughout Western Europe and some even in America against the Pershing II; hundreds of thousands of Europeans are said to have taken to the street to proclaim their opposition to the Pershing II. Yet we should also remember those millions who did not protest deployment, the people who voted in the governments which favor deployment. Do not forget that the Social Democrats in West Germany were voted from power when that party's hardliners began to vacillate against the Pershing, threatening the policies of their party head, the then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who strongly favored the Pershing missile. The Europeans are scared, and they have a right to be with some 260 SS-20's pointed at their throats. The Pershing will offer them protection against the Soviet threat. If, on the other hand, we do away with the Pershing, we will have taken a big step in the direction of the Finlandization of Western Europe. And that will, in time, lead to its Sovietization.

Last, we bear in mind what messages we would send the world were we not to deploy the Pershing II in Europe. To our allies we will say that we are unreliable, that our professed commitments mean nothing. To the Soviets we will say, go ahead, we will not stand in your way—walk all over us and the rest of the free world. On the other hand, if we act positively today, the Soviets may begin to negotiate seriously at Geneva. If the Soviets were to show themselves sincerely willing to cut back their threatening SS-20's, then the Pershing will not be necessary. We have been waiting 4 years: The ball is in their court.●

● Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, I welcome this opportunity to debate the issues involved in the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. It is vital that we explore every meaningful option for arms control available now before we go ahead with deployment.

I would not ask my colleagues to consider a delay in deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles unless I considered such a delay to be in the best long-term interests of the United States. In 1979, when the NATO nations agreed to the two track decision on deployment they believed that the United States and the Soviet Union would have reached an arms agreement by this time and deployment would have been unnecessary. Because of the failure of SALT II and the reluctance of the Reagan administration to take arms reduction negotiations seriously, however, no arms control agreement has been achieved. A 6-month delay in deployment would give the United States and the Soviet Union one final opportunity to reach an agreement. We should not deprive ourselves of this opportunity.

The delay would be contingent upon a Soviet agreement to enter into negotiations which would result in an intermediate-range nuclear force—INF—treaty by the end of the 6-month period. The ultimate result of such a treaty would be a U.S. agreement not to deploy INF missiles in exchange for substantial reductions in Soviet INF missiles.

Deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles would escalate the arms race. It would undermine arms reduction negotiations and provoke a similar response by the Soviet Union. Deployment of these missiles will not push the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. The Soviet Union will interpret deployment as a serious threat to their security and may respond by increasing its INF missiles in Eastern Europe or possibly even by deploying nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere. The best way to prevent this from happening is to negotiate an INF treaty now.

Deployment would not enhance the security of the Western World. The

missiles would be within minutes of Soviet targets. Human response to a launch warning would be virtually impossible. The Soviet Union and the United States would be forced to rely on computers to confirm a missile launch, the same computer warning systems which have malfunctioned in the past. Nuclear missile forces would be placed on a launch-on-warning mode. A mistaken launch of a nuclear missile cannot be corrected. To think that a computer error could trigger an all out nuclear exchange is extremely frightening.

Divisions within the NATO alliance could precipitate as a result of deployment. In recent weeks we have seen large-scale demonstrations against deployment of INF missiles in Europe. Millions of people throughout Europe have participated in these peaceful demonstrations. The demonstrators have been joined by prominent European leaders, including former West German Chancellor Willie Brandt. Lack of public support for deployment will jeopardize the future unity of NATO. Moreover, U.S. leadership in NATO could be severely weakened. Recent polls have indicated that an increasing majority of Europeans favor either nondeployment or a delay in deployment.

I urge my colleagues who up until now have opposed a delay in deployment to reconsider seriously their position and support an amendment to the Defense appropriations bill which would delay deployment until July 1984. Once the missiles are deployed, the Soviet Union will not bargain. They will simply respond in a similar fashion. Therefore, we must demonstrate our willingness to negotiate now before it is too late. We have the opportunity to avoid a major escalation of the arms race and we should not let it slip by.●

● Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. Speaker, I join my fellow Members of Congress today in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota. The Pershing missile has many drawbacks which should prohibit its deployment in the European nuclear theater. As many have pointed out, the Pershing missile will force the Soviet Union into a dangerous launch-on-warning position greatly enhancing the chances of accidental nuclear disaster.

However, today I would like to address an area which I believe is equally as threatening as the actual deployment of those Euro-missiles. Through past statements and media campaign designed to denigrate the peace movement at home and abroad, the Reagan administration attempted to link those opposed to the deployment of the new medium-range nuclear missiles to Moscow and communism.

This misinformed scare tactic might not appear as ominous had it been generated by some political extremist group. However, its importance takes on new proportions when stated as accepted fact by the executive branch of our Government. Not only does this shed light upon the lack of seriousness with which the present administration views the majority of people in Europe and America who oppose the deployment of the Pershing missiles, it also is an example of what we might expect to profit from the President's attempts at reaching an agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union.

For the past 3 months polls have consistently shown that as many as 75 percent of the West Germans, 80 percent of the Belgians and well over half of the Italians and the United Kingdom oppose the stationing of the cruise missiles. This past weekend an estimated 2 million peace marchers gathered in the cities of Europe and the United States in an attempt to send their message to President Reagan and the Congress. Their message was "do not deploy these missiles because we judge them to be too great a threat to our existence. Deployment can only be achieved against the will of the people, and the people will voice their protest every step of the way."

The present administration displays a callous disregard toward the people who they are asking to live with the missiles, and the governments who have acquiesced to the Pershing missile's deployment. We have further divided NATO and coerced the governments of Europe to act against the will of their people. For the administration to belittle these developments by claiming that Moscow has engineered and manipulated them is an affront to all concerned, peace-minded people throughout the world.

I urge the passage of this amendment to delay the deployment of the Pershing missiles and support the efforts of those people whose ongoing contributions work toward the future and a sane and peaceful world order. ●

● Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise to wholeheartedly support the amendment to be offered by Congressman SABO, delaying the deployment of the Pershing II missiles until July 1, 1984.

President Reagan insists that the December deployment of these missiles is essential to achieving U.S. objectives in enhancing NATO security in Western Europe and possibly forcing the Soviets to negotiate more seriously in the START talks.

Under the President's plan, we will deploy 108 new missiles within 10 launch minutes of many of the Soviet Union's key command bunkers and nuclear storage sites. These missiles will be capable of delivering a 10- to 20-kiloton nuclear warhead to a target up to 1,800 kilometers from the launch site.

According to Mr. Reagan's unique brand of logic, this policy will definitely make the Soviets much more amenable to negotiate in the arms reduction talks, since their own defense system will now be in jeopardy. His logic continues that the Soviets, of course, will not set about to deploy more powerful missiles of their own to try and shore up their national security systems.

In fact, history has proved how well this concept works—in the 1960's when we deployed the Minuteman and Titan missiles to close the then-perceived missile gap, the Soviets responded by developing and deploying more powerful missiles of their own. Again, in the 1970's when we deployed MIRV's to again close the missile gap, the Soviets again responded by deploying an even larger and more powerful missile arsenal. Each time we have deployed new missiles to enhance NATO's defense structure, the Soviets have responded in kind. Yet President Reagan now thinks that they will have a change of heart.

The people of Western Europe demonstrated for the world to see exactly how much they want these weapons of death and destruction deployed on their doorstep. What makes the December deployment even more despicable is that this is supposed to be the season of good will and brotherhood among people around the world. I cannot think of a better way to show our good will toward our brothers and sisters around the world than by the deployment of these missiles. What a lovely present to give the human population. ●

● Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Speaker, NATO plans to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground launched cruise missiles—GLCM—in five European countries, including West Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. NATO is scheduled to begin deploying the missiles in December, unless an agreement is reached at the U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations in Geneva. But there is slim hope for an agreement by December.

In Europe, polls indicate upward of 70 percent of the people question whether this modernization of our nuclear forces is as necessary to Western security as NATO officials contend. Is there a military rationale for the Euromissiles? Would they enhance U.S. and NATO security? The answer to both questions is no. The new missiles are an unnecessary addition to NATO's existing nuclear arsenal of some 6,000 battlefield nuclear weapons, and pose a serious risk to the nuclear balance.

On July 26, I voted for an amendment to the Defense authorization bill which would delay deployment of Pershing II and GLCM's in Western Europe. That amendment lost but I

intend to fight for a similar amendment when the House takes up the Defense appropriations bill. The amendment would delay deployment until July 1, 1984. I believe that willingness to reduce dramatically or forgo deployment is our most powerful bargaining tool to achieve deep Soviet reductions. Indeed, in discussions with Soviet officials during a recent congressional trip to the U.S.S.R., it was clear the Soviets regard our actions with respect to the Euromissiles as a major test of U.S. intentions.

Under the existing schedule, however, President Reagan plans to begin deployment in 2 months, leaving insufficient time to make meaningful progress in negotiations. The actions I support to delay deployment do not in any way reduce production of these missiles; however, they do provide more time for our negotiators in Geneva. If we do not delay deployment for a reasonable period, it is almost certain that the Soviets will turn from the negotiating table and will, instead, increase deployment of their SS-20's and possible new missiles.

Finally, in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs—which I commend to you—former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argues that all nuclear weapons are militarily useless and serve only to deter the other side's use of nuclear weapons. This being the case, our present Western European nuclear forces remain effective. Newer Pershing II's and GLCM's add nothing to our tactical capability in Europe. Taking the money spent on the missiles and spending it instead to improve the readiness of our conventional forces in Europe would make much more sense.

In sum, I believe that deployment of new Euromissiles will harm our efforts to achieve meaningful arms control, will further destabilize the strategic balance, and will add nothing to our conventional force strength. It is in the best interests of the United States and our allies to delay, and through arms agreements halt, the installation of Euromissiles. ●

● Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I join with my colleagues today to speak out against the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. I support the amendment to delay deployment of the missiles until July 1984, unless an intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty has been ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union, or unless the President certifies after March 19, 1984, that no substantial progress is being made in negotiations.

The planned deployment of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles in December 1983 has been justified as an enhancement to the security of our European allies. I believe, how-

ever, that deployment will only intensify already high East-West tensions, and increase the strains within the Atlantic Alliance. Our security will best be served by a United States-Soviet arms agreement. Further, the history of previous conflicts on European soil provides strong guidance that deployment in Germany can only exacerbate Soviet-German tensions that have taken years to calm. And the folly of it all is that the German Government does not have first authority over these missiles, but rather the United States, located 2,000 miles away.

The special characteristics of the Pershing II missile in conjunction with its proximity to the Soviet Union can endanger both Western Europe and the United States by making nuclear war more likely. This deployment can lead to a "launch-on-warning" policy on the part of the Soviet Union, thereby escalating the chance of a nuclear war starting by computer error. The Pershing II missiles will threaten the Soviet Union with capabilities that go far beyond countering the SS-20 missiles; they can reach targets in the Soviet Union within 8 to 10 minutes from West Germany. Also, the Pershing II's primary targets include vital command and control centers in the Soviet Union. The unprecedented accuracy of the missile and its relatively low yield make it an ideal weapon for attacking hardened command silos which in turn will threaten the Soviet Union's ability to retaliate.

The case for a delay is a strong one. It will be a sign of considerable strength and sincerity, to delay the missiles at this critical juncture. The interests of both the United States and Europe will be served by delaying these initial deployments. Let me touch upon three major reasons why I support a delay.

First, a delay will provide more time for working out realistic compromises between the United States and the Soviet Union in the current arms talks. Both sides have somewhat modified their positions since negotiations began, but both sides need more time to develop a practical agreement that takes into account their respective security needs. Deployment in the absence of an agreement will increase nuclear instability in Europe, and prompt further Soviet modernization and deployment instead of restraint. Deployment may also jeopardize the success of the negotiation process, at least for the near term.

Second, we cannot ignore the enormous controversy in Europe over these new nuclear weapons. Europeans are justifiably concerned about the danger of nuclear war. They do not want to participate in a new round of the nuclear arms race unless it is absolutely necessary. A delay will help ease tensions in Europe, and give Europeans more time to reach a consensus with-

out the pressure of an immediate deadline. A delay will also help prevent further divisions within NATO by demonstrating U.S. sincerity, flexibility, and leadership.

Third, a postponement of deployment will allow us to more thoroughly test the Pershing II and cruise missiles. Testing results to date have been erratic. A delay will insure that all technical problems with the new weapons are worked out and that we will not waste billions of dollars or missiles that may not really work the way they are supposed to or may be quickly superseded by new weapons.

If we deploy the missiles in Europe now, it is inevitable that the Soviets will put in new arms of their own. In fact, yesterday, the Soviet Union announced that it had started preparatory work for the deployment of new Soviet missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Increasing the level of nuclear capability on both sides is a blueprint for disaster. A delay in deployment of the cruise and Pershing missiles can make a major contribution toward achieving a negotiated arms control settlement.●

● Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from New York for yielding, and I want to associate myself with his remarks.

I support a delay in the deployment of this new generation of theater nuclear forces. I do so because I believe that we must go that proverbial extra mile if we are truly serious as a nation and as one of an alliance of Western nations about creating an atmosphere of stability and peace in Europe.

No less is demanded of us in the Atomic Age, and no less is demanded by the 1979 NATO accord whose purpose was to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe posed by Soviet intermediate-range missiles.

It is imperative that we remember this objective.

The basis for the INF dual-track approach has always been to render the deployment of the American missiles unnecessary by persuading the Soviets to cut back their own theater nuclear forces.

That has not changed.

There is thus nothing wrong and everything right with allowing more time in which to reach an accord with the Soviets.

A 6-month delay would better serve the security of the West than going ahead to meet a deadline set 4 long years ago.

No one in this Chamber can doubt that much has changed the complexion of the world since then.

Instead of a stable arms control environment promised by a ratified Salt II treaty, we have, for instance, an accelerated arms race, heightening the dangers of atomic weapons not only to Europe but also to the continental United States.

Instead of cooperation among nations, we have conflict and tension—in Lebanon, in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and now in Grenada.

It would be an ironic twist of fate, foreshadowing tragic consequences, if we abet this trend—if we now allow these 572 missiles to take on a life of their own, and leap from the drawing board to operational bases, without due regard for the main intent of the 1979 NATO accord.

We cannot let that happen. Our goal must be to reduce the nuclear threat to Europe, not enlarge it. In the name of that worthy goal, I support a 6-month delay.

Let us go the extra mile for peace and security.●

● Mr. LEHMAN of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have consistently supported amendments to delay the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. I supported the Dellums amendment to the Defense authorization bill earlier this year, and more recently I supported the Sabo amendment during consideration of the Defense appropriations bill in the full House Appropriations Committee.

The deployment of these weapons is scheduled to take place in December. As the time draws nearer, I become more and more convinced that deployment should be delayed at least until July. It is important that we provide more time for our negotiators in Geneva to obtain an agreement through the INF talks.

Contrary to the administration's expectations, I fear that deployment will not prod the Soviet Union to come to an early agreement. A 6-month delay will give our negotiators the flexibility needed to reach an agreement without resorting to threats from both sides.

There have been some hopeful signs recently in the INF negotiations. The Soviets have raised the possibility of dismantling of some of their SS-20 missiles, and the United States has expressed a willingness to consider the inclusion of Great Britain and France in the negotiations.

I am also concerned that deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles will encourage the Soviets to move to a policy of launch-on-warning. Because these weapons will directly threaten the Soviet Union and provide a minimum of warning, we risk making Soviet leaders even more trigger-happy than they may already be. This represents a grave threat not only to the Soviet Union but to ourselves as well since nuclear warfare will quickly escalate and ultimately lead to the end of civilization as we know it.

During consideration of the Defense appropriations bill on the House floor, I intend to support the Sabo amendment. We all share a desire for a reduction in the number of missiles in

Europe and a reduction in the level of hostility between the superpowers. I believe a delay is the best way to accomplish these goals.●

● Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, there has yet to be a good faith effort to negotiate the deployment of theater nuclear forces in Europe. On August 26, Soviet President Yuriy Andropov offered to liquidate all the missiles that the Soviet Union would remove from Europe as part of mutual, verifiable agreement on limiting intermediate range nuclear forces—INF—in Europe. This would include the solid-fuel, mobile-launch SS-20's, which allegedly provoked the 1979 NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in five West European countries (West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, England, and Italy). The Andropov proposal was not acted upon, even though it directly addressed one of the stated principal concerns of the NATO allies.

In my judgment, the Pershing II missile is currently the single most destabilizing weapons system in either side's nuclear arsenal. Carrying a warhead of 200 kilotons—16 times the size of the atomic weapon that destroyed Hiroshima—the Pershing II has a launch-arrival time of less than 10 minutes to major military targets in the Soviet Union. It would create an immediate Cuban missile crisis for their leadership, and force them to move to a launch-on-warning nuclear strategy, thus putting the entire Northern Hemisphere in jeopardy of a nuclear holocaust. At every opportunity since its inception, I have undertaken legislative action to terminate all funding for the Pershing II program. In July, I also introduced an amendment to defer deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles for a year, hoping to spur progress on INF arms control negotiations, but that proposal was also defeated.

In mid-September I went to Italy, England, the Netherlands, and West Germany, at the invitation of parliamentary leaders in those countries, to discuss the impending crisis that will be the consequence of the Pershing II and cruise deployment, and at an international conference in Rome, I discussed these issues with a number of European parliamentarians from various NATO countries, including Greece and Spain. In The Hague, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Dutch Parliament discussed the issue with me in great detail, and the members were gratified to learn that some in the U.S. Congress share their concern about the threat to world peace that would be caused by this deployment.

In West Germany, I had extensive meetings with Bundestag members from the Social Democrat Party (SDP), including Willi Brandt and Peter Glotz, the SDP's International

Secretary, the Green Party, including Petra Kelly and former Bundeswehr General Gert Bastian, and even some members of the Christian Democrats (CDU) who serve on the West German Foreign Affairs Committee. Their collective concern about being made hostage to the ideological confrontation between the nuclear superpowers reinforced my determination to do everything possible to terminate all funding for these heinous weapons, and to try to educate as many Americans as possible to the common dangers we face.

A decision to defer deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles at this juncture in East-West relations is the least that we can do to slow down the further escalation of the nuclear arms race and ultimate self-immolation through a nuclear holocaust. In the name of sanity and survival for our children let us act—now—to halt this madness.●

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may be permitted to revise and extend their remarks on the subject of my 1-minute speech today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

NATIONAL THEATER WEEK

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 292) to provide for the designation of the week of June 3 through June 9, 1984, as National Theater Week, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do so just to indicate that this bill is not going to cost any money. There will be no appropriations. The minority has no problem with it.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mrs. HALL) for bringing this measure to the floor.

Mr. Speaker, as the Member from the east side and midtown Manhattan, my district encompasses most of the theater district, where some of the best in theatrical entertainment can be viewed. Therefore it was a pleasure for me to introduce House Joint Reso-

lution 292, which designates the week of June 3, 1984, as "National Theater Week."

National Theater Week is a worthwhile tribute to the thousands of Americans all over the United States in professional theater companies, high schools, colleges, and community theaters whose talents make the American theater one of the finest cultural and educational resources in the world.

National Theater Week has been endorsed by theaters, unions, and art agencies in all 50 States. Included among these are 350 legitimate theaters, 7 nationally prominent unions with thousands of members, individual State and community arts agencies, as well as the National Association of State Arts Agencies.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BENNETT). Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mrs. HALL)?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the joint resolution, as follows:

H.J. RES. 292

Whereas many Americans have devoted much time and energy for advancing the cause of theatre; and

Whereas the theatres of America have pioneered the way for many performers and have given them their start in vaudeville and stage; and

Whereas theatre is brought to Americans through high schools, colleges, and community theatre groups as well as through professional acting companies; and

Whereas citizens of America have been called upon to support the theatre arts in the Nation's interest; and

Whereas many individuals and organizations are hailing the strength and vitality of the theatres of America: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week of June 3 through June 9, 1984, shall be proclaimed "National Theatre Week" throughout the country, and all citizens are urged to support this effort with assistance to theatres throughout the country.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MRS. HALL OF INDIANA

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mrs. HALL of Indiana: Page 2, line 4, strike "proclaimed National Theatre Week throughout the country" and insert in lieu thereof: "designated National Theatre Week and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people".

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mrs. HALL).

The amendment was agreed to.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed,

and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1800

NATIONAL DRUG ABUSE EDUCATION WEEK

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 57) to designate the week of April 3, 1983 through April 9, 1983, as "National Drug Abuse Education Week," and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. GILMAN).

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in strong support of Senate Joint Resolution 57, which as you know, was passed by the Senate earlier. This measure designates the week of April 3-9, 1983, as National Drug Abuse Education Week. It is estimated that the illicit drug trade involves approximately \$90 billion in retail business per year; it is a killer of our youth and destroys their future. By removing the demand for drugs, we can help reduce the illicit drug trafficking that plagues so many of our cities, villages, and townships.

This national awareness and education week is sought because the most effective deterrent we have in fighting drug abuse is the education of parents and our children, whether it be at home, in the school, or in the community. This most important facet has been in the forefront of Mrs. Reagan's work to combat drug abuse, and I applaud her efforts in this area. The public television program, "Chemical People," has the support of Mrs. Reagan and seems to raise the consciousness of the public of the dangers of drug abuse. All of us must do whatever we can to encourage the education of our children, our teachers and parents with regard to the deadly affects of drug abuse. As ranking minority member of the Select Committee on Narcotics, I have heard countless hours of testimony bearing out the irreparable harm to our society as a result of drug abuse. I strongly urge our full support for this legislation, Mr. Speaker, and urge my colleagues to take part in drug education activities.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, I would like to agree with the words of my colleague, and I, too, would like to go on record congratulating the Presi-

dent's wife for becoming involved in this very crucial issue. It is a good commemorative. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of it.

● Mr. DAUB. Mr. Speaker, I would like to rise in support of Senate Joint Resolution 57 which will declare the week of November 2 through 9 "National Drug Abuse Education Week."

I have a very specific interest in this concern because Mary Jacobson, who is a resident of Omaha, Nebr., has been the national president of the National Federation of Parents for Drug-Free Youth. This organization held its first national conference last year with 46 States represented and our very distinguished First Lady, Nancy Reagan, serving as the national chairperson.

The concern about drug abuse among our young people is a concern of national importance. Nearly all of our young people are confronted with drugs at one time or another. Young people ages 15 to 25 are dying from abuse in greater numbers today than in the past, and children ages 11 and 12 are being exposed to these substances every day.

The National Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth is responding to the problems that families are facing when they find out that a young son or daughter has been experimenting with drugs. This organization can serve as a support group for the family. Most importantly, these organizations can alert parents and youth of the horrifying effects of drug abuse so when the young are confronted with drug questions, they can make the right choice and not the choice they may feel is fashionable with their peers. ●

● Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I support this needed legislation. There is no greater curse alive in this day than the tragedy of drug abuse.

I particularly congratulate Mrs. Reagan, the First Lady, for her inspiring fight against drug abuse. If the first family accomplished nothing else in these "Reagan years," this fight against drug abuse would justify the leadership the President and Mrs. Reagan have on their shoulders. God bless you Mrs. Reagan and your fine husband too. ●

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution, as follows:

S.J. RES. 57

Whereas the illegal drug trade consists of approximately \$79,000,000,000 in retail business per year;

Whereas removing the demand for drugs would reduce the illegal drug trade;

Whereas drug abuse destroys the future of many of the young people and adults in the Nation;

Whereas the eradication of drug abuse requires a united mobilization of national resources, including law enforcement and educational efforts; and

Whereas the most effective deterrent to drug abuse is education of parents and children in the home, classroom, and community: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week of April 3, 1983, through April 9, 1983, is designated as "National Drug Abuse Education Week" and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to participate in drug abuse education and prevention programs in their communities and encouraging parents and children to investigate and discuss drug abuse problems and possible solutions.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MRS. HALL OF INDIANA

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mrs. HALL of Indiana: Strike line 1, page 2, and insert in lieu thereof "That the week of November 2, 1983, through November 9, 1983, is".

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mrs. HALL).

The amendment was agreed to.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

TITLE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MRS. HALL OF INDIANA

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment to the title.

The Clerk read as follows:

Title amendment offered by Mrs. HALL of Indiana: Amend the title so as to read: "Joint resolution to designate the week of November 2, 1983, through November 9, 1983, as 'National Drug Abuse Education Week'."

The title amendment was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL FAMILY WEEK

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 45) designating the week of November 20, 1983, through November 26, 1983, as "National Family Week," and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, under my reservation I would first like to mention that I was remiss in not mentioning the fact that it is the Speaker pro tempore, the gentleman from Florida, who is the sponsor of the previous com-

memorative on National Drug Awareness Week, and I would like to congratulate the Speaker pro tempore. I apologize for my oversight.

Mr. Speaker, under my reservation, I yield to the gentleman from Utah (Mr. MARRIOTT).

Mr. MARRIOTT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, as the sponsor of this resolution calling for National Family Week for the 10th time, I would like to thank the 225 Members of Congress who signed the resolution calling for Thanksgiving week to be designated as National Family Week.

The objective is to draw attention to the importance of the family in American life. The family is the heart of America. Strong families mean a strong nation. All of us are concerned about the fact that 50 percent or more of all marriages now end in divorce, and there are now some 13 million children around the country who live with one parent. Many of the problems of drug abuse, of children dropping out of school, of psychological problems with children stem because of the family breakup.

The purpose of this resolution is to draw attention to the fact that the family is very important. Strong families mean a strong country, and we can solve many of our social and economic problems if families are intact, as they ought to be.

I would like to thank the gentlewoman from Indiana (Mrs. HALL) for bringing up this resolution, and I again thank all of those Members who have voted to designate Thanksgiving week as National Family Week.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman from Utah for his observations.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution, as follows:

S.J. RES. 45

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized and requested to issue a proclamation designating the week of November 20, 1983, through November 26, 1983, as "National Family Week", and inviting the Governors of the several States, the chief officials of local governments, and the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL DIABETES MONTH

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 121) to designate November 1983 as National Diabetes Month, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I simply do so to indicate the minority has no problem with the resolution and, in fact, is very much in favor of this commemorative.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution, as follows:

S.J. RES. 121

Whereas diabetes kills more than all other diseases except cancer and cardiovascular diseases;

Whereas eleven million Americans suffer from diabetes and five million seven hundred thousand of such Americans are not aware of their illness;

Whereas \$9,700,000,000 annually are used for health care costs, disability payments, and premature mortality costs due to diabetes;

Whereas up to 85 per centum of all cases of noninsulin-dependent diabetes may be controllable through greater public understanding, awareness, and education; and

Whereas diabetes is a leading cause of blindness, kidney disease, heart disease, stroke, birth defects, and lower life expectancy, which complications may be reduced through greater patient and public understanding, awareness, and education: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the month of November 1983 is designated as "National Diabetes Month", and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe that month with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, 11 million Americans suffer from diabetes, a leading cause of blindness, kidney, disease, heart disease, stroke, birth defects, and lower life expectancy. Greater public understanding awareness, and education would reduce complications caused by diabetes, and increase the control diabetics have over their disease. Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of this resolution which authorizes and requests the President to issue a proclamation designating November 1983 as National Diabetes Month.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mrs. HALL of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the joint resolutions just passed.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

THE CHADHA RESPONSE BILL

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. LOTT) is recognized for 60 minutes.

● Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, today I am adding 28 new cosponsors to H.R. 3939, the Regulatory Oversight and Control Act, which I first introduced on September 20 with 17 cosponsors. This bill has been specifically drafted in response to the Supreme Court's June 23 decision in *I.N.S. against Chadha* holding the legislative veto unconstitutional.

H.R. 3939 offers an alternative not only for the 20-odd legislative veto provisions which now apply to various agency regulations, but would extend that alternative to all regulations which are subject to informal rule-making under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Major regulations would be subject to approval by the enactment of a joint resolution, while nonmajor regulations could be disapproved by the same means. Automatic consideration of major rule resolutions is provided if committees do not report as required by the bill, and one-fourth of the membership could force committee and floor consideration of nonmajor rule resolutions.

The bill recognizes that congressional review of individual regulations is not the only answer to restoring political accountability to the regulatory process. The bill also forces internal agency reforms including requirements for cost-benefit analyses on major rules and their alternatives, and the periodic review by agencies of all existing major rules, tied to a sunset date. Most of the regulatory reform provisions of the bill are taken directly from the compromise of H.R. 746 in the last Congress worked out between the Speaker's Office, the White House, our Judiciary Committee, and business and public interest representatives.

Finally, the bill amends House rules to improve on our oversight efforts of existing programs, agencies, and regulatory activities, establishes a Regulatory Review Calendar in the House for the orderly consideration of approval and disapproval resolutions, and permits limitation amendments on appropriations bills for regulations whose disapproval resolutions have either

not been considered by the House or have passed the House but not been enacted during the 90-day review period.

Mr. Speaker, I think the Congress would be well advised to give serious consideration to a generic law of this kind for regulations before we have a new proliferation of conflicting, confusing, and chaotic legislative veto alternatives spring up on individual authorization bills. Moreover, the requirements for committee consideration and reports and expedited procedures for consideration on set days, provided for in H.R. 3939, are essential to making any such congressional review process both a credible and workable one.

At this point in the RECORD, Mr. Speaker, I include a list of the cosponsors of H.R. 3939 together with an article on the bill which appeared in the September 29, 1983, issue of Roll Call:

COSPONSORS OF LOTT "REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL" BILL (H.R. 3939)

Thomas J. Biley, Jr. of Virginia.
John B. Breaux of Louisiana.
Hank Brown of Colorado.
James T. Broyhill of North Carolina.¹
Dick Cheney of Wyoming.¹
E. Thomas Coleman of Missouri.¹
Tom Corcoran of Illinois.
Hal Daub of Nebraska.
Michael DeWine of Ohio.
David Dreier of California.
Jack Edwards of Alabama.¹
Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma.
Bill Emerson of Missouri.
Hamilton Fish, Jr. of New York.¹
Edwin B. Forsythe of New Jersey.
James V. Hansen of Utah.
Henry J. Hyde of Illinois.¹
Jack F. Kemp of New York.¹
Thomas N. Kindness of Ohio.¹
Ken Kramer of Colorado.
Robert J. Lagomarsino of California.¹
Delbert L. Latta of Ohio.¹
Elliott H. Levitas of Georgia.¹
Jerry Lewis of California.¹
Marilyn Lloyd of Tennessee.
Tom Loeffler of Texas.
Alfred A. McCandless of California.
James G. Martin of North Carolina.¹
Lynn Martin of Illinois.
G. V. Montgomery of Mississippi.
Carlos J. Moorhead of California.
Stan Parris of Virginia.
Charles Pashayan, Jr. of California.¹
James H. Quillen of Tennessee.¹
William R. Ratchford of Connecticut.
J. Kenneth Robinson of Virginia.
Harold S. Sawyer of Michigan.
Mark D. Siljander of Michigan.
Thomas J. Tauke of Iowa.
Gene Taylor of Missouri.¹
William M. Thomas of California.¹
Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan.¹
Bob Whittaker of Kansas.
Chalmers P. Wylie of Ohio.
Doug Barnard of Georgia.

**GOP WHIP LOTT OFFERS BILL FOR LEGISLATIVE VETO RELIEF
(By Rich Burkhardt)**

When the Supreme Court declared that Congressional use of the legislative veto

against executive rulemakers is unconstitutional, a flurry of activity began within Congress to find ways to retain control over the bureaucracy. The first attempts immediately after the decision were aimed at specific agencies and rules, but now House Minority Whip Trent Lott (R-Miss) has proposed a bill to cover all executive rules.

Lott's legislation, the "Regulatory Oversight and Control Act," proposes a waiting period between the proposal and enactment of all rules and regulations. During that period, Congress would review the proposed rules, and action would be needed before major rules could take effect.

Major rules, which are defined as "those which an agency or the President determine would have an annual impact of \$100 million or more on the economy or would otherwise have substantial impact on some sector," could not take effect unless a joint resolution of approval is passed within "90 days of continuous session of Congress."

All other rules would automatically take effect after that same 90-day period, unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval. Non-major rules could also take effect if neither House has acted on a disapproval resolution within 60 days after receipt of the rule, or if one House has rejected a disapproval resolution.

Safeguards are also provided in the Lott bill to prevent resolutions of approval for major rules from being bottled up in committee by chairmen who might be hostile to the proposed rules. Those provisions require the appropriate committee chairman or his designee to introduce a resolution of approval within one day after receipt of a major rule, and act on that resolution within 45 days after the rule is received.

If the committee does not act within the prescribed 45-day period, the approval resolution is automatically discharged and sent to the whole House and placed on the appropriate calendar for action. A motion to proceed on such a resolution is considered privileged, and if adopted, debate limited to two hours.

Since using the same type of procedures for non-major rules "could burden the Congress with hundreds of rules resolutions every year which any Member might introduce," according to Lott, a different procedure is used for minor rules, which requires "a showing of substantial support" before a disapproval resolution can come to the House floor.

That procedure involved filing a "motion for consideration" of a disapproval resolution with the Clerk of the House after a resolution of disapproval is introduced, no later than 25 days after the proposed rule is received. If one-fourth of the House Members sign the resolution for consideration within 30 days of receipt of the rule, the committee must consider the resolution.

The appropriate committees have 45 days after receiving a proposed non-major rule to consider it; otherwise it is automatically discharged. Once it reaches the House floor, the motion to proceed is privileged and non-debatable if the committee has voluntarily discharged the disapproval resolution, or debatable for 20 minutes if the resolution was automatically discharged.

The Lott legislation also contains provisions for dealing with resolutions coming from one body to another. If one House had not reported or discharged its own resolution 75 days after Congress receives the proposed rule, the resolution from the other House is considered discharged and gets privileged consideration.

If a resolution is received from the other body and the receiving House has already reported or discharged a resolution, consideration would occur on the action taken by the other house, to avoid votes on two resolutions.

Since joint resolutions are employed for both resolutions of approval and disapproval, any decision by Congress on executive rules would then go to the President for his signature. If he vetoed the Congressional action on the proposed rule, Congress would then have to go through the normal override procedure.

In addition to proposing how approval of rules would be handled, the Lott bill also proposes several changes in House Rules to deal with the loss of the legislative veto. Because of the volume of approval and disapproval resolutions that will result, a special Regulatory Review Calendar is created which would be called on the first and third Monday and second and fourth Tuesday of each month.

Resolutions whose review period would expire before the next call of the Regulatory calendar would be given top priority during these sessions, Lott said.

The purpose of the special calendar is to enable the House leadership to retain control over scheduling and be able to advise Members of forthcoming action.

Another proposed House rules change involves modifying a rule instituted at the beginning of the 98th Congress, which prohibits amendments limiting funding from being offered until after the rest of the amendment process is complete, and then only if the House votes down a motion for the committee of the Whole to rise and report the bill to the House.

The new rule would enable limiting amendments to be offered during the initial process to halt funding for proposed executive rules which have not been considered by the proper authorizing committee of the House, or if they have been passed by the House but not enacted.

Other changes in House operating procedure in the Lott legislation would require all House committees to adopt their oversight plans at the beginning of each Congress, and would prohibit consideration of a committee's funding resolution unless their oversight plans had been adopted and submitted to the Government Operations Committee.

Each Committee's final report at the end of each Congress would also have to contain an oversight report, contrasting the review actually conducted with the plan laid down at the beginning of each Congress.

The Lott bill also gives the Speaker authority to appoint joint ad hoc oversight committees containing members from two or more committees whose jurisdiction over a particular rule might overlap.

The bill is not Lott's first at solving the legislature veto question. He introduced a similar regulatory reform package in 1981, which never got considered by the full House.

THE BETTER BUSINESS INVESTMENT ACT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. CORCORAN) is recognized for 10 minutes.

● Mr. CORCORAN. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing legislation today to elimi-

¹ Denotes cosponsors of bill when originally introduced on September 20.

nate double taxation of dividend income by eliminating individual income taxes on dividend income. My bill quite simply excludes the gross income amounts received by individuals as dividends from domestic corporations.

There are three excellent reasons for Congress to take this step. First, and most obvious, dividend income is double-taxed under current law. Corporations pay taxes on the income before it is distributed to shareholders as part of their corporate income tax. Individuals then pay taxes on the same income when paying their Federal income taxes, with the exception of the first \$100 in dividend income received. This taxpayer double jeopardy is patently unfair.

Second, this double tax discourages investment in corporate stocks. Our tax system is not exercising investment neutrality, penalizing as it does investments in business growth—the last thing we should be doing after years of repeated, crippling recessions. Our economy has been reeling for a decade, and we must take firm steps to encourage the business growth that we say we need to create jobs and reduce Federal deficits. The success of the tax reductions in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 is very instructive. It is time to eliminate this disincentive to investment in business growth.

Finally, by eliminating this double tax at the individual level, we will make it easier for American citizens to invest and build up equity that can provide for retirement in later years, or for home, education, and family.

I urge my colleagues to do the fair thing, the smart thing, and support the Better Business Investment Act when it is considered by Congress. Mr. Speaker, for the benefit of my colleagues, the text of my bill follows:

H.R. 4219

A bill to repeal the dollar limitation on the amount of dividends received by individuals which may be excluded from gross income.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "Better Business Investment Act of 1983."

SEC. 2. Dollar limitation on exclusion of dividends from gross income repealed.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to partial exclusion of dividends received by individuals) is amended to read as follows:

"(a) EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME.—Gross income does not include amounts received by an individual as dividends from domestic corporations."

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—Paragraph (4) of section 301(e) and paragraph (7) of section 643(a) of such Code are each amended by striking out "partial".

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.—

(1) The heading of such section 116 of such Code is amended by striking out "partial".

(2) The item relating to section 116 in the table of sections for part III of subchapter B of chapter 1 of such Code is amended by striking out "Partial exclusion of dividends and interest" and inserting in lieu thereof "Exclusion of dividends".

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to dividends received in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983.●

U.S. TROOPS IN GRENADA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FASCELL) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, we are all deeply concerned about the presence of U.S. troops in Grenada and the deaths and injuries of American servicemen. However, under the circumstances which existed in that region, which is virtually in our own backyard, I believe the U.S. action was justified.

Our friends in the Organization of East Caribbean States, whose leaders I know and respect, requested our assistance in a difficult and dangerous situation in which they saw the stability of their region seriously threatened. The events in Grenada of the past week, culminating in the assassination of most of the existing government and the resulting chaos in that country, did pose very real danger for not only our own citizens living and studying there, but for citizens of the other Caribbean nations as well. The stabilization of the situation was imperative in order to ensure the safety of these innocent civilians. I hope that order will be restored quickly so that our troops can be withdrawn and the people of Grenada will be able to make their own decisions about the future of their country and its government.

While I support the action, I must share my deep concern with our colleagues over the lack of prior consultation with the Congress pursuant to the War Powers Act. For most of yesterday, the entire world knew more about what was happening in Grenada than the Congress.

As most of our colleagues know, I am one of the strongest proponents of a bipartisan foreign policy in this body. I believe the administration would have benefited by advising and consulting with Congress beforehand. As one of the authors of the War Powers Act, I am deeply distressed that the law was not complied with so that the Congress could have also shared in the responsibility of this commitment of U.S. troops and lives.●

□ 1810

DISASTER IN LEBANON

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BENNETT). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. GONZALEZ) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, they are still counting the dead in Lebanon. Meanwhile, an invasion of Grenada has been mounted and the occupation of Honduras goes on.

Alongside that, there is a not-so-secret war against the Government of Nicaragua, not to mention the U.S. involvement in El Salvador.

The risks of these entanglements are now quite clear. It is a shame and a blot on this Nation's conscience that those risks were not adequately assessed before the disaster in Lebanon. Now the question can no longer be evaded.

Last week I repeatedly characterized our situation in Lebanon as a trap. Now the trap has sprung. Our troops have been murderously assaulted, with more than 200 dead and perhaps over 75 wounded. I mourn their loss, honor their memory. These young sailors and marines never had a chance even to resist the terrorists, the attackers who destroyed their billets in the early hours of Sunday. Their lives have been wasted. Their deaths were needless.

I cannot find the words to express the sorrow that I feel over that tragic loss. I do not have the words to express my feelings. Sunday after I had spoken here in closing out the session last week and had asked the President, "How long, Mr. President?" and had asked my colleagues, while they were all shooting off to go home and have a good, big juicy steak, and the President in the comfort and relaxation of the White House dining room, to think of those marines who were in imminent peril and under the shadow of death or serious bodily harm.

I know that sounded to some, perhaps, even shrill, but I was trying to raise a fundamental question. Ever since the debate on the so-called War Powers Resolution, which it was not at all, it was, and I continue to say, a lot of talk on a second Gulf of Tonkin resolution, except this one was sort of festooned with some promises by the President, and commitments and reservations meaning nothing. But it was not a war powers resolution.

Now we have wasted lives. There is no human expression that could describe, of course, the baseness, the villainess of the attackers who killed them, nor are there words to convey the frustration that I personally do feel. As I say, I feel great frustration that the majority of the Congress did not heed numerous warnings, did not ask hard questions about what was

possible in Lebanon, let alone what the risks were when the President was handed a blank check to continue exercising a policy that was never and has never been defined.

Meanwhile, in the sessions we had, like the caucus this morning and the others, and the President and our leaders speaking and strutting, and the world opinion reported not unlike what I had said was world opinion about our policy thus far in Latin America, where we do not have one single nation in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada, supporting that policy.

It reminded me of those words in Shakespeare:

But when we in our viciousness grow hard,
O misery on it!

The wise Gods seal our eyes!

Make us adore our errors,

Laugh at while we strut to our confusion.

I feel frustration that no one was willing to listen to, let alone attempt to answer the question of what our options would be in the event of a major attack against our forces in Beirut. Exactly a week ago I was asking that question from this very same forum.

What will you do, my colleagues. What, Mr. President, will you do if the sniping continues and the killed are 2 at a time, or some, God forbid, I said, attack that takes 10, 15, 20 or more? What will you do, Mr. President?

Of course I feel frustration to equal the sorrow that I feel now over the needless waste of better than 200 of our finest young men. Last week on many occasions I talked about how our policy in Lebanon was a trap. Today, to my dismay, there are many voices saying what mine alone said last week, that an attack would leave us with three bitter choices:

One, to become actively involved as combatants in history's most protracted, most fractured, most complex civil war.

Or to leave the marines in their static and dangerous positions.

Or, three, to get out at huge political and national embarrassment, considered by many.

Now that at last the choices are generally recognized, I hear this shocked and sad chorus that says, "Our losses have been so great that it would be a disaster to retreat. Our country would be irreparably damaged by such a course." Those same voices admit that they never thought it would come to this, never thought such a disaster possible; that if they had known that the risks were so grave they would never have agreed to keep the marines in Lebanon. In other words, they say we are irrevocably trapped, hostages to events that we can no longer control.

There is a kind of sad acquiescence to the inevitability of staying on in Lebanon, and with it a hope that there will be no further attacks. But those

sanguine expressions born of the desperate need for national solidarity and resolve in the face of disaster still fail to come to grips with the magnitude of the trap into which we have fallen.

Last week and before that, as long ago as May, I discussed how the danger confronting the U.S. forces in Lebanon would grow with each passing day. There is no longer any dispute about that. But look how many have died. Beyond that, I talked about how from a military point of view our static and passive position in Beirut was impossible and even militarily irresponsible.

Today, in the wake of catastrophe, there are many second guesses about how better military planning might have avoided the disaster. But only a few are seeing the real points, the real nature of the choice that now becomes so brutally clear, the choice that I talked about last Thursday night and in several preceding statements.

Militarily, it is still impossible to fully protect a static and passive force that is confined to the low ground in an urban area. That is as true today as it was last week. But if military logic is followed, the U.S. forces must become active combatants, must in short abandon the very role that they have been assigned, the role of peacemaker. If they become actively engaged in combat, they enter a morass that will take many more lives, could last years, and might never secure peace in that land of endless strife between religious factions, strife that has been going on for more than a thousand years, family divisions, and near universal conflict between countries, contending religious leaders and would-be leaders of the Arab world.

□ 1820

Moreover, they would enter on the side of a government that represents only a Lebanese faction that does not even control the city limits of its own capital, and that has only one aim, and that is to hang onto power in the hope of gaining some ultimate advantage against competing factions and warlords.

What is worse, U.S. entry into combat would instantly unite the disparate factions that are now attempting to overthrow the Gemayel government. And so taking the responsible course of military action destroys the whole policy upon which the Marine detachment was sent to Lebanon in the first place and places the United States in the midst of a civil war we never wanted nor in which we have any real interest.

That is the nature of the trap in Lebanon. If to withdraw is unthinkable, it is militarily witless to keep troops tied down in a passive, static role that subjects them to an ever-growing threat of attack. But it is the most unthinkable thing of all to sink

into the bottomless sea of violence that is the ultimate reality of Lebanon today and for centuries past.

So here we are, in the aftermath of catastrophe, coming to understand, too little and too late, the real dimensions of the trap in Lebanon. If there were no good choices before, there are even fewer good choices now. Our innocent young men have paid the price of congressional refusal to face the facts and ask the hard questions and risk challenging an empty and hopeless policy.

As I said this last Monday, the marines have not failed; we have. They have not lacked honor and courage; we have. They have not lacked will; we have. And I repeat that tonight. They paid that price of refusal to face the facts, make the hard decisions, ask the difficult questions, and challenge the President as the coequals that indeed we are. Our leaders are forgetting that, and these young men paid the price of congressional refusal to risk challenging an empty and hopeless policy.

The reality of Lebanon is unchanged. Only the tragedy has been compounded, the political stakes multiplied, and, for the United States, the trap sprung. So great are our losses, so high the political stakes, our national leadership has frozen into inflexibility, playing out a hand whose emptiness is apparent to all, hoping for some miracle to unravel the Gordian knot of Lebanese fractiousness and ages-old fratricide.

The reality is that the Government of Lebanon today is no different today than it was last week. It still does not control even the city limits of Beirut, any more than it did 6 months ago when the U.S. Embassy was bombed at great cost to human life. If ever there was evidence of that lack of control, we have it now.

Syria is still in Lebanon, controlling a third of the country. Through the Druze and other factional allies, Syria controls much of the center of Lebanon, outside and maybe even inside the limits of Beirut. And Syrian designs on Lebanese territory are no different now than last week, and the ability of Syria to pull the strings in Lebanon is still the same today as it was then.

Israel still holds the southern third of Lebanon. There is no evidence that Israel ever intends to leave, because their condition for departure is the departure of Syria, which has been in Lebanon for 8 years and has never given up claims over Lebanese territory, claims dating back to the days after World War I.

Yet another reality is that there is still something like 16 private armies operating in Lebanon, some for and some against the official government. Added to these are fanatical armed

bands of one kind or another whose only apparent aim is to earn heavenly immortality by killing as many innocents as possible—unarmed peacekeepers, helpless prisoners, women, children, or even former allies.

For example, the Druze leader operating at the behest of the Syrians is the successor of his father who was killed by the Syrians. This is the gangster-ridden, fratricidal, shifting sea into which we have committed our troops, for who knows how long, on a mission no one can define nor has even to define.

The tragedy of Lebanon is endless, and now we are drawn into it. The true test of our leadership will be whether or not we can extricate ourselves from Lebanon or whether it will become a new Vietnam. I say, as I said months ago, that it is time to get out.

The original possibility of accomplishing what we set out to accomplish no longer really exists, if indeed it ever did. Whatever possibility of uniting Lebanon and bringing about peace that ever existed really vanished weeks and months ago in the poisoned, frozen hatreds of the Lebanese factions and the shifting interests of the nations that are manipulating events in that tormented, demented land. All that remains for us is to decide whether to commit our troops to that endless quagmire or to get out. To my mind, the only real choice is to get out.

The test of our national leadership lies not in its ability to make brave statements in the wake of disaster but to understand what the future possibilities are and to extricate our troops from impossible military situations without delay. Our policy was a long gamble to begin with. It was unwise militarily and warned against by military advisers from the very outset. It was an extraordinarily dangerous political move, warned against by those who had seen such danger before.

But the warnings were ignored, and now it is time to ask the questions and make the hard decisions that have evaded for months on end. And now, after this bloodshed, the risks and the costs are greater than ever. It is not the Marines who failed; it is those who put them in an impossible situation, giving them an assignment no tiny military force could ever accomplish and then pretending that there was no real danger.

Mr. Speaker, Lebanon was, from the beginning, a trap. It is now a disaster.

TRAGEDY IN LEBANON

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. FUQUA) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Speaker, the flag atop this building, as well as countless flags throughout America are at half

mast today as we mourn our marines killed and wounded in Lebanon. The latest figures indicate over 200 dead, large numbers wounded, and others unaccounted for. A tragedy of this proportion affects us all. My heart goes out to the families of those marines who died serving their Nation in a far-off land.

Now, as we pick up the pieces, we must determine our national course of action. I believe our policy should contain several elements.

First, we must move our troops to higher ground. They are in a basically indefensible position at the airport and they must have secure quarters that they can defend.

Second, we must recognize that we cannot permit ourselves to be blackmailed by international terrorists. If our enemies ever believed that a senseless act like this would radically alter U.S. foreign policy, we would be held hostage to every terrorist in the entire world. No, we cannot be blackmailed.

Third, as the President indicated in his televised statement, there are no easy solutions to the difficulties in the Middle East and "we cannot withdraw our troops while their mission remains." They are part of a multinational peacekeeping force and they have accomplished some of their goals since their arrival. We are not in Lebanon as warriors but as peacekeepers. My concern is that we insure that they are given the tools necessary to perform their role. They cannot be sitting ducks.

As we mourn our national loss, we should convey our sympathy and understanding to the French Government and the families in France who also lost loved ones in a dastardly raid yesterday. Our resolve, and that of our allies, must be stronger than ever.●

FRANK ENEA LUCIDO—A PAESANO FOR ALL TIMES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. PANETTA) is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, this weekend the family of Frank Enea Lucido, who recently turned 83 years old, will hold a party in his honor, and I would like to take this opportunity to tell my colleagues about the life of this great man, whom I am proud to call my friend.

Frank Lucido has been a well-known figure in Monterey, Calif.—my hometown—for nearly four decades. Born in 1900 in Pittsburg, Calif., Frank moved to Monterey when he was 44, and his business, political, and social activities have made him a favorite of Monterey residents since that time.

Frank established himself in business well before he came to Monterey. In 1918, he became the youngest movie exhibitor in California when he

became manager of the Palace Theater in Pittsburg. In 1925, he and his uncles built the California Theater there, and in 1935, they built the Enean Theater.

In 1944, Frank came to Monterey, where he and the Enean family built the Enean Cannery. During the years after World War II, he bought the Harry Greene estate, which he had admired since he visited Monterey as a boy. In 1970, he sold the estate, where he had lived for many years.

Frank has always been very active in civic clubs and Italian Catholic organizations. In 1976, Frank became politically active, organizing the 60's Club in Monterey against high taxation in Monterey, and he has continued his interest in reducing the level of taxes.

Frank has had a lifetime interest in the arts, not only as a businessman but also as an artist himself. Six years ago, he produced an opera that he had written called "La Chiave," which is Italian for "The Key." It ran locally in Monterey and was a great success. Frank had begun the first draft of his opera back in 1956. It is based on the stories that his grandfather told him about the smuggling of tobacco from North Africa to Sicily in the 1860's.

In addition, Frank has, for many years, been the maestro of the annual Santa Rosalia Festival in Monterey, and long ago he composed a song for the festival.

Mr. Speaker, it is difficult to sum up 83 years of a man's life in a statement of this kind. A witness to the great San Francisco earthquake and fire, a friend of John Steinbeck, an acquaintance of Cecil B. DeMille, a washing machine salesman, a writer, a producer, a theater owner, an active citizen, and a friend to all those who have known him, Frank Lucido certainly deserves the many tributes he has received.

One of his most recent tributes came on his 83d birthday, September 23, when Mayor Gerald Fry of Monterey made that date Monterey Frank Enea Lucido Day. I look forward to participating in the celebration in his honor on October 30, and I know my colleagues join me in wishing Frank the best for many years to come.●

SHAME ON YOU, JAMES ROOSEVELT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BOEHLERT) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, never in the history of two programs so important to our elderly, social security and medicare, have Congress and the American people been more conscious of the pressing need for cooperative efforts to guarantee that these pro-

grams are adequately funded and there when needed.

We have met the challenge of social security in a bipartisan manner. Now we are going to have to come to grips with the reality of the medicare crisis, and I am confident we will.

Unfortunately, while so many of us, Republicans and Democrats alike, are concentrating on programs of positive action to preserve and strengthen social security and medicare, there are out there in this land opportunists whose conduct suggests they are taking personal advantage of the situation. They must be exposed.

Many of our constituents across the country are being solicited by the prominent son of a former President to send him money so that he personally will be able to guarantee that the Nation's commitment to social security and medicare is kept.

A letter from James Roosevelt to millions of Americans plays upon the worst fears of our concerned citizenry. It mentions a severe threat to the very existence of social security and medicare and urges all recipients to send him \$10 "to help block the rich and powerful forces who would destroy" those two programs.

He says his goal is to get at least 1 million participants which, at \$10 a person, would give him \$10 million to play with.

Allegedly, he would use these millions to communicate to Congress what each of us, regardless of party affiliation, already knows, that social security and medicare are vital programs whose financial integrity and future must be assured.

□ 1830

What does Mr. Roosevelt offer those who are conned into his scheme? Information that is readily accessible within the public domain, through the TV and radio and printed media. The only difference is that Mr. Roosevelt's information comes to them with a gold-embossed personal plastic membership card.

Shame on you, James Roosevelt. You tarnish the otherwise bright luster of a great name and deserve to be exposed. Shame on you.

Mr. Speaker, so that my colleagues will be fully apprised of this sham, I include in the RECORD a copy of the infamous James Roosevelt solicitation letter received by my constituents and by many other constituents across this land.

The letter is as follows:

MY FATHER STARTED SOCIAL SECURITY—NOW, WE MUST ACT TO SAVE SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE!

DEAR CONCERNED AMERICAN: Will you spend 45 seconds, right now, to save Social Security and Medicare?

If your answer is "Yes" then sign and return the enclosed official certified petition to the Congress of the United States right now!

Never in the 45 years since my father, Franklin Delano Roosevelt started the Social Security system has there been such a severe threat to Social Security and Medicare benefits.

Just consider these facts:

Ronald Reagan's recently enacted "Social Security" bailout is just a stop-gap measure. It won't permanently solve the threat to the continued payment of our Social Security and Medicare benefits. For this assurance, we need a permanent non-political solution.

The Medicare Fund faces even more severe funding problems than Social Security. Without citizen action we could lose many of Medicare's benefits.

Recently three United States Senators and the Budget Director recommended cutting Social Security, including the cost-of-living increases which benefit 35 million Americans.

In 1982 Congress cut \$17 billion from Medicare.

Just recently, the National Commission on Social Security suggested taxing Social Security as ordinary income!

Another proposal would increase the minimum age for receiving Social Security to 68.

Three government reports now say unless we act Now, Medicare benefits will have to be cut severely or the Medicare fund will go bankrupt!

Last year a proposal was made to wipe out even minimum Social Security benefits for 3,000,000 (3 million) retirees.

Still another proposal would have cut 40 percent from early retirement benefits.

The Medicare Fund has borrowed \$12,400,000,000.00 (12.4 billion dollars!) from the Social Security Fund. Medicare is in so much trouble it has been unable to even pay the interest on this loan! This debt endangers both Social Security and Medicare.

In addition, Medicare now faces continuing deficits, which further threaten both these vital programs.

We, as a nation, have a solemn commitment to the tens of millions of our people who have paid into Social Security and Medicare over their long working years. These Americans are counting upon Social Security and Medicare, and they must have it, or face a crippling financial hardship.

Deep cuts will mean a dreary existence for present and future Social Security and Medicare recipients, and will create a terrible hardship on their children and grandchildren—those who will somehow have to support retired family members.

Must it be so? Must we break our solemn commitments to the men and women who worked so hard, and paid their fair share into Social Security and Medicare?

No, it need not happen, not if you will join with me and millions of Americans to stop it—right now.

The politicians say we can't afford Social Security and Medicare. But, they say we can afford ever increasing welfare payments.

They don't say we can't afford millions upon millions of new South American and Asian and Haitian immigrants.

They don't say their rich corporate buddies have to give up their tax loopholes.

They don't say we should stop the illegal aliens who cost billions each year.

And they don't say we can't afford the politician's limousines and foreign junkets and billion dollar pet projects.

No. They say we can't afford Social Security and Medicare.

They are saying, in effect, "Let the retired widow go without a decent meal or enough heat or health care. Let her live in an

unsafe neighborhood, and wear shabby clothes. But please, not one less gallon of gasoline for my limousine!"

Well, we've got to show them! We must take action, by mounting a mass petition drive and forming a huge organization, to Save Social Security and Medicare.

It is my goal to deliver 1,000,000 petitions to the Congress of the United States this year alone. These Petitions demand the preservation of Social Security and Medicare, and keeping the solemn commitment they represent, for our people.

I served as Secretary to the President in the White House when my father held that office.

And I served for 11 years as a Member of the United States Congress.

So I know, better than anyone, how powerful is our "right to petition the government for a redress of our grievances."

So, please, right now, sign and mail me your petition. It has never been so necessary, so urgent, that you take action.

At the same time, please seriously consider joining your National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare.

The National Committee is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, comprised solely of concerned Americans such as yourself, who have invested a small amount to help block the rich and powerful forces who would destroy Social Security and Medicare.

The National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare is non-partisan and non-governmental. We have no corporate members, no special interest group support, and no source of income other than the voluntary dues of ordinary Americans who want our nation to keep its commitment to the Social Security and Medicare programs.

As a Member, your annual dues are only \$10. And for this you will receive a gold embossed personal plastic membership card, a regular newsletter which includes how your Senators and Congressmen stand on Social Security and Medicare, and other vital information on how you can help your cause.

In addition, as a Member, you will be enrolled in the Legislative Alert Service.

The Legislative Alert Service will immediately advise you, by telegram or letter, of fast breaking developments in Washington with respect to the Save Social Security and Medicare programs.

Your Legislative Alert will also tell you how you can best act to help—such as by calling your Congressman's local office or sending one of your Senators an immediate letter.

And, most importantly, you will be helping to make it possible to continue our work here in The Capitol to protect, defend and improve the Social Security and Medicare Programs.

So, please act today. Mail your Officially Certified Petition to the Congress of the United States today. Hopefully, you will also join your National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare at the same time—but in any case, please act today. I have enclosed a first-class, postage paid envelope for your use.

Urgently awaiting your reply, I am,

Most sincerely yours,

JAMES ROOSEVELT,

*U.S. Congressman (Retired), Chairman,
National Committee to Preserve Social
Security and Medicare.*

P.S.—Thousands of ordinary Americans, like yourself, have invested an average of \$10 to send petitions, such as the one en-

closed, to concerned people all across our country. Naturally, they hope you will also join them as Members of the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, but even if you cannot afford to join please do, at least, sign and return your petition.

If you fail to at least return your Petition, the investment of so many Americans will go to waste. At the same time, I will be very disappointed if you don't join, because we must continue collecting petitions and funding our work with the Congress, so join your fellow Americans, as a Member, if you possibly can.

Mr. Speaker, the letter is a disgrace.

Among other things, it is highly critical of the program which has saved the social security system by assuring its financial integrity, a program painstakingly fashioned by our President, by our Speaker, and by a bipartisan commission of dedicated and determined Americans, including that champion of the elderly, our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Florida, the Honorable CLAUDE PEPPER.

In addition to misrepresenting a good plan, the Roosevelt letter uses all the scare language it can muster.

It says we are talking in terms of letting a retired widow go without a decent meal, or enough heat, or enough health care. It talks about that and suggests that all of us who serve in the Congress are more concerned about 1 more gallon of gasoline for our fancy limousines—limousines, incidentally, which we do not have.

The letter is a disgrace and I say, shame on you, James Roosevelt.

Mr. Speaker, a copy of the petition above referred to is as follows:

PETITION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

From: Agricola Tucci, Box 672, Utica, N.Y. 13503; Officially Certified Petition Number: 966-10A-00257030-3-01.

To: Senator ALFONSE M. D'AMATO; Senator DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN; Congressman SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT.

Whereas, tens of millions of Americans rely upon Social Security payments and Medicare protection, and

Whereas, tens of millions more Americans are depending upon Social Security and Medicare during their upcoming retirement years, and

Whereas, these Americans have paid into the Social Security System for many years, and

Whereas, the recent Congressional legislation gives no permanent solution to the problem of funding Social Security and Medicare.

Be It Resolved, That I (we) demand that every commitment to Americans who qualify for Social Security and Medicare Benefits be kept, and

Be It Further Resolved, That I (we) urge the Congress of the United States to take no action which would be destructive to the Social Security and Medicare benefits which have been solemnly promised to our people.

As further evidence of our determination to protect our vital Social Security and Medicare programs, I (we) have become Members of the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare. (Mark out

this sentence if you have decided not to join.)

Sign here:

AGRICOLA TUCCI.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CLINCH RIVER BREEDER REACTOR

(Mr. PRICE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

● Mr. PRICE. Mr. Speaker, the Clinch River breeder reactor project has national significance beyond being the next logical step in our research and development program. It is important to recognize that national security is enhanced by having an inexhaustible domestic energy resource available for wide-scale deployment. Breeder reactor technology is the only inexhaustible energy approach that is scientifically proven to be capable of deployment without bankrupting the Nation. It can fill the inevitable gap in what we know are depleting energy reserves and growing energy demands, but it can do so only if we continue our 35-year effort at its development.

A strong United States will be one that minimally relies on other nations for energy to run our economy. Breeder reactors can tap the energy equivalent of the OPEC oil reserves in the Government stockpile of depleted uranium now stored at our uranium-enrichment plants. Energy security can be guaranteed simply by being able to use what we already have in storage through breeder reactor technology.

Additionally, if we wish to be secure by limiting nuclear proliferation, we must have a seat at the table in peaceful use of the atom. Other nations are developing breeder technology and if we wish to influence that development to foster the proliferation resistance of its utilization, we must continue with projects like the CRBR. Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy said it very well in his statement before the recent hearing of the Science Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production and I ask that his statement be printed below for your consideration.

I urge my colleagues to support this project when the issue comes before you.

With my remarks, I include herewith correspondence from the Department to our colleague, to the Honorable MARILYN LLOYD.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE,

Washington, September 21, 1983.

Hon. MARILYN LLOYD,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production, Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives.

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to respond to your request for my views on the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) Project as it may relate to achieving U.S.

non-proliferation and other international goals.

A number of large industrialized countries have, as a major element of their ongoing energy research and development efforts, programs designed to assess the promise of the fast breeder reactor as a potentially significant future energy source. Most recently, for example, the United Kingdom has indicated that it plans to open negotiations leading to participation in development with a European group, including France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR), the concept of the Clinch River Breeder, has been widely considered as the most promising concept for research and development. Development programs and plans all comprise base technology efforts accompanied by construction and operation of progressively larger breeder power plants. Demonstration LMFBR's of the same intermediate size class as Clinch River have been operated in the United Kingdom, France, and the USSR; construction of such plants is also planned in Japan and the FRG.

The LMFBR involves the use of substantial quantities of plutonium and also involves the use of reprocessing technology to separate and make available that plutonium. Thus, international safeguards and physical security arrangements are vital considerations in the development of any system. This in turn will require both leadership and international cooperation, if the non-proliferation goals we seek are to be achieved and protected. Active U.S. participation in such a program would enhance our ability to contribute effectively and to have the impact which our technical competence and commitment to sound non-proliferation standards justify. If, on the other hand, the United States does not play an active role in breeder technology development and demonstration, its ability to influence the formulation of safeguards and physical security systems and techniques essential to the future deployment of that technology will be diminished.

The Administration seeks to enhance the posture of the United States as a reliable supplier and cooperative partner in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time, it seeks to assure that sensitive technologies, such as reprocessing and the breeder reactor, are not employed except where advanced nuclear programs are in place and there is no proliferation risk, as is the case of the industrialized countries now pursuing breeder research and development. The simple fact is that this development is going forward, and the United States will better be able to affect the course of the development in ways that can most effectively support its nonproliferation goals and objectives, if it participates actively in it.

Active United States participation on its own account and cooperation with others will facilitate the development of the essential agreed set of norms and procedures which will lessen the potential proliferation risk associated with the use of plutonium in the fast breeder reactor program. An active U.S. system development program could provide a basic test bed for the development and application of such norms and procedures. In this way, the United States would be able to exert the fullest measure of influence and give the most effective guidance.

For these reasons, I believe that if it were decided to go forward with a fast breeder reactor development program, such as that contemplated with the Clinch River

LMFBR, important nonproliferation objectives could be well served and United States leadership in the effort to strengthen the worldwide nonproliferation regime could be furthered.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this letter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD T. KENNEDY.●

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. MITCHELL (at the request of Mr. WRIGHT), for today, on account of medical check-up.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. McKERNAN) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. CORCORAN, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. GINGRICH, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. GINGRICH, for 60 minutes, on October 27.

Mr. GINGRICH, for 60 minutes, on October 28.

Mr. BOEHLERT, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. FASCELL, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CROCKETT, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 30 minutes, today.

Mr. FUQUA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PANETTA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DYMALLY, for 60 minutes, on October 27.

Mr. DONNELLY, for 60 minutes, on November 15.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. DANIEL, and to include extraneous material, during debate on H.R. 4185 in the Committee of the Whole today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. McKERNAN) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GINGRICH.

Mr. LEACH of Iowa in three instances.

Mr. ARCHER.

Mr. GREEN.

Mr. BEREUTER.

Mr. LEWIS of Florida.

Mr. SHUMWAY.

Mr. BETHUNE.

Mr. KEMP.

Mr. LOTT.

Mr. PAUL.
Mr. GOODLING.
Mr. WEBER.
Mr. SCHULZE.
Mr. GILMAN.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. APPEGATE.

Mr. ROYBAL.

Mr. VALENTINE.

Mr. OBERSTAR.

Ms. MIKULSKI.

Mr. RODINO.

Mr. FLORIO.

Mr. LEVINE of California in two instances.

Mr. LONG of Maryland.

Mr. EDGAR.

Mr. HAMILTON.

Mr. BOLAND.

Mr. ROE in two instances.

Mr. DYMALLY in two instances.

Mr. OTTINGER.

Mr. KOLTER.

Mr. MINETA in two instances.

Mr. SOLARZ.

Mr. ACKERMAN.

Mr. RANGEL in two instances.

Mr. BERMAN.

Mr. SKELTON.

Mr. SWIFT.

Mr. TORRES in two instances.

Mr. LEHMAN of California.

Mrs. BOXER.

Mr. CONYERS in two instances.

Mr. GUARINI.

Mr. STOKES in two instances.

Mr. GARCIA.

Mrs. KENNELLY.

Mr. WYDEN.

Mr. MRAZEK.

Mr. MARKEY.

BILL PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. HAWKINS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on October 25, 1983 present to the President, for his approval, a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 3363. An act making appropriations for the Department of the Interior and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 33 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, October 27, 1983, at 10 a.m.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2048. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a report on the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Grenada (H. Doc. No. 98-125); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed.

2049. A letter from the Secretary of Education, transmitting a followup on the report submitted in March, 1983 (Ex. Com. No. 804) on the cause of the decline in the selection of minority sponsors in the section 202 program, as requested in House Report No. 97-959; to the Committee on Appropriations.

2050. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting D.C. Act 5-71, "Successor in Interest to a Gasoline Products Marketing Agreement Act of 1983," pursuant to section 602(c) of Public Law 93-198; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

2051. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting D.C. Act, 5-72, "Senior Citizen Motor Vehicle Accident Prevention Course Certification Act of 1983," pursuant to section 602(c) of Public Law 93-198; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

2052. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting D.C. Act 5-73, "Public Postsecondary Education Reorganization Clarification Act of 1983," pursuant to section 602(c) of Public Law 93-198; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

2053. A letter from the Director, Office of Personnel Management, transmitting the final personnel regulations designed to enhance the role of performance for the operations of the Federal Government to be published in the Federal Register (proposed regulations Ex. Coms. Nos. 679 and 1541), pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 4703(b)(6); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

2054. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting the annual report on the activities of the national climate program for fiscal year 1982, pursuant to section 202(b) of Public Law 97-375; to the Committee on Science and Technology.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. PERKINS: Committee on Education and Labor. Supplemental report on H.R. 2751 (Rept. No. 98-163, Pt. II). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. BENNETT: Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 3980. A bill to allow the obsolete submarine U.S.S. *Albacore* (AGSS-569) to be transferred to the Portsmouth Submarine Memorial Association before the expiration of the otherwise applicable 60-day congressional review period; with amendments (Rept. No. 98-441). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DINGELL: Committee on Energy and Commerce. H.R. 4136. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for reconciliation savings and other changes with respect to the medicare program, to amend title XIX of such act to increase the Federal medical assistance matching percentage for services provided to certain pregnant women and young children under

State medicaid plans, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. No. 98-442, Pt. I). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. BROOKS: Committee on Government Operations. Report on Federal Crop Insurance Corporation: Risk management and mismanagement (Rept. No. 98-443). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BRITT:

H.R. 4218. A bill to extend duty-free treatment to Meta-toluic acid (MTA); to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CORCORAN:

H.R. 4219. A bill to repeal the dollar limitation on the amount of dividends received by individuals which may be excluded from gross income; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DELLUMS:

H.R. 4220. A bill to change the name of the "Ernest Orlando Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory" facilities at Livermore, Calif., to the "Livermore National Laboratory"; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. FAZIO (for himself, Mr. COELHO, and Mr. LEHMAN of California):

H.R. 4221. A bill to establish in the Department of State the position of Under Secretary of State for Agricultural Affairs; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. KASTENMEIER:

H.R. 4222. A bill to make certain technical amendments with respect to the court of appeals for the Federal circuit, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MOORE:

H.R. 4223. A bill to suspend for a 3-year period the duty on 4-0-beta-D-Galactopyranosyl-D-fructose; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 4224. A bill to suspend for a 3-year period the duty on nicotine resin complex; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 4225. A bill to suspend for a 3-year period the duty on an iron dextran complex; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. PAUL:

H.R. 4226. A bill to provide for the minting of gold coins and silver coins by the United States; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. RANGEL:

H.R. 4227. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to extend the provisions of section 167(k) of such code; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SKELTON:

H.R. 4228. A bill to establish a Commission for the Advancement of Educational Computer Software for the purpose of conducting a national competition and a fair designed to encourage the development of low cost, quality computer software for use primarily in the instruction of students at the primary and secondary school levels; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. SWIFT (for himself and Mr. LENT):

H.R. 4229. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to provide a national

policy regarding cable television; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. BILIRAKIS:

H.J. Res. 400. Joint resolution designating September 14, 1984, as "National Women Veterans Recognition Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. MARLENEE:

H.J. Res. 401. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to provide for 4-year terms of office for Members of the House of Representatives; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ZABLOCKI (for himself, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. YATRON, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. BONKER, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. BARNES, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. REID, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. ZSCHAU, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. MILLER of California, and Mr. MOODY):

H.J. Res. 402. Joint resolution declaring that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, when U.S. Armed Forces were introduced into Grenada; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. LEACH of Iowa:

H. Con. Res. 198. Concurrent resolution expressing the support of the Congress for the United Nations on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the coming into force of the Charter of the United Nations; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. WILLIAMS of Montana (for himself, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. MURPHY, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. SIMON, Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. KOGOVSEK, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. PETRI, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. OWENS, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. BOUCHER, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. ECKART, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. CORRADA, and Mr. LOWRY of Washington):

H. Res. 349. Resolution to express the thanks of the House of Representatives to America's educators; jointly, to the Committees on Post Office and Civil Service and Education and Labor.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 29: Mr. SABO, Mr. D'AMOURS, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. KASICH, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. TALLON, Mr. REGULA, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. RUSSO, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. LENT, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. NATCHER, Mrs. SCHNEIDER, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. MICA, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. FAZIO, and Mr. SUNIA.

H.R. 214: Mr. PATMAN.

H.R. 470: Mr. COURTER.

H.R. 765: Mr. FISH and Mr. LAGOMARSINO.

H.R. 1136: Mr. BOSCO.

H.R. 1225: Mr. PARRIS.

H.R. 1376: Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. McNULTY, and Mr. BEDELL.

H.R. 1434: Mr. GREGG.

H.R. 1675: Mr. SHUMWAY.

H.R. 1706: Ms. SNOWE, Mr. COURTER, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. PETRI, Mr. McKERNAN, Mr.

FORD of Tennessee, Mr. D'AMOURS, Mr. SABO, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, and Mr. BURTON of Indiana.

H.R. 2352: Mr. RINALDO.

H.R. 2474: Mr. WEISS, Mr. WEAVER, and Mr. ROYBAL.

H.R. 2714: Mr. FROST, Mr. WOLPE, and Mr. McNULTY.

H.R. 2928: Mr. MATSUI.

H.R. 3016: Mr. OXLEY, Mr. GREGG, Mr. PEASE, Mr. VENTO, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. LELAND, Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii, and Mr. CRAIG.

H.R. 3175: Mr. RICHARDSON.

H.R. 3651: Mr. BROWN of Colorado, Mr. GREEN, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. FORSYTHE, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mr. WHITEHURST.

H.R. 3713: Mr. GEKAS.

H.R. 3790: Mr. SUNQUIST.

H.R. 3858: Mr. BLILEY, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. LUKEN, Mr. HILER, and Mr. ALEXANDER.

H.R. 3884: Mr. WON PAT, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. OWENS, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. WEISS, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, and Mr. ROYBAL.

H.R. 3939: Mr. BLILEY, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. BROWN of Colorado, Mr. CORCORAN, Mr. DAUB, Mr. DeWINE, Mr. DREIER of California, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. FORSYTHE, Mr. HANSEN of Utah, Mr. KRAMER, Mr. LEVITAS, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. LOEFFLER, Mr. McCANDLESS, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. RATCHFORD, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. SILJANDER, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. WYLIE, and Mr. BARNARD.

H.R. 4052: Mr. ANTHONY.

H.R. 4128: Mr. OLIN and Mr. SENSENBRENER.

H.J. Res. 20: Mr. DeWINE, Mr. EVANS of Iowa, Mr. WILLIAMS of Ohio, Mr. RINALDO, and Mr. SISISKY.

H.J. Res. 74: Mr. CONTE, Mr. SWIFT, Mr. CLAY, Mr. LIVINGSTON, and Mr. MAZZOLI.

H.J. Res. 103: Mr. HOYER, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. McHUGH, and Mr. WOLF.

H.J. Res. 215: Mr. LONG of Louisiana, Mr. MOORE, and Mr. MADIGAN.

H.J. Res. 307: Mr. SISISKY, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. CARR.

H.J. Res. 322: Mr. MATSUI, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. MINETA, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. FROST, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. HOPKINS, Mr. ACKERMAN, and Mr. DYMALLY.

H.J. Res. 385: Mr. FORSYTHE, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. MITCHELL, Mrs. SCHNEIDER, Mr. YATRON, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. HARRISON, and Mr. WILSON.

H. Con. Res. 100: Mr. SAWYER, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. RUDD, Mr. HANSEN of Idaho, Mr. KOGOVSEK, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. ECKART, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mrs. LLOYD, and Mr. SIMON.

H. Con. Res. 181: Mr. APPEGATE, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. McCANDLESS, Mr. RAHALL, and Mrs. SCHNEIDER.

H. Res. 205: Mr. MOORHEAD.

H. Res. 311: Mr. SILJANDER.

H. Res. 334: Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. PATTERSON, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. BROOMFIELD, and Mr. BEDELL.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

262. The SPEAKER presented a petition of David S. Fraser, St. Albert, Alberta, Canada, relative to the Congressional Medal

of Honor; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

AMENDMENTS

Under clause 6 of rule XXIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows:

H.R. 1904

By Mr. MARRIOTT:

—Page 7, beginning on line 4, strike out "\$25,000,000" and all that follows through "1987" and insert in lieu thereof "\$35,000,000 for fiscal year 1984, \$36,250,000 for fiscal year 1985, \$37,563,000 for fiscal year 1986, and \$38,941,000 for fiscal year 1987."

—Page 7, beginning on line 22, strike out "\$3,000,000" and all that follows through "1987", and insert in lieu thereof "\$10,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1987."

—Page 3, after line 5, insert the following new paragraph (and redesignate the subsequent paragraphs accordingly):

"(7) beginning not later than 90 days and completing not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Child Abuse Amendments of 1983, review State statutes establishing child abuse trust funds for the prevention of neglect, sexual exploitation, molestation, and other forms of abuse of children, and compile, publish, and widely disseminate information relating to the development of such trust funds as a resource in combating child abuse;"

H.R. 4139

By Mr. FRANK:

—On page 37, lines 10 through 15, strike SEC. 514.

H.R. 4170

By Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut:

—At the end of the bill, insert the following new title:

TITLE XIV—TAX RATE EQUITY ACT OF 1983

SEC. 1401. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This title may be cited as the "Tax Rate Equity Act of 1983".

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—

TITLE XIV—TAX RATE EQUITY ACT OF 1983

Sec. 1401. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 1402. Revenue gained from \$700 cap to be used to reduce Federal deficits.

Sec. 1403. \$700 cap on individual income tax reduction.

SEC. 1402. REVENUE GAINED FROM \$700 CAP TO BE USED TO REDUCE FEDERAL DEFICITS.

Whereas projected Federal deficits threaten to abort economic recovery for all Americans, and

Whereas the need to reduce these deficits is one of the paramount issues facing this Congress:

It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the revenue gained from a cap on the third year of the individual tax rate cut be applied to a reduction in Federal deficits, and

(2) the Budget Committees apply the revenue gained from such cap to reduce deficit projections.

SEC. 1403. \$700 CAP ON INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX REDUCTION.

(a) JOINT RETURNS, ETC.—Subsection (a) of section 1 (relating to married individuals filing joint returns and surviving spouses) is

amended by striking out paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(3) FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1984.—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--|---|
| Not over \$3,400..... | No tax. |
| Over \$3,400 but not over \$5,500..... | 11% of excess over \$3,400. |
| Over \$5,500 but not over \$7,600..... | \$231, plus 12% of excess over \$5,500. |
| Over \$7,600 but not over \$11,900..... | \$483, plus 14% of excess over \$7,600. |
| Over \$11,900 but not over \$16,000..... | \$1,085, plus 16% of excess over \$11,900. |
| Over \$16,000 but not over \$20,200..... | \$1,741, plus 18% of excess over \$16,000. |
| Over \$20,200 but not over \$24,600..... | \$2,497, plus 22% of excess over \$20,200. |
| Over \$24,600 but not over \$29,900..... | \$3,465, plus 25% of excess over \$24,600. |
| Over \$29,900 but not over \$35,200..... | \$4,790, plus 28% of excess over \$29,900. |
| Over \$35,200 but not over \$45,800..... | \$6,274, plus 33% of excess over \$35,200. |
| Over \$45,800 but not over \$60,000..... | \$10,196, plus 42% of excess over \$45,800. |
| Over \$60,000 but not over \$85,600..... | \$16,160, plus 46% of excess over \$60,000. |
| Over \$85,600..... | \$27,936, plus 50% of excess over \$85,600. |

"(4) FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING AFTER 1984.—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--|---|
| Not over \$3,400..... | No tax. |
| Over \$3,400 but not over \$5,500..... | 11% of the excess over \$3,400. |
| Over \$5,500 but not over \$7,600..... | \$231, plus 12% of the excess over \$5,500. |
| Over \$7,600 but not over \$11,900..... | \$483, plus 14% of the excess over \$7,600. |
| Over \$11,900 but not over \$16,000..... | \$1,085, plus 16% of the excess over \$11,900. |
| Over \$16,000 but not over \$20,200..... | \$1,741, plus 18% of the excess over \$16,000. |
| Over \$20,200 but not over \$24,600..... | \$2,497, plus 22% of the excess over \$20,200. |
| Over \$24,600 but not over \$29,900..... | \$3,465, plus 25% of the excess over \$24,600. |
| Over \$29,900 but not over \$35,200..... | \$4,790, plus 28% of the excess over \$29,900. |
| Over \$35,200 but not over \$45,800..... | \$6,274, plus 33% of the excess over \$35,200. |
| Over \$45,800 but not over \$60,000..... | \$9,772, plus 38% of the excess over \$45,800. |
| Over \$60,000 but not over \$85,600..... | \$15,168, plus 42% of the excess over \$60,000. |
| Over \$85,600 but not over \$109,400..... | \$25,920, plus 45% of the excess over \$85,600. |
| Over \$109,400 but not over \$162,400..... | \$36,630, plus 49% of the excess over \$109,400. |
| Over \$162,400..... | \$62,600, plus 50% of the excess over \$162,400." |

(b) HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD.—Subsection (b) of section (1) (relating to heads of households) is amended by striking out paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(3) FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1984.—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--|--|
| Not over \$2,300..... | No tax. |
| Over \$2,300 but not over \$4,400..... | 11% of excess over \$2,300. |
| Over \$4,400 but not over \$6,500..... | \$231, plus 12% of excess over \$4,400. |
| Over \$6,500 but not over \$8,700..... | \$483, plus 14% of excess over \$6,500. |
| Over \$8,700 but not over \$11,800..... | \$791, plus 17% of excess over \$8,700. |
| Over \$11,800 but not over \$15,000..... | \$1,318, plus 18% of excess over \$11,800. |
| Over \$15,000 but not over \$18,200..... | \$1,894, plus 20% of excess over \$15,000. |
| Over \$18,200 but not over \$23,500..... | \$2,534, plus 24% of excess over \$18,200. |
| Over \$23,500 but not over \$28,800..... | \$3,806, plus 28% of excess over \$23,500. |
| Over \$28,800 but not over \$34,100..... | \$5,290, plus 32% of excess over \$28,800. |
| Over \$34,100 but not over \$44,700..... | \$5,674, plus 36% of excess over \$34,100. |
| Over \$44,700 but not over \$55,300..... | \$7,150, plus 39% of excess over \$44,700. |

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--|---|
| Over \$44,700 but not over \$60,600..... | \$11,284, plus 46% of excess over \$44,700. |
| Over \$60,600..... | \$18,598, plus 50% of excess over \$60,600. |

"(4) FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING AFTER 1984.—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|---|---|
| Not over \$2,300..... | No tax. |
| Over \$2,300 but not over \$4,400..... | 11% of the excess over \$2,300. |
| Over \$4,400 but not over \$6,500..... | \$231, plus 12% of the excess over \$4,400. |
| Over \$6,500 but not over \$8,700..... | \$483, plus 14% of the excess over \$6,500. |
| Over \$8,700 but not over \$11,800..... | \$791, plus 17% of the excess over \$8,700. |
| Over \$11,800 but not over \$15,000..... | \$1,318, plus 18% of the excess over \$11,800. |
| Over \$15,000 but not over \$18,200..... | \$1,894, plus 20% of the excess over \$15,000. |
| Over \$18,200 but not over \$23,500..... | \$2,534, plus 24% of the excess over \$18,200. |
| Over \$23,500 but not over \$28,800..... | \$3,806, plus 28% of the excess over \$23,500. |
| Over \$28,800 but not over \$34,100..... | \$5,290, plus 32% of the excess over \$28,800. |
| Over \$34,100 but not over \$44,700..... | \$6,986, plus 35% of the excess over \$34,100. |
| Over \$44,700 but not over \$60,600..... | \$10,696, plus 42% of the excess over \$44,700. |
| Over \$60,600 but not over \$81,800..... | \$17,374, plus 45% of the excess over \$60,600. |
| Over \$81,800 but not over \$108,300..... | \$26,914, plus 48% of the excess over \$81,800. |
| Over \$108,300..... | \$39,634, plus 50% of the excess over \$108,300." |

(c) UNMARRIED INDIVIDUALS.—Subsection (c) of section 1 (relating to certain unmarried individuals) is amended by striking out paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(3) FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1984.—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--|---|
| Not over \$2,300..... | No tax. |
| Over \$2,300 but not over \$3,400..... | 11% of excess over \$2,300. |
| Over \$3,400 but not over \$4,400..... | \$121, plus 12% of excess over \$3,400. |
| Over \$4,400 but not over \$6,500..... | \$241, plus 14% of excess over \$4,400. |
| Over \$6,500 but not over \$8,500..... | \$535, plus 15% of excess over \$6,500. |
| Over \$8,500 but not over \$10,800..... | \$835, plus 16% of excess over \$8,500. |
| Over \$10,800 but not over \$12,900..... | \$1,203, plus 18% of excess over \$10,800. |
| Over \$12,900 but not over \$15,000..... | \$1,581, plus 20% of excess over \$12,900. |
| Over \$15,000 but not over \$18,200..... | \$2,001, plus 23% of excess over \$15,000. |
| Over \$18,200 but not over \$23,500..... | \$2,737, plus 26% of excess over \$18,200. |
| Over \$23,500 but not over \$28,800..... | \$4,115, plus 30% of excess over \$23,500. |
| Over \$28,800 but not over \$34,100..... | \$5,705, plus 38% of excess over \$28,800. |
| Over \$34,100 but not over \$41,500..... | \$7,719, plus 42% of excess over \$34,100. |
| Over \$41,500 but not over \$55,300..... | \$10,827, plus 47% of excess over \$41,500. |
| Over \$55,300..... | \$17,313, plus 50% of excess over \$55,300. |

"(4) FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING AFTER 1984.—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--|--|
| Not over \$2,300..... | No tax. |
| Over \$2,300 but not over \$3,400..... | 11% of the excess over \$2,300. |
| Over \$3,400 but not over \$4,400..... | \$121, plus 12% of the excess over \$3,400. |
| Over \$4,400 but not over \$6,500..... | \$241, plus 14% of the excess over \$4,400. |
| Over \$6,500 but not over \$8,500..... | \$535, plus 15% of the excess over \$6,500. |
| Over \$8,500 but not over \$10,800..... | \$835, plus 16% of the excess over \$8,500. |
| Over \$10,800 but not over \$12,900..... | \$1,203, plus 18% of the excess over \$10,800. |

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Over \$12,900 but not over \$15,000. | \$1,581, plus 20% of the excess over \$12,900. |
| Over \$15,000 but not over \$18,200. | \$2,001, plus 23% of the excess over \$15,000. |
| Over \$18,200 but not over \$23,500. | \$2,737 plus 26% of the excess over \$18,200. |
| Over \$23,500 but not over \$28,800. | \$4,115 plus 30% of the excess over \$23,500. |
| Over \$28,800 but not over \$34,100. | \$5,705, plus 34% of the excess over \$28,800. |
| Over \$34,100 but not over \$41,500. | \$7,507 plus 38% of the excess over \$34,100. |
| Over \$41,500 but not over \$55,300. | \$10,319 plus 42% of the excess over \$41,500. |
| Over \$55,300 but not over \$81,800. | \$16,115 plus 48% of the excess over \$55,300. |
| Over \$81,800..... | \$28,835 plus 50% of the excess over \$81,800." |

(d) **MARRIED INDIVIDUALS FILING SEPARATE RETURNS.**—Subsection (d) of section 1 (relating to married individuals filing separate returns) is amended by striking out paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(3) **FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1984.**—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Not over \$1,700..... | No tax. |
| Over \$1,700 but not over \$2,750. | 11% of excess over \$1,700. |
| Over \$2,750 but not over \$3,800. | \$115.50, plus 12% of excess over \$2,750. |
| Over \$3,800 but not over \$5,950. | \$241.50, plus 14% of excess over \$3,800. |
| Over \$5,950 but not over \$8,000. | \$542.50, plus 16% of excess over \$5,950. |
| Over \$8,000 but not over \$10,100. | \$870.50, plus 18% of excess over \$8,000. |
| Over \$10,100 but not over \$12,300. | \$1,248.50, plus 22% of excess over \$10,100. |
| Over \$12,300 but not over \$14,950. | \$1,732.50, plus 25% of excess over \$12,300. |
| Over \$14,950 but not over \$17,600. | \$2,395, plus 28% of excess over \$14,950. |
| Over \$17,600 but not over \$22,900. | \$3,137, plus 37% of excess over \$17,600. |
| Over \$22,900 but not over \$30,000. | \$5,098, plus 42% of excess over \$22,900. |
| Over \$30,000 but not over \$42,800. | \$8,080, plus 46% of excess over \$30,000. |
| Over \$42,800..... | \$13,968, plus 50% of excess over \$42,800. |

"(4) **FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING AFTER 1984.**—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Not over \$1,700..... | No tax. |
| Over \$1,700 but not over \$2,750. | 11% of the excess over \$1,700. |
| Over \$2,750 but not over \$3,800. | \$115, plus 12% of the excess over \$2,750. |
| Over \$3,800 but not over \$5,950. | \$241, plus 14% of the excess over \$3,800. |
| Over \$5,950 but not over \$8,000. | \$542, plus 16% of the excess over \$5,950. |
| Over \$8,000 but not over \$10,100. | \$870, plus 18% of the excess over \$8,000. |
| Over \$10,100 but not over \$12,300. | \$1,248, plus 22% of the excess over \$10,100. |
| Over \$12,300 but not over \$14,950. | \$1,732, plus 25% of the excess over \$12,300. |
| Over \$14,950 but not over \$17,600. | \$2,395, plus 28% of the excess over \$14,950. |
| Over \$17,600 but not over \$22,900. | \$3,137, plus 33% of the excess over \$17,600. |
| Over \$22,900 but not over \$30,000. | \$4,886, plus 38% of the excess over \$22,900. |
| Over \$30,000 but not over \$42,800. | \$7,584, plus 42% of the excess over \$30,000. |
| Over \$42,800 but not over \$54,700. | \$12,960, plus 45% of the excess over \$42,800. |
| Over \$54,700 but not over \$81,200. | \$18,315, plus 49% of the excess over \$54,700. |
| Over \$81,200..... | \$31,300, plus 50% of the excess over \$81,200." |

(e) **ESTATES AND TRUSTS.**—Subsection (e) of section 1 (relating to estates and trusts) is amended by striking out paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"(3) **FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING IN 1984.**—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Not over \$1,050..... | 11% of taxable income. |
| Over \$1,050 but not over \$2,100. | \$115.50, plus 12% of excess over \$1,050. |
| Over \$2,100 but not over \$4,250. | \$241.50, plus 14% of excess over \$2,100. |
| Over \$4,250 but not over \$6,300. | \$542.50, plus 16% of excess over \$4,250. |
| Over \$6,300 but not over \$8,400. | \$870.50, plus 18% of excess over \$6,300. |
| Over \$8,400 but not over \$10,600. | \$1,248.50, plus 22% of excess over \$8,400. |
| Over \$10,600 but not over \$13,250. | \$1,732.50, plus 25% of excess over \$10,600. |
| Over \$13,250 but not over \$15,900. | \$2,395, plus 28% of excess over \$13,250. |
| Over \$15,900 but not over \$21,200. | \$3,137, plus 37% of excess over \$15,900. |
| Over \$21,200 but not over \$28,300. | \$5,098, plus 42% of excess over \$21,200. |
| Over \$28,300 but not over \$41,100. | \$8,080, plus 46% of excess over \$28,300. |
| Over \$41,100..... | \$13,968, plus 50% of excess over \$41,100. |

"(4) **FOR TAXABLE YEARS BEGINNING AFTER 1984.**—

| "If taxable income is: | The tax is: |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Not over \$1,050..... | 11% of taxable income. |
| Over \$1,050 but not over \$2,100. | \$115, plus 12% of the excess over \$1,050. |
| Over \$2,100 but not over \$4,250. | \$241, plus 14% of the excess over \$2,100. |
| Over \$4,250 but not over \$6,300. | \$542, plus 16% of the excess over \$4,250. |
| Over \$6,300 but not over \$8,400. | \$870, plus 18% of the excess over \$6,300. |
| Over \$8,400 but not over \$10,600. | \$1,248, plus 22% of the excess over \$8,400. |
| Over \$10,600 but not over \$13,250. | \$1,732, plus 25% of the excess over \$10,600. |
| Over \$13,250 but not over \$15,900. | \$2,395, plus 28% of the excess over \$13,250. |
| Over \$15,900 but not over \$21,200. | \$3,137, plus 33% of the excess over \$15,900. |
| Over \$21,200 but not over \$28,300. | \$4,886, plus 38% of the excess over \$21,200. |
| Over \$28,300 but not over \$41,100. | \$7,584, plus 42% of the excess over \$28,300. |
| Over \$41,100 but not over \$53,000. | \$12,960, plus 45% of the excess over \$41,100. |
| Over \$53,000 but not over \$79,500. | \$18,315, plus 49% of the excess over \$53,000. |
| Over \$79,500..... | \$31,300, plus 50% of the excess over \$79,500." |

(f) **REMOVAL OF \$700 CAP ONLY IF DEFICIT LESS THAN 2 PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.**—Section 1 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:

"(g) **REMOVAL OF \$700 CAP ONLY IF DEFICIT LESS THAN 2 PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.**—

"(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The rate schedules set forth in paragraph (4) of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) shall not apply (and the rate schedules set forth in paragraph (3) of such subsections shall continue to apply) to taxable years beginning in any calendar year before the first calendar year for which the requirement of paragraph (2) is met.

"(2) **REQUIREMENT.**—The requirement of this paragraph is met for any calendar year (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as the 'determination year') if (and only if) the Secretary of the Treasury determines, and publishes such determination in the Federal Register, before November 15 of the preceding calendar year, that the estimated deficit in the Federal budget for the fiscal year ending in the determination year will be less than 2 percent of the projected gross national product as of the close of such fiscal year. The estimate under the preceding sentence shall assume that the rate schedules set forth in paragraph (4) of subsections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) will apply to taxable years beginning in the determination year."

(g) **TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.**—

(1) **SECTION 21 NOT TO APPLY.**—

(A) Subsection (d) of section 21 (relating to effect of changes) is amended by inserting "section 1403 of the Tax Rate Equity Act of 1983," after "Tax Act of 1981".

(B) The subsection heading for subsection (d) of section 21 is amended by inserting "OR TAX RATE EQUITY ACT OF 1983" after "TAX ACT OF 1981".

(2) **WITHHOLDING.**—Paragraph (3) of section 3402(a) (relating to income tax collected at source) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Notwithstanding subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall take into account the amendments made by section 1403 of the Tax Rate Equity Act of 1983."

(h) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1983.

H.R. 4185

By Mr. MARKEY:

—Page 79, after line 14, insert the following new section:

Sec. 797. None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be used to support or maintain members of the Armed Forces in Grenada after (1) the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, or (2) the end of the 3-day period beginning on the date on which all United States citizens desiring to be evacuated from Grenada (other than members of the Armed Forces) have been evacuated, whichever is earlier. This section shall not apply to the use of the Armed Forces of the United States to respond to a clear and present danger of an attack on the United States or to a use of the Armed Forces specifically authorized by law after the date of the enactment of this Act.

By Mr. MONTGOMERY:

—Page 18, line 8, strike out "\$3,116,748,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$3,198,448,000".

By Mr. RAHALL:

—Page 49, line 2, strike out "specialty metals or".

By Mr. STRATTON:

—On page 80, after line 2, insert the following:

TITLE IX

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN LEBANON

Sec. 901. None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended for the continued deployment of land-based United States Armed Forces participating in the Multinational Force in Lebanon after March 1, 1984, unless the Congress of the United States adopts a concurrent resolution which contains the following findings:

(a) That the President of the United States has defined a clear and realistic mission for U.S. Forces stationed in Lebanon.

(b) That the President has established a set of policy goals in Lebanon that are achievable and has a clear agenda for achieving those goals.

(c) That security arrangements for American forces in the area have been upgraded to the maximum extent possible.

—On page 80, after line 2, insert the following:

TITLE IX

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN LEBANON

Sec. 901. None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended after March 1, 1984 for the continued deployment of land-based United States Armed Forces participating in the Multinational Force in Lebanon.